—Noam Kozlov, John M. Olin Fellow and LLM Candidate, Harvard Law School
Public trust in institutions is vital for effective law enforcement. This is especially true when the government equips the police with extensive power in a fight against organized crime and terrorism. A new legislative act in Israel empowers law enforcement authorities to impose significant restrictions on the rights and freedoms of suspected members of criminal organizations. The law has generated substantial public outcry, with some fearing it could be used to persecute political protesters and undermine due process. The amendment and the reactions it generated underscore the importance of public trust in institutions for the state’s ability to successfully implement anti-crime reforms. In Israel, institutional trust has been diminished by the government’s judicial overhaul, which has introduced numerous constitutional and legislative amendments aimed at weakening the judicial branch and concentrating power in the executive. Most of the amendments were either officially backtracked or are yet to be approved by the Knesset, partially due to the outbreak of the War, which brought some of the most contentious bills to a halt. Nevertheless, any appearance of the government attempting to concentrate power and create new authorities, even for positive goals, is now met with suspicion and distrust. In that sense, the Israeli government’s judicial overhaul has created an unexpected victim – the war on crime.
The Law for the Protection of the Public from Organized Crime
The Law for the Protection of the Public from Organized Crime (“PPOC”), recently passed by the Knesset, allows the state to impose significant restrictions on a person suspected of participating in racketeering activity, provided that the state has proven with “administrative evidence” that there is a “real possibility” the individual is a member of a criminal organization, and he or she is involved in the pursuit of criminal activity. If the state can prove these elements, a district court may impose a wide range of restrictions on the individual in question, such as prohibiting them from leaving the country, limiting their phone and internet access, and even placing them under house arrest. Lawmakers justified the PPOC by pointing to rising crime rates, with record-breaking homicide rates in recent years. It was argued that traditional policing practices have proven insufficient to address the problem, and that the PPOC is a necessary step towards ensuring public safety and combating organized crime.
The PPOC thus joins a broader body of legislation both in Israel and abroad aimed at equipping the state with special powers to combat organized crime. For some time now, it has been argued that traditional law enforcement does not suffice in fighting criminal organizations; the latter’s clandestine structure and need-to-know operation basis often undercut law enforcement’s ability to uncover and prosecute organized crime. These challenges have led many countries and jurisdictions to equip law enforcement authorities with special powers when investigating organized crime, such as anti-racketeering statutes, privacy-invasive technologies, and, like the PPOC, the authority to circumvent the traditional criminal process when imposing sanctions on criminal organizations (civil and administrative forfeiture come to mind).
Considering the destructive effects of organized crime, these policies are often seen as justified and even necessary. However, they inherently pose a risk to personal rights, such as privacy, liberty, and due process. This dynamic between the pressing interest in fighting organized crime and safeguarding personal liberties demonstrates the immediate link between law enforcement and democracy, specifically highlighting the importance of public trust that institutions will not abuse their power to unduly harm personal liberties. In Israel, this trust has been eroding.
The Judicial Overhaul and Mistrust of Law Enforcement
Few in Israel would dispute that the police have been increasingly struggling to control organized crime. In fact, this is one of the few issues on which there is almost a consensus in Israel’s fractured politics – from the depths of the religious right to the Arab leaders, all agree that organized crime, homicide rates, and public safety erosion are grave and escalating problems in Israel. Consequently, one could have expected that the PPOC would have also enjoyed widespread support across political divisions. This, however, is not the case.
In January 2023, weeks after the formation of the current Israeli government, Minister of Justice Yariv Levin introduced an extensive reform of the judiciary and interbranch relations, which came to be known as the Judicial Overhaul. The reform includes changes to the committee for the selection of judges, restrictions on the Supreme Court’s power to review government decisions, an override clause that would allow the Knesset to overrule Supreme Court decisions that deem a legislative act unconstitutional, and more. The reform led to widespread protests, some of the largest in Israel’s history. Public pushback forced the government to backtrack on some of the most contentious reforms, and the October 7 War seems to have sealed off most of the reform bills.
Nevertheless, public opposition to the government persisted throughout the War, with protesters pleading for the release of the hostages up until their recent release. In response, the police have implemented escalating methods to attempt to quash the public unrest. Opponents of the government have accused the police of using unnecessary force against protesters and attempting to unreasonably press criminal charges against them. A few months ago, protesters who fired a flare during a protest near the Prime Minister’s residence were charged with committing arson as an act of terrorism.
