Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law

Category: amendment

  • Burma’s Constitution: Straitjacket or red-herring?

    [re-posted from New Mandala] While Burma watchers continue to debate the extent of and motives behind Naypyitaw’s current reform process (see here for my take), there seems to be much wider agreement that the 2008 Constitution is a deeply flawed document.

  • Notes from Behind the Bench

    Willy Forbath and John Ferejohn (visiting from NYU) are running a unique colloquium at Texas this spring.  They’ve invited six of the leading justices from constitutional courts around the world to visit and share insights from their time on the bench.  

  • Iraq’s Constitutional Review Committee Delivers its Final Report to Parliament

    The Iraq Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) submitted its final report to the Iraq Parliament on July 27 with little notice or fanfare – over two and half years after it began its constitutionally mandated comprehensive review, the report comes in at 68 pages (in English) and represents dozens of proposed amendments to the 2005 Constitution.

  • The Iraq Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) just submitted its final report to Parliament – over two and half years after it began its constitutionally mandated comprehensive review, the report comes in at 65 pages (in English) and represents dozens of amendments to the 2005 Constitution.

  • The Puzzle of Unamendable Provisions: Debate-Impairing Rules vs. Substantive Entrenchment

    Many constitutions purport to make some provisions immune from ordinary amendment processes. The Constitution of Turkey, for example, states that the character of the country as a secular democracy and republic cannot be changed, and forbids any proposal to amend these provisions.

  • Albert on Amendments

    An article posted on SSRN, written by Richard Albert from Boston College Law School, might be of interest to our readers. Here is the summary: The constitutional text in a constitutional democracy does not necessarily constrain constitutional change. Quite the contrary, constitutional change in a constitutional democracy often occurs in ways that depart from the rigid procedures governing constitutional amendment enshrined in the text of the constitution.