–John Simte, lawyer and legal researcher based in New Delhi
On 08 April 2025, the Indian Supreme Court delivered its judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, clarifying the constitutional limits of the Governor’s role under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution. The case arose from a prolonged standoff between the Tamil Nadu Government and the Governor concerning multiple Bills passed by the State Legislative Assembly. One such Bill, the Tamil Nadu Universities Laws (Amendment) Bill, was passed on 11 May 2022 but received no response from the Governor for over seventeen months. On 18 October 2023, the Governor returned the Bill with a message under the first proviso to Article 200. After the Assembly re-passed the Bill in the same form, the Governor reserved it for consideration by the President under Article 201. This would inter alia then give the President authority on whether to assent or withhold assent to the Bill.
The Supreme Court examined the legality of this sequence and addressed broader concerns about the permissible scope and timeline of gubernatorial and presidential actions in the legislative process. It held that under the scheme of Articles 200 and 201, the Governor cannot reserve a Bill for the President after returning it for reconsideration and the Assembly re-passes it in the same form. Article 200 allows the Governor to either assent to the Bill, withhold assent and return it with a message, or reserve it for the President – but only at the initial stage. Once the legislature has reconsidered and reaffirmed the Bill, the Governor is expected to grant assent. Allowing reservation at that stage would nullify the purpose of legislative reconsideration under the first proviso to Article 200.
While the Constitution does not provide fixed timeframes for gubernatorial or presidential action, the Court held that both offices are expected to act within a constitutionally reasonable period. Indefinite delay by the Governor in dealing with Bills is inconsistent with the principles of parliamentary democracy and impedes the functioning of the state legislature.
To operationalize this obligation of timeliness, the Court prescribed timelines. Where the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, a decision to assent, withhold assent, or reserve a Bill should ordinarily be made within one month. If the Governor exercises discretion contrary to such advice, that decision must be made within three months. In cases where a Bill has been re-passed after being returned, the Governor must give assent within one month. At that stage, the power to reserve the Bill for the President cannot be exercised.
Regarding the President’s role under Article 201, the Court held that a decision on whether to assent to or withhold assent from a reserved Bill should generally be taken within three months. If this period is exceeded, reasons must be recorded and conveyed to the concerned state government. These timelines reflect longstanding administrative practices and federal concerns identified by India’s Sarkaria (1988) and Punchhi (2010) Commissions, particularly regarding delays, procedural ambiguity, and Centre-State coordination.
The Court clarified that these timelines are not constitutional amendments or rigid statutory requirements. Instead, they are judicial standards that give practical effect to the constitutional principle of reasonableness in public decision-making. Their objective is to prevent legislative processes from being stalled by prolonged inaction. The Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to issue directions necessary to ensure justice and uphold constitutional governance.
The Court relied on the Constituent Assembly Debates, including the deletion of the phrase “in his discretion” from the draft of Article 200, to show that the Governor was not intended to exercise independent discretion over state legislation, except in defined circumstances. The Governor’s role was designed to align with the principles of a responsible executive accountable to the legislature.
In addition to resolving the specific issues arising in the Tamil Nadu case, the judgment offers broader doctrinal clarifications. Most notably, the Court affirmed that a Governor’s power to withhold assent is not absolute. It is not open-ended and must be exercised in conformity with constitutional obligations. The Governor cannot withhold assent indefinitely without communicating a decision. The power to withhold assent must be exercised in a time-bound and reasoned manner.
The Court also clarified that once the Governor returns a Bill for reconsideration and the Assembly re-passes it – whether in the same form or with amendments – the Governor cannot then choose to reserve it for the President. To allow such a course would render the legislative power of reconsideration nugatory and contradict the structured sequencing of Article 200. The Governor’s options are limited to granting assent after reconsideration.
Crucially, the judgment underscored that even in cases where the Constitution uses the phrase “in his discretion,” such discretion is constitutionally confined and cannot be construed as unreviewable. Drawing from Nabam Rebia and Shamsher Singh, the Court reiterated that discretionary powers of Governors are subject to judicial scrutiny and must align with the principles of constitutionalism and responsible government.
The Court also addressed a long-standing ambiguity regarding gubernatorial silence. It held that silence by the Governor on a Bill duly presented for assent is not a constitutionally recognised mode of action. Article 200 does not contemplate inaction. A failure to act amounts to a failure of constitutional duty and can invite judicial correction. This is particularly significant in view of recent trends where Governors have declined to respond to state legislatures for extended durations, effectively imposing a “pocket veto.”
Further, the Court ruled that the Governor is not required to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers when deciding to reserve a Bill for the President under Article 200, but that this discretion is nonetheless subject to constitutional parameters. It must be exercised in rare and well-defined circumstances, not as a default response to political disagreement.
The judgment reaffirmed that the Governor’s involvement in the legislative process must operate within constitutional limits and cannot be used to override legislative outcomes. The same principles apply to the President’s role under Article 201, which must respect the authority and autonomy of state legislatures. The Court’s interpretation reinforces the federal structure of the Constitution, which recognizes state governments as constitutionally empowered entities.
Though the case arose from developments in Tamil Nadu, the Court’s ruling has wider relevance. Delays by Governors in granting assent to Bills have been observed in several states, particularly in politically sensitive areas. For instance, the State of Kerala sought to withdraw its petition before the Supreme Court on May 6, 2025, citing the April 8 judgment as having settled the law. The judgment provides a framework to assess such conduct, highlighting that prolonged inaction by constitutional authorities can disrupt legislative functioning. It also reaffirms the Supreme Court’s role in intervening to protect democratic governance. By asserting that Articles 200 and 201 do not grant unreviewable discretion, the Court ensures constitutional functionaries are subject to constitutional norms and judicial scrutiny.
In conclusion, the decision clarifies the constitutional processes for state legislation and reaffirms the foundational principle of representative democracy. By holding that legislative outcomes must not be obstructed by inaction or procedural delays, the Court preserves the functioning of elected state legislatures, reinforces federalism, and ensures that constitutional authorities remain accountable to the democratic will.
Following the judgment, on May 13, 2025, the President of India invoked Article 143 of the Constitution to seek the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion on questions relating to the powers of Governors. However, key issues such as whether a Governor can indefinitely withhold assent, or reserve a Bill after returning it and its re-passage, have already been conclusively addressed in the Tamil Nadu ruling. The judgment leaves little ambiguity on these points. Indeed, the clarity of the Tamil Nadu opinion raises doubts about the necessity of the Article 143 reference, which may risk diluting a currently clear constitutional position grounded in accountability and federalism.
Suggested citation: John Simte, Clarifying Gubernatorial Powers in the Legislative Process: The Indian Supreme Court’s Judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, May 22, 2025, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/clarifying-gubernatorial-powers-in-the-legislative-process-the-indian-supreme-courts-judgment-in-state-of-tamil-nadu-v-governor-of-tamil-nadu/
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