Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law

Tag: Turkish Constitutional Court

  • Populism and the Turkish Constitutional Court: the Game Broker, the Populist and the Popular

    —Bertil Emrah Oder, Koç University Law School (Istanbul) [Editor’s Note: This post is part of the joint I-CONnect/Verfassungsblog mini-symposium on populism and constitutional courts. An introduction to the symposium can be found here.] Introduction Populist strategies have for some time been an integral part of Turkish political life employed dominantly by the right wing political parties.[1]

  • The Hamartia of the Constitutional Court of Turkey: Part I

    — Dr. Ali Acar, Ph.D. in Law, European University Institute Introduction The dismissals of so many academics by an emergency decree in early February has sparked, once again, a public debate concerning the controversial judgments of the Constitutional Court of Turkey delivered on October 12, 2016, which dealt with the emergency decrees adopted after the disastrous coup attempt of July 15, 2016.

  • On the Silence of Turkish Constitutionalists in the Face of the Amendment

    —Kemal Gözler, Professor of Constitutional Law, Retired from Uludag University Faculty of Law, Turkey. [Editor’s Note: This piece was originally published in Turkish on the website of the author,, on February 20, 2017. It was translated into English by a friend of the author, who would like to remain anonymous.]

  • The Misguided Judicialization of the Right to Education in Turkey

    —Serkan Yolcu, Visiting Scholar, Boston College Law School On July 13, 2015 the Turkish Constitutional Court annulled — on a 12 to 5 vote — some provisions of a law amending the “Law on Private Teaching Institutions.” The law would have excluded “private tutoring centers” from the scope of “private teaching institutions” and thus closed these centers down.[1]

  • The Electoral Threshold Case in Turkey

    –Ali Acar, PhD Student, European University Institute According to recent statements made to a journalist by the President Hasim Kilic of the Turkish Constitutional Court,[1] the Court will soon deliver a decision on the 10% electoral threshold that exists for political parties to be represented in Parliament in a case brought before the Court by three political parties through the constitutional complaint, also known as the “individual application” mechanism.

  • On the Tight Rope: The Turkish Constitutional Court and the Balbay Case

    —Basak Cali, Koç University Law School It is well-known political science knowledge that domestic high courts strive for simultaneous sources of legitimacy. On the one hand, courts seek political legitimacy from governing political elites. On the other they seek legal legitimacy from lower rank domestic courts, other high courts, lawyers and domestic the judicial community in general.