—Faraz Firouzi Mandomi, Ph.D. Candidate in Law, University of Hamburg
On June 4, 2025, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, declared: “The United States and Israel can’t do a damn thing.” As I argued at the time, this statement was not mere defiance, but a constitutional directive. In Iran’s theocratic-legal structure, the Supreme Leader’s words—when delivered in the form of ḥukm-e ḥokūmatī—function as binding commands across all state institutions. Khamenei’s declaration legally framed confrontation as both permissible and necessary, narrowing the space for de-escalation. In this sense, the war was not unexpected—it was pre-scripted. On 13 June 2025, Iran and Israel entered a 12-day direct military confrontation, marking a historic rupture in regional conflict dynamics.
Although international legal analysis has primarily focused on the legality of Israel’s use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, insufficient attention has been directed towards the domestic constitutional changes instigated by this conflict within Iran. Subsequently, the Islamic Republic has invoked national security rhetoric to broaden espionage legislation, rationalize widespread detentions, and curtail interactions with foreign organizations. This post contends that the war did not simply incite a political crackdown; it elicited a pre-existing constitutional rationale wherein repression is not anomalous but legally institutionalized. In post-war Iran, the repression of rights is not a legal anomaly but a deliberate manifestation within the framework of authoritarian constitutionalism.
A Sui Generis Constitutional Framework Built for Ambiguity
The 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran establishes a theocratic-republican order that combines Islamic sovereignty with formal commitments to individual rights. While the Constitution enumerates civil and political rights—such as freedom of belief, expression, association, and due process in Articles 23 to 36—these guarantees are systematically subordinated to undefined “Islamic criteria” and the institutional supremacy of clerical oversight. Central to this architecture is the concept of maslaha (public interest), a principle rooted in classical Islamic legal theory but reinterpreted within the Shiʿi jurisprudential framework of the Islamic Republic as maslahat-e nezām—the overriding interest of safeguarding the Islamic state.
In the last forty years, the regime has employed maslahat-e nezām as a malleable and unchallengeable legal criterion to rationalize limitations on constitutional rights. This enables state institutions to redefine dissent, independent journalism, and engagement with foreign entities as threats to national security. In the aftermath of the conflict with Israel, this rationale intensified: what was previously articulated in veiled legal terminology has now transformed into overt policy. The constitutional framework does not limit state power; rather, it facilitates its discretionary and frequently oppressive application under the guise of legal legitimacy.
Securitizing Failure: From Military Defeat to Domestic Crackdown
During the 12-day conflict, Israel achieved unprecedented air superiority over Iranian territory. Using fifth-generation F-35 aircraft, drone operations, and Mossad assets operating inside Iran, Israeli forces reportedly disabled key components of Iran’s air defence infrastructure. In a matter of days, numerous high-ranking military officials in Iran were assassinated, including the commander of the Revolutionary Guards Aerospace Force, the head of military intelligence, and a former national security chief. The magnitude of this operational breach represented a strategic and symbolic failure.
Instead of establishing institutional accountability or conducting a transparent review, Iranian authorities shifted the crisis inward—toward society. In a constitutional framework governed by hefze-e nezām, the preservation of the regime functions as a legal imperative that supersedes individual rights. The subsequent actions constituted not only political retribution but also the legal implementation of repression to reaffirm sovereign authority. The state’s inability to protect its airspace served as a justification for eroding the constitutional right to dissent.
Codifying Suppression: The Espionage Bill and the Criminalization of Contact
In the aftermath of the war, over 700 individuals—including activists, journalists, artists, ethnic minorities, and ordinary citizens—were apprehended nationwide. At least six executions were conducted on charges of espionage, with trials lacking legal representation, due process, and transparency. Kurdish communities experienced extensive surveillance and unjust detention. These violations were not merely tolerated; they were portrayed as a legal imperative. The necessity to safeguard nezām now functioned as both the impetus and rationale for circumventing fundamental assurances of the rule of law.
Simultaneously, the Iranian Parliament presented a draft espionage bill in June 2025 that significantly broadens the legal definition of cooperation with adversarial entities. The bill, positioned as a countermeasure to “hybrid warfare,” criminalizes a wide array of activities: engagement with foreign media or NGOs, academic collaboration, online information dissemination, and any actions perceived as undermining public morale. Numerous stipulations classify such conduct as mofsad fi’l-arz (corruption on earth), a capital crime under Article 286 of Iran’s Penal Code. Other articles mandate lengthy taʿzīrī prison sentences and lifelong disqualification from public service.
Although not yet enacted, the law’s vocabulary has already shaped the state’s legal rhetoric and policing practices. This underscores a defining feature of the Islamic Republic’s constitutionalism: law does not merely follow repression—it prefigures and legitimizes it.
Conclusion: The Legal Face of Authoritarian Survival
The 12-day war between Iran and Israel exposed not only the limits of Iran’s military capacity, but also the elasticity of its constitutional order. The Islamic Republic’s response to military failure was not reform, but repression—legally framed through the doctrine of hefze-e nezām. In this reasoning, the preservation of the regime supersedes all rights, rendering law an instrument of survival. The enforcement of the espionage law demonstrates that repression in Iran is not a failure of legality but a calculated recalibration. As the Islamic Republic faces external threats, it continues to wage an internal war against public dissent—one fought not in defiance of the constitution, but through it.
Suggested citation: Faraz Firouzi Mandomi, When War Comes Home: The Constitutional Cost of Iran’s Security Crackdown, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Jul. 23, 2025, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/when-war-comes-home-the-constitutional-court-of-irans-security-crackdown/
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