—Rafid Azad Saumik, Intern, ILS & Labour Law, International Labour Organisation and law graduate from the University of Dhaka; and Abdul Awal, Lecturer, Green University and law graduate from the University of Dhaka


In the recent Bangladesh case of Mohammad Saddam Hossen v Bangladesh, one advocate took an unconventional approach in arguing against the constitutionality of Article 116 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, as amended by the 4th and 15th Amendments. Instead of solely relying on the basic structure doctrine, which has already largely been incorporated within the constitutional jurisprudence of Bangladesh, he put forward an additional line of argumentation based on the doctrine of supra-constitutionalism. Although the Court did not directly engage with this argument (or the doctrine, for that matter), this event reminds us of the growing interest in this concept in academia, possibly even foreshadowing a situation where the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (SCOB) cannot but engage with this doctrine in a future case.
As such, we believe a close examination of this concept is imperative. We argue in this blog that within Bangladesh’s constitutionalism, there is a possibility, albeit unexplored and limited, of incorporating the doctrine of supra-constitutionalism indirectly. We think this will mitigate some of the concerns existing presently with the basic structure doctrine. However, we caution that a wholesale adoption of the doctrine may neither be possible nor desirable.
‘Basic Structure’ doctrine vs ‘Supra-Constitutionalism’ doctrine
To put it simply, the basic structure doctrine deals with the question “whether an amendment would make the Constitution cease to be recognizably itself”. The doctrine was developed by the Dacca High Court in the case of Fazlul Quader Chowdhury (1963) and by the Indian Supreme Court in the famous Kesavananda Bharati (1973) case, and it was soon adopted by the SCOB in the Eighth Amendment case. Essentially, the doctrine distinguishes between ‘amendment’ power and ‘constituent’ power. It argues that although a constituent assembly can bring about wholesale change to the Constitution or even write a new one exercising its constituent power, the amendment power of the Parliament is limited, as the latter is a creation of the Constitution itself. In other words, since the amendment power is a derivative power, it cannot destroy the basic structure of the Constitution, which was created through the constituent power.
Supra-constitutionalism doctrine, on the other hand, is the idea that certain rules or principles are situated above the domestic constitutional legal order, such as natural or international law. For instance, Serge Arne says that according to this doctrine, some rules or principles are placed above the content of the constitution itself, whether they are explicit or implicit. In other words, supra-constitutionalism asks: are some norms superior to the constitution itself? Indeed, Constitutions sometimes explicitly permit placing natural law or international law above the constitutional legal framework, e.g., Swiss Constitution in Articles 193(4) and 194(2). However, this explicit reference too serves only a declaratory function, not a constituent one.
In summary, there are three main differences between the two approaches. In terms of what is unamendable, the basic structure doctrine posits that amendments cannot alter the identity or the basic structure of a constitution. In contrast, the concept of supra-constitutionalism dictates that what remains unalterable is a ‘higher law’, whether it is principles of natural law, international law, or regional law. Secondly, in terms of the foundation of the ‘unamendability’, the former has its roots within the constitutional legal order itself, whereas the latter relies on a legal order beyond and above the domestic constitutional order. And finally, the basic structure doctrine is limited in that it only limits the amendment power of the Parliament, whereas supra-constitutionalism, theoretically speaking, restricts even the constituent power.
The Experience with the Basic Structure Approach in Bangladesh
The primary problem with the basic structure doctrine is the indefiniteness of its content. While judges decide what is part of the basic structure, different judges consider different principles to be part of it. There are also variations across jurisdictions. As such, what the basic structures of a constitution are often depends upon the judges in a particular case, their political ideology, the school of thought they subscribe to, experience, and what they focus on as well as what they overlook. As a result, it may make the entire process of unamendability too dependent on the particular predilections of the judges in a particular case. Take, for instance, the case(s) of the Caretaker Government (CTG) in Bangladesh. For foreign readers, the CTG is a non-partisan, interim government that must organize national elections in Bangladesh, which was introduced into the Constitution through the 13th Amendment. When this Amendment was challenged, initially the High Court Division (HCD) held that the CTG did not violate any basic structure of the Bangladesh Constitution. On appeal, however, the Appellate Division (AD) held in 2012 that the CTG violated the basic structure since it was incompatible with the principle of democracy. Subsequently, Parliament adopted the 15th Amendment to the Constitution to remove the CTG-related provisions. After the 2024 uprising in Bangladesh, the judges of the AD, including the Chief Justice himself, resigned. Completely overturning the AD’s appellate stage judgment, in the review judgment of the 13th Amendment case, the AD unanimously found that the CTG did not violate the basic structure of the Constitution. To make the matter even more interesting, in the 15th Amendment judgment by the HCD, the Court said that removing the CTG should be treated as amounting to a breach of the basic structure of the Constitution (more particularly, the commitment to democracy). This example clearly shows how the basic structure has been interpreted radically differently by different judges.
Can the ‘Supra-constitutionalism’ Approach Save the Day?
The answer is both yes and no. Yes, because the contents of ‘supra-constitutionalism’ are more precisely defined than under the basic structure doctrine. It is true that relying on natural law is not an option, as it suffers from the same lack of systematic nature, precision, procedural accessibility, and effectiveness to function as a norm of reference for judicial review.