Against the backdrop of these escalating dynamics between the police and liberal factions in Israel, some have argued that the PPOC might be abused by the police to further pursue political opponents of the government. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel has petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that the PPOC is unconstitutional. The petition argues that the law effectively creates a “bypass” of the criminal procedure, allowing the government to impose quasi-criminal sanctions without providing the procedural and evidentiary protections of the criminal process, such as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. These changes, it is argued, violate the rights to human dignity, liberty, and due process, all recognized as constitutional rights in Israeli law. The petition also stipulates that the PPOC violates the Arab community’s right to equality, since legislators explicitly stated that the law is intended to target the Arab community specifically. The petition, still pending before the Supreme Court, reflects concerns about potential abuse of the PPOC, especially considering broader distrust in the government.
The PPOC’s sweeping provisions have underscored these concerns; as mentioned, it is enough for the state to show that there is a reasonable basis to believe that a “real possibility” exists that an individual will engage in criminal activity. This reasonable basis burden of proof is lower than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standardused in the criminal process. Furthermore, a special provision in the PPOC allows the court to deviate from the general rules of evidence, permitting reliance on illegally obtained evidence.
Another reason to suspect the actual objectives behind the PPOC can be found in statements made by Israeli government officials, including the Prime Minister, referring to protest groups as criminal organizations and fascists, which may hint at an intention to apply the PPOC to senior members of those political groups. Once again, distrust in the government, partially created by the judicial overhaul and subsequent unrest, characterizes anti-crime reforms in light of this broader debate; the government’s attempts to crack down on pro-judiciary protests raise suspicions about the actual motives behind the push to expand government authority in the fight against crime.
A similar effect seems to take place with respect to another government-sponsored bill that is set to allow the government to declare criminal organizations “terrorist groups”. The bill has exacerbated fears over the abuse of newly acquired powers by the government, as the law would allow the government to use Israel’s clandestine secret service, the Shin Bet, along with its extensive surveillance and monitoring authorities designed to fight terrorism, against citizens suspected of being related to criminal organizations. Commentators argue the bill might label Arab communities as terrorists, painting “Arab society itself as a security threat.” Some of these arguments underline the broader public distrust in the government – opposition leaders and protesters fear that anti-crime reforms might be used against them, while some in the Arab community think these reforms would be used to crack down on Arab civil society.
Furthermore, even if the PPOC is not directly applied to political opponents, its mere existence might create a chilling effect for protesters, who will know that the government might impose significant sanctions on them even without sufficient evidence to justify a traditional criminal charge. This chilling effect is exacerbated by other recent actions by police, such as the aforementioned criminal charges levied against protesters and allegations that government officials pressure police to use violence at protests. Once again, suspicions over the government’s intentions, in part stemming from the judicial overhaul, influence the discussion over anti-crime reform.
Overall, the PPOC highlights the link between trust in institutions, specifically the government and law enforcement, and the ability of these institutions to pursue crime control policies. The judicial overhaul pushed by the Israeli government, as well as questionable police tactics in response to public protests, all have diminished the government’s legitimacy when pursuing crime control efforts. In this sense, although the judicial overhaul is nominally unrelated to crime control and law enforcement, its ramifications have diminished the government’s legitimacy in pursuing these reforms, even if they are necessary for combating organized crime. Consequently, despite the law’s approval in the Knesset, it seems that every use of it will be closely watched and scrutinized, which may mean that the policy could prove ineffective in achieving substantial anti-crime reform.
Conclusion
We often discuss the effects of democratic backsliding in the context of its impact on constitutional institutions. However, democratic overhauls frequently have broader effects. Indeed, democratic backsliding affects virtually every aspect of life. This is true especially in the context of law enforcement and the fight against crime. Public trust is vital for successful law enforcement, especially when the government expands the authority of its law enforcement agencies in a crackdown on crime. In an environment of significant public mistrust, such reforms will be viewed with suspicion and seldom receive public backing. Without it, meaningful change in the fight against crime will often remain out of reach.
Suggested citation: Noam Kozlov, The War on Crime, and Freedom: Fighting Organized Crime and Political Dissent in Israel, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Nov. 6, 2025, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/the-war-on-crime-and-freedom-fighting-organizes-crime-and-political-dissent-in-israel/