–Stefanus Hendrianto, Creighton University School of Law
Introduction
In the first six months of 2025, the Asian continent has witnessed a wave of impeachments in several nations. On April 4, 2025, President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea was removed from Office by the Constitutional Court, following his impeachment on in December 2024.[1] In the Philippines, on February 5, 2025, the Philippines House of Representatives approved the impeachment complaint against Sara Duterte. Nevertheless, on July 25, 2025, the Supreme Court of the Philippines declared the impeachment articles against Vice President Sara Duterte unconstitutional.[2] Impeachment proceedings are also currently underway in Thailand. On July 1, 2025, the Constitutional Court suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra from her duties as Prime Minister pending its investigation and ruling.[3] Finally, there was a potential impeachment that went unnoticed in Indonesia, in which a group of retired military generals petitioned the House of Representatives to initiate an impeachment process against the sitting Vice President, Gibran Rakabuming Raka.
The impeachment processes in South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand demonstrate that the system is effective, or at the very least, there is progress in the pending impeachment proceedings, pending the outcome. The Indonesian experience, however, is an anomaly because, although an impeachment petition has been filed, it is uncertain whether the proceeding will even advance in the House. This essay will provide an overview and explain why the Indonesian case might have ended in total failure.
The Odd Case of the Indonesian Impeachment Mechanism
If we compare the impeachment proceedings in South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, all three countries employ a two-stage process involving both legislative and judicial bodies. The legislative body initiates the process, and the judicial body ultimately adjudicates the case. Key distinctions include the rule of the Constitutional Court in both South Korea[4] and Thailand,[5] which has the final say on the impeachment. While in the Philippines, the Senate functions as an impeachment tribunal and final authority to convict officials and remove them from office.[6]
In contrast to the three jurisdictions mentioned earlier, the impeachment mechanism in Indonesia is quite different. The process involves multiple stages. Initially, the House of Representatives (DPR) initiates the impeachment proceedings. Following this, the House submits a request to the Constitutional Court to begin the trial.[7] Suppose the Constitutional Court decides that the President and/or Vice-President is proven to have violated the law. In that case, the House will submit the proposal to remove the President to the Assembly (MPR).[8] The Assembly will then conduct the second impeachment trial, in which it will allow the President or Vice President to present his/her explanation to the Assembly.[9] Finally, the Assembly will decide on the removal of the President. In summary, the three-stage impeachment mechanism in Indonesia makes it extremely difficult to remove the President or Vice President from Office.
Recent Impeachment Saga in Indonesia
To understand the anomaly of impeachment in Indonesia, we can analyze the recent failed attempt to impeach the sitting Vice President, Gibran Rakabuming Raka. On June 2, 2025, a group of retired military generals submitted a formal petition to the DPR, urging the impeachment of Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka, citing constitutional violations, ethical breaches, and questions over his qualifications.[10]
The House (DPR) opted not to take up a petition to impeach Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka during the House plenary session on June 24, 2025.[11] The Indonesian House Speaker, Puan Maharani, stated that she has not read the letter as it is still in the General Secretariat of the House.[12] The ruling coalition decided to let the issue die down, as they are entirely behind Gibran. The ruling coalition, under the so-called Advance Indonesia Coalition Plus (Koalisi Indonesia Maju Plus – KIM Plus), has controlled 78% of the seats in the House. The PDIP is the only significant party that, as of summer 2025, that is not part of the governing coalition; nevertheless, as usual, it does not play an oppositional role, and there has been speculation that it may also join the governing coalition.[13] Under these circumstances, it is very unlikely that Gibran will be impeached and removed from Office.
But, apart from the political calculations, several other reasons make impeaching a vice president a challenging process in Indonesia. First, unlike the Philippine Constitution that explicitly specifies that any citizen may file an impeachment complaint upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member of the House,[14] the Indonesian Constitution does not specify the rights of citizens to file an impeachment complaint to the House. Thus, the House may simply dismiss the petition from the retired generals as it has no constitutional basis.