However, having recourse to certain principles and norms of international law can be a feasible solution. For instance, norms of jus cogens, human rights, democracy, and rule of law have near-universal endorsement. Needless to say, the acceptance of supra-constitutional principles and norms is dependent on widespread and near-universal consensus. As such, a single judge or a bench of judges in a case cannot arbitrarily modify the list, or at least, it is more difficult to do so. Hence, if the concept can be incorporated within Bangladesh’s constitutionalism at least to a limited extent, we believe it will enable greater consistency in the case law of the SCOB.
But how accommodating is Bangladesh’s Constitutionalism?
It should be clarified that Bangladesh’s Constitution does not contain any explicit provision allowing supra-constitutional norms to be placed above the Constitutional legal framework, unlike those of Switzerland and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, Article 7 of Bangladesh’s Constitution unequivocally establishes constitutional supremacy. Moreover, the judiciary of Bangladesh has generally taken a dualist approach in terms of applying international law. Hence, a wholesale adoption of the supra-constitutionalism approach is not possible. However, we argue that an indirect adoption of this concept is still possible and necessary.
The first reason is that Bangladesh’s constitutional framework permits an indirect adoption of this concept. In fact, its constitutional design, history, and the Constituent Assembly debate clearly demonstrate respect for international law, particularly international human rights law. The text of the Constitution, the Preamble and Article 25 mention ‘fundamental human rights and freedom’, ‘international peace and cooperation’, and ‘international law’. Additionally, democracy, rule of law, human rights (both civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights), separation of powers, and independence of the judiciary have been firmly incorporated within the constitutional design. This was not at all an isolated event. The Proclamation of Independence, which is considered Bangladesh’s interim constitution during the liberation war and is part of the Constitution as a schedule, explicitly included a promise to give effect to all duties and obligations under international law. A reading of the Constituent Assembly’s debate also shows how international law, especially the UDHR, influenced the constitution drafting process (9th Sitting: 25 October 1972). All of these together show how, irrespective of whether we choose to read the Constitution in a textual, contextual, originalist, or teleological light, the limited adoption of supra-constitutional principles is justifiable.
Additionally, the judiciary of Bangladesh, although known for its dualist traits, has shown what Prof. Ekramul Haque labelled as ‘creeping monism’. In BNWLA v Bangladesh (2009), the SCOB held that in areas where there is a lacuna in the domestic law, international law will apply. In the same light, in HM Ershad v Bangladesh (2000), it was held that international obligations cannot be simply ignored just because Bangladesh is a dualist country. Again, in the Mohammad Saddam Hossen judgment, to determine the constitutionality of Article 116, the court looked to the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and the Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles to see how judicial independence is interpreted globally and to support its findings. Hence, the application of international law is very common in relevant cases, including basic structure doctrine cases.
The second reason why Bangladesh’s apex court can consider incorporating this concept, albeit indirectly, is that there is growing global consensus on the preeminent importance of supra-constitutional principles. For instance, according to some, international human rights have gained a sort of global constitutional status. Jorge Tapia Valdés, for instance, suggests that the globalization of rights and jus cogens norms set new limits on amendment powers. In fact, international courts and tribunals have often held certain constitutional provisions of countries violative of such principles and, as such, void. For example, the European Court of Human Rights criticized Article 70(5) of the Hungarian Constitution for indiscriminately depriving the right to vote from persons placed under total or partial guardianship. Another example is Security Council (SC) Resolution 554 of 1984, regarding the new Constitution of South Africa of 1983 that established an apartheid regime. In that resolution, the SC declared that it “strongly rejects and declares as null and void the so-called ‘new constitution’”, as the text was held to contradict fundamental principles laid down in the UN Charter, mainly racial equality. Hence, international practice also demonstrates the supreme importance of such principles.
The Way Forward
The actors in Bangladesh’s constitutional arena now face a dilemma. With the growing popularity and acceptance of certain principles and norms as supra-constitutional, judges must decide where to place this concept within their constitutional case law. On the one hand, the inconsistent and unpredictable exercise of power via the basic structure doctrine by the Bangladesh judiciary necessitates sufficient guardrails. On the other hand, a complete replacement of the basic structure doctrine with the supra-constitutional doctrine seems neither permissible nor desirable. The solution, we argue, lies in an indirect adoption of the concept of supra-constitutionalism. The supra-constitutional principles should be used by the judiciary ‘consciously’ and ‘systematically’ to identify, interpret, and find grounds for principles it deems to be part of the basic structure. It is true that the SCOB often does this already. However, we posit that this is neither a conscious effort on the part of the Supreme Court nor a systematic practice; rather, it is sporadic. Unfortunately, the Court never clarifies its reasons or in what capacity such instruments are used. We propose that the supra-constitutional concept can help in at least three aspects. First, it can help the SCOB identify the principles it needs to protect. Second, it can help build a stronger rationale for holding certain principles and norms as unamendable. And finally, it can also be helpful in interpreting these principles.
Conclusion
Constitutionalism is an evolutionary arena. Every country constantly develops it, learns from its experiences, and contemplates what possible solutions are on hand. The innovative argument made in the Saddam Hossain case provides a good opportunity to ponder the problems with the basic structure doctrine and whether the concept of supra-constitutionalism can help mitigate it. Even if we eventually reject this theory, is it not worth considering it?
Suggested citation: Rafid Azad Saumik and Abdul Awal, What the Doctrine of Supra-Constitutionalism Can Teach Bangladesh, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 24, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/what-the-doctrine-of-supra-constitutionalism-can-teach-bangladesh/