—Karla Žeravčić, Ph.D. Researcher, European University Institute, Department of Law
–Kaja Stelmaszewska, LL.M. student, University of Wrocław
In January 2025, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) delivered a decision that struck down elements of the Republika Srpska school curriculum for violating the state Constitution. The ninth-grade history curriculum was found to have glorified war criminals, presented a false narrative of the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, and delegitimised both the state and its judicial institutions. This landmark ruling marked the first time the Constitutional Court has directly addressed the issue of politicised and biased currihttps://www.eui.eu/people?id=karla-zeravciccula in schools – a persistent issue in BiH’s post-war education system. Nonetheless, while ostensibly about education, this decision reveals much deeper fractures: the fragility of BiH’s constitutional structure, persistent challenges to judicial authority, and the enduring legacy of ethno-nationalism in public life.
The School Curriculum ruling is emblematic of BiH’s broader political and constitutional dysfunction. It highlights how entrenched ethno-political divisions and constitutional design flaws continue to undermine democratic norms, the rule of law, and the possibility of societal reconciliation – with the education system being one of many areas affected by competing conflicting visions of identity and governance.[1]
From War to Dayton: A Fragile Constitutional Settlement
The Bosnian War was one of the most brutal conflicts in post-war Europe, marked by ethnic cleansing, genocide, and mass displacement.[2] The General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH, more commonly known as the Dayton Agreement (1995) brought an end to the war but created a deeply fragmented state structure. BiH today comprises two entities – the Federation of BiH (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS) – along with the self-governing Brčko District. The state also has a tripartite presidency and a complex system of overlapping layers of governance.
Entities function with broad autonomy, particularly RS, which has repeatedly acted as if it were a quasi-sovereign state. This institutional fragmentation has paralysed central governance and entrenched ethno-political vetoes, making reform extremely difficult.
BiH’s constitutional framework was intended to maintain peace through power-sharing between the three ‘constituent peoples’ (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs), but it also entrenches internal ethnic segregation, rigid territorial and ethnic division, and overt discrimination against the ‘Others’ – a category that refers to all citizens who do not identify as one of the three ‘constituent peoples’.
Fragmented Curricula and Divided Classrooms
One of the areas where this fragmentation is most evident is education. There is no state-level ministry of education in BiH. Instead, responsibility is dispersed among thirteen administrative bodies. While RS has a centralised education ministry, the FBiH is subdivided into ten cantons, each with its own education ministry. Additionally, the Brčko District maintains an independent Department of Education. In such a fragmented structure, curricula are developed separately across jurisdictions, leaving space for politicisation and competing ethno-national narratives.
In the FBiH, the practice of “two schools under one roof” persists, in which children are segregated based on their ethnicity.[3] Children attend classes in the same building, but follow different curricula, have different teachers, and often arrive at different hours or use separate entrances. In RS, language discrimination against pupils persists, and the curriculum remains heavily shaped by Serb nationalist narratives.[4]
A Curriculum on Trail
The removed history curriculum mandated the teaching of several contentious topics, including “The Inception of the Republika Srpska”, “The Army of the Republika Srpska and the Homeland Defence War (1992–1995)”, and “Ordeals of and crimes against Serb people”. In terms of the learning objectives, pupils were also expected to identify sites of Serb suffering and major Serb cultural losses during the 20th century. The accompanying textbook, approved by the RS Ministry, consistently presented the war as a defensive struggle by the Bosnian Serbs. It praised figures such as Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić – both convicted of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia – as key architects of RS, omitting any mention of their criminal convictions.
The textbook also portrayed RS as closely tied to its “motherland”, Serbia, and depicted the international community, especially the United States and European Union, as largely supporting the “Bosniak side”. Alarmingly, it described state institutions, including the Constitutional Court, as acting against RS interests, claiming that Bosniak and international judges regularly outvoted Serb and Croat judges.[5] Students were asked to answer questions such as: “Which two institutions served to undermine the competences of Republika Srpska?”, referring to the Constitutional Court and the Office of the High Representative (OHR).
In its decision, the Constitutional Court found that the curriculum in question failed to meet constitutional and international standards on education, pluralism, and non-discrimination. The content presented a singular and ethnically exclusive perspective, marginalising other experiences and promoting a version of history incompatible with democratic values and human rights norms.
The Court emphasised that teaching history reflects diverse viewpoints and should actively promote cultural diversity, tolerance, and mutual understanding. Excluding perspectives supported by international courts violated both the state Constitution and the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education, which mandates inclusive and non-discriminatory educational content. The judges also stressed that education must respect the rule of law, which includes acknowledging final and binding decisions of national and international courts. The omission of genocide and war crimes verdicts in the RS textbook was found to trivialise these crimes and hinder reconciliation – a core constitutional objective.
The Court also criticised the portrayal of its own authority. Depicting the Constitutional Court and OHR as hostile to RS interests was found to undermine students’ trust in state institutions and the post-war constitutional order established by the Dayton Agreement. In highlighting the use of terms such as “common institutions” to refer to the BiH institutions, the Court noted a clear pattern of disrespect for the country’s legal and constitutional framework.