Secondly, it will be an uphill battle to fulfill the grounds of impeachment itself. Let’s review the grounds for impeachment that retired generals are alleging. First, they have cited allegations of money laundering involving Gibran in his private business. These allegations date back to 2019, when a venture capital firm affiliated with the Sinar Mas Group—one of the largest conglomerates in Indonesia—invested approximately one hundred billion rupiahs into the start-ups owned by Gibran and his brother, Kaesang.[15] Ten days after the investment, the former managing director of Sinar Mas was appointed as the Indonesian ambassador to South Korea. There are allegations of corruption, collusion, and nepotism involving not only Gibran but also his father, President Joko Widodo, who was still in Office when the incident took place. The Constitution prescribes that corruption and bribery are grounds for impeachment.[16] So, Gibran can be impeached on the grounds of corruption and bribery if the allegation was proven. Nevertheless, more than five years have passed since the incident occurred, and the Anti-Corruption Commission has yet to investigate the alleged corruption. Moreover, the police forces have been playing an increasingly significant role as a political instrument to support the regime, and they are less likely to help with the investigation.[17] Therefore, it will be challenging for the Constitutional Court to substantiate this allegation.
Secondly, the retired generals cited ethical violations, pointing to Gibran’s alleged link to a pseudonymous online account that posted derogatory content.[18] The Constitution mentions the violation of moral turpitude (perbuatan tercela) as the ground of impeachment, but the definition of moral turpitude itself is pretty vague.[19] Unlike the Constitution of Thailand that addresses explicitly the Prime Ministers’ moral integrity and ethical standards,[20] the Indonesian Constitution does not explicitly address the ethical standards and moral behavior of the President and Vice President. Therefore, the Constitutional Court must first determine the scope and meaning of moral turpitude. Moreover, it is not easy to verify that the anonymous account is indeed none other than Gibran. Finally, some argued that Gibran has denied that the account belongs to him, and so he has made a false statement. But this false statement cannot be classified as perjury because it was not made under oath. Gibran only made the statement in a casual media interview when the media asked him about the allegations, and he said: “Go ask the account owner. Why do you ask me?”[21]
Finally, the retired generals argue that Gibran is no longer qualified to be Vice President because his nomination was based on a controversial Constitutional Court decision that lowered the minimum age requirement for the Vice President.[22] As I previously argued in this blog,[23] the Court decision was controversial – it involved collusion and an ethical violation by then-Chief Justice Anwar Usman, who is Gibran’s uncle. Moreover, all five majority judges agreed that a former governor (as opposed to another type of regional head, such as a bupati or mayor) was exempt from the age limit. But Gibran was only a mayor of Solo at the time of his nomination. Thus, Gibran’s Vice Presidential nomination was based on a false assumption. While there was blatant manipulation in Gibran’s nomination, it is not easy to impeach him on this ground either, because the Court itself has never corrected its decision and admitted that the decision is wrong. When the Court was asked to rule on the legality of Gibran’s candidacy, it chose to disregard this issue and declined to address the subject matter.[24] This suggests a lack of epistemic humility on the part of the Court.
In sum, impeaching Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka is an arduous process due to the high procedural barriers and the dominance of the political elite. Thus, the path to impeachment is improbable in the near future. The discourse surrounding a potential impeachment of Gibran may reveal a need for constitutional reform in Indonesia, as the current constitutional system, particularly regarding impeachment and accountability of the President and Vice President, is not functioning effectively.
Suggested citation: Stefanus Hendrianto, The Failure of Impeachment in Indonesia: A Comparative View, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Aug. 8, 2025, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/the-failure-of-impeachment-in-indonesia-a-comparative-view/
[1] Yoomin Won, South Korean Constitutional Court Upholds Impeachment of President Yoon for Abusing Emergency Power, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Apr. 10, 2025, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/south-korean-constitutional-court-upholds-impeachment-of-president-yoon-for-abusing-emergency-power/.
[2] See Sara Z. Duterte v. House of Representatives, https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-sara-z-duterte-in-her-capacity-as-the-vice-president-of-the-philippines-vs-house-of-representatives-represented-by-ferdinand-martin-g-romualdez-et-al-atty-israelito-p-torreon-e/.
