—Yoomin Won, Associate Professor, Seoul National University
The political crisis that swept South Korea since the martial law declaration on the night of 3rd December 2024 has now stabilized. The former President Yoon, who declared martial law, was impeached by the Constitutional Court decision and a new president has been elected. Criminal trials against those involved in martial law have begun for the charges of insurrection and others. Some viewed this series of events as a constitutional crisis in South Korea, others as safeguards that worked successfully in an unexpected case of a self-coup. The most critical moment would be when the National Assembly passed a resolution to lift the martial law six hours after declaration. But that’s not the whole story. There were other officers who resisted following unlawful orders, the hidden heroes of that night.
When martial law was declared, former President Yoon and the martial law commander ordered the dispatch of military troops to the National Assembly located in Yeoido, an island in the Han River which crosses Seoul from east to west. Colonel Cho Sung-hyun was ordered to bring out the lawmakers from the National Assembly. Sensing that such an order was wrong, he instead instructed his troops not to cross Seogang Bridge and wait for further instructions outside of Yeoido.
Martial law force helicopters arrived very late at the National Assembly, only at 23:40, over an hour after martial law was declared at 22:27. The helicopters needed approval from Colonel Kim Moon-sang to pass the airspace of Seoul. He refused the first request at 22:46, and three times in total. He refused to approve because they did not answer clearly about the purpose of passage. His refusals delayed the helicopters by 40 minutes, which bought time for enough lawmakers to arrive at the National Assembly and request the lifting of martial law at 01:02 the next morning.
Legal officers inside the military stood by their professional conscience. When Defense Counterintelligence Commander Yeo In-hyung ordered troops to search and seize the servers of the National Election Commission, Colonel Yoon Bi-na, the Legal Director, objected to the search and seizure along with all six other members of the Legal Office of the Command. She stated that such a search and seizure would be in violation of the Constitution and Martial Law Act. She stated that criminal allegations must be clearly specified to conduct a search and seizure; otherwise, the evidence obtained would be deemed illegally collected.
Another legal officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ryu Ga-young, played an important role in not deploying the Army 1st Corps. As the Legal Director of the Army 1st Corps, she pointed out the illegality of the order. She reported that since the martial law declaration was unconstitutional, the order to compose a joint police-military situation room was illegal. Thus, the Army 1st Corps did not send their troops, while other Army Corps did.
There were people who objected within the secret service and police. Former President Yoon ordered the Chief of Korean Police Cho Ji-ho to arrest lawmakers at the National Assembly for violation of the martial law decree. He was also handed a list of high-profile politicians, journalists, and judges and was ordered to locate them. Although he did carry out an order to send police to the National Assembly, he did not cooperate with the order to arrest lawmakers and locate those people on the list. Hong Jang-won, the Deputy Chief of the National Intelligence Service, was ordered to help the martial law force arrest those people by a direct phone call from Yoon. He did not carry out this order because it simply did not make sense.
Lastly, there was an order to suppress citizens who gathered towards the National Assembly that night. Lieutenant Colonel Kim Hyung-ki was ordered to drag out lawmakers and disperse citizens. He responded passively to the order. He later testified at the impeachment trial that obedience to a superior’s orders only applies when their mission is to defend the nation and its people. All soldiers sent to the National Assembly were there trying to avoid violence. While heavily loaded, they did not shoot a single gunshot towards citizens. That night windows and furniture were broken, but not a single person was hurt.
I wish there were more such people. One person’s job might be a tiny little piece in the huge system of a state, but that little part can make a difference in making things work. Just doing their job as usual might prevent something awful. Following their professional ethics and code of conduct prevented a huge downfall of democracy that night.
Yet history shows us how difficult such resistance is. Often the worst atrocities take place by political decisions of the ones at the very top of the command chain whose orders have been carried out. For the officials lower down in the chain of command, it is difficult, and not even desirable, to question orders they get. But in exceptional circumstances when the order clearly does not make sense, there is room for their participation to make a difference. By caring enough, by questioning when there is a doubt, by exercising professional conscience, one might contribute to preventing or even stopping atrocities. Just doing one’s job with care can make all the difference.
Suggested citation: Yoomin Won, The Professional Duty to Resist Unlawful Orders: The Hidden Heroes of South Korea’s Martial Law Crisis, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 16, 2025, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/the-professional-duty-to-resist-unlawful-orders-the-hidden-heores-of-south-koreas-martial-law-crisis/