Implementation Paralysed: Political Hostility and Legal Deadlock
Despite the binding ruling, its implementation remains uncertain. RS authorities have a long history of rejecting the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court. The entity has refused to appoint judges to the Constitutional Court since the last judge from RS retired under political pressure in 2022. Political figures from RS and Serbia have referred to the Constitutional Court of BiH as krnji (incomplete), highlighting the absence of judges from RS. The conflict escalated when, in 2023, the RS legislative body adopted a law prohibiting the implementation of Constitutional Court decisions on the territory of RS. These acts constitute a direct attack on the rule of law and the integrity of the state judiciary.
The RS government, led by RS President Milorad Dodik, continues to portray the Court as biased and foreign-imposed. As a result, compliance with the School Curriculum ruling is unlikely.
Dodik, a populist, has long modelled his politics on leaders like Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán, and has courted ties with both. Following Trump’s return to the presidency in November 2024, Dodik was seen wearing a “Make America Great Again” cap, hoping for sanctions relief. Those hopes quickly faded, but he continued lobbying, reportedly hiring an Israeli lawyer to help.
Democratic Backsliding or Constitutional Dysfunction?
The political situation in BiH might be framed in terms of democratic backsliding, a concept frequently applied to Central and Eastern European states. However, for democratic backsliding to happen, we must first start with a functioning democracy. Therefore, is something fundamentally different at play?
This year marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Agreement, which also serves as the foundation of the country’s constitutional order. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement, entered into force without any public vote or parliamentary procedure.
The structural discrimination entrenched in the Constitution has been challenged before the European Court of Human Rights. Most notably in Sejdić and Finci, in which the Court found a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections), as the Constitution barred the applicants from running for the Presidency and the House of Peoples due to their ethnic origins.
A similar outcome followed in the Zornić case, though it remains lesser-known. At the domestic level, in Zuhrić et al., the Constitutional Court ruled that the 2022 amendments to the Federation Constitution and the Election Law, imposed by High Representative Christian Schmidt, discriminated against ‘Others’ by preventing them from nominating candidates for the (vice)president of the Federation. While the above-mentioned cases were brought by those outside the three constituent groups, the ECtHR cases of Pilav and Pudarić prove that the system discriminates even within the constituent peoples. Both applicants were barred from running for the Presidency due to their residency in the ‘wrong’ entity – their ethnic group did not elect its member of the Presidency from that entity.
None of the ECtHR judgments have ever been implemented. It is also worth noting that all of these cases concern access to the highest political offices. But even a look at the Constitutional Court’s composition reveals the same ethnic fragmentation. Although there are no written rules dictating the Court’s ethnic composition, in practice, the two judges from RS have always been Bosnian Serbs, while the four judges from FBiH have always included two Bosniaks and two Bosnian Croats.
Conclusion
The Guardian described the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as at “the most dangerous moment since 1995”, citing Dodik’s relationship with Orbán and his secessionist ambitions. But to many citizens, this ‘most dangerous moment’ feels less like a sudden crisis and more like an unbroken time loop.
In a system where the constitutional design itself contains embedded mechanisms of degradation, it does not take much to push the state further into decline. A lack of civil liberties, deep-rooted corruption, non-implementation of judicial decisions, and the systematic undermining of state sovereignty have all contributed to this crisis – indeed, this erosion of sovereignty is a stated goal of ethno-nationalist parties, which seek to dismantle the state structure with the aim of eventual secession.
The January 2025 Constitutional Court decision is more than a legal verdict on a school curriculum – it is a mirror held up to the constitutional and political reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It exposes a system in which democratic institutions exist on paper but are routinely subverted by entrenched ethno-nationalist power structures.
Consequently, the rules imposed by Dayton are deeply entrenched and resistant to reform. The 2006 “April Package”, which attempted constitutional reforms, failed due to a lack of political will from ethno-nationalist parties that benefit from the status quo. Thus, the question remains: is there a democratic future for Bosnia and Herzegovina, or is the best we can hope for a managed standstill – supervised by an ever-present international community?
The authors would like to thank Professor Śledzińska-Simon for all her support and guidance.
Suggested citation: Karla Žeravčić & Kaja Stelmaszewska, Rethinking Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Past and Future: History Education Before the Constitutional Court, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Jul. 22, 2025, at http://www.iconnectblog.com/rethinking-bosnia-and-herzegonivas-past-and-future-history-education-before-the-constitutional-court/
[1] Tamara Trošt and Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc ‘Identity Politics in History Textbooks in the Region of the Former Yugoslavia’ in Adam Bence Balazs and Christina Griessler (eds) The Visegrad Four and the Western Balkans: Framing Regional Identities (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2020) 197-230.
[2] Steven L Burg and Paul S Shoup, Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93 (Taylor and Francis 2015).
[3] ECRI Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina (sixth monitoring cycle)’ Council of Europe [2024] 19.
[4] ‘ECRI Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina (sixth monitoring cycle)’ Council of Europe [2024] 20; Judgment AP 1198/19 of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 23 June 2021.
[5] The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is officially composed of nine judges, including four elected by the FBiH, two elected by the RS, and three foreigners appointed by the European Court of Human Right.
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