[3] Sui-Lee Wee, “Thai Court Suspends Prime Minister as Political Crisis Spirals,” The New York Times, July 1, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/01/world/asia/thai-pm-shinawatra-suspended.html#:~:text=Paetongtarn%20Shinawatra%20is%20accused%20of,stoking%20fears%20of%20a%20coup.
[4] The 1987 Republic of Korea Constitution, Article 111, Section 3.
[5] The 2017 Thailand Constitution, section 144.
[6] The 1986 Philippines Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 (6).
[7] The 1945 Indonesian Constitution, Article 7B (1).
[8] The 1945 Indonesian Constitution, Article 7B (5).
[9] The 1945 Indonesian Constitution, Article 7B (7).
[10] Yerica Lai, “Pressure mounts on Gibran as impeachment process continues,” The Jakarta Post, June 5, 2025, https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2025/06/05/pressure-mounts-on-gibran-as-impeachment-process-continues.html.
[11] Yerica Lai, “House shelves Gibran impeachment petition,” The Jakarta Post, June 25, 2025, https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2025/06/25/house-shelves-gibran-impeachment-petition.html.
[12] Dian Rahma Fika, “House Speaker Responds to Impeachment Against VP Gibran by Retired TNI Soldiers,” Tempo.Co, July 3rd, 2025, https://en.tempo.co/read/2024125/house-speaker-responds-to-impeachment-against-vp-gibran-by-retired-tni-soldiers.
[13] Ahmadi Sultan, “Prabowo Beri Sinyal Ajak PDIP Gabung Pemerintahan, Ini Respons Puan,” (Prabowo gives a signal to invite PDIP joining the Governing Coalition) Batam Pos, July 25, 2025, https://news.batampos.co.id/prabowo-beri-sinyal-ajak-pdip-gabung-pemerintahan-ini-respons-puan/.
[14] The 1987 Philippines Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 (2).
[15] “Activists report Jokowi’s son to KPK over alleged gratuity,” Indonesia Business Post, September 11, 2024, https://indonesiabusinesspost.com/2698/Politics/activists-report-jokowis-son-to-kpk-over-alleged-gratuity.
[16] The 1945 Indonesian Constitution, Article 7A.
[17] Made Supriatma, “The Indonesian police’s dual function under Jokowi,” EastAsia Forum, October 6, 2020, https://eastasiaforum.org/2020/10/06/the-indonesian-polices-dual-function-under-jokowi/; Maidina Rahmawati and Erasmus Napitupulu, “Indonesia’s new Police Bill: more power, less oversight,” Indonesia at Melbourne, May 28, 2025, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/indonesias-new-police-bill-more-power-less-oversight/ .
[18] Ary Hermawan, “For Prabowo, Gibran’s online past is less of a problem than his offline future,” Indonesia at Melbourne, October 2, 2024, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/for-prabowo-gibrans-online-past-is-less-of-a-problem-than-his-offline-future/ .
[19] The 1945 Indonesian Constitution, Article 7A.
[20] The 2017 Thailand Constitution, Section 160(4) and Section 160(5).
[21] Laila Afifa, “VP-Elect Gibran Rakabuming Reacts to Fufufafa Account Polemic,” TempoCo, September 10, 2024, https://en.tempo.co/read/1914551/vp-elect-gibran-rakabuming-reacts-to-fufufafa-account-polemic.
[22] The Presidential Candidate Minimum Age IV case – Constitutional Court Decision 90/PUU-XXI/2023
[23] Stefanus Hendrianto, The Indonesian Constitutional Court and the Subversion of Democracy: The Court Removes Minimum Age Requirements for the President’s Son, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Nov. 9, 2023, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/the-indonesian-constitutional-court-and-the-subversion-of-democracy-the-court-removes-minimum-age-requirements-for-the-presidents-son/.
[24] The Presidential Election Dispute – Constitutional Court Decision 1/PHPU.PRES-XXII/2024.
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