—Prof. Dr. Anna Phirtskhalashvili, University of Georgia; Visiting Scholar, Human Rights Centre (MRZ), University of Potsdam

I. Between Self-Protection and Self-Endangerment
A party ban is one of the most far-reaching instruments available to a democratic constitutional state. It is intended to prevent political parties from using the freedoms of democracy to abolish that very order. The experience of the Weimar Republic raised the fundamental question of whether, and to what extent, a liberal democracy may provide mechanisms for its own protection. Precisely for this reason, a party ban is a double-edged sword: it can protect the free democratic basic order, but, where substantive requirements or procedural safeguards are weakened, it can itself damage political competition, the freedom of political parties from state influence, and trust in democratic institutions.
The debate in Germany over possible ban proceedings against the AfD makes this ambivalence visible. On 30 January 2025, the German Bundestag considered two cross-party motions seeking a review of the AfD by the Federal Constitutional Court; both were referred to the Committee on Internal Affairs. Since then, two concerns have stood side by side: the risk of underestimating a threat to democracy or responding too late, and the risk of drawing the most severe instrument of party law into political competition.
These questions must be kept separate. Whether a political party satisfies the substantive requirements of Article 21(2) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) is decided solely by the Federal Constitutional Court. Before that, however, there is a political decision: whether the Bundestag, the Bundesrat (Federal Council) or the Federal Government should submit an application at all. This sphere of political discretion itself requires a structured framework. To this end, this post proposes a preliminary test for political instrumentalization. This instrumentalization test asks whether the decision to initiate ban proceedings rests on objective reasons aimed at protecting the democratic order, or whether there are indications of partisan misuse.
Delay can also create risks. In the second NPD ban proceeding, the German Federal Constitutional Court emphasized that Article 21(2) GG does not require a concrete danger to have already materialized. The provision responds to the historical experience that radical movements become increasingly difficult to counter the more ground they gain. A democracy that always waits until a danger has fully materialized may miss the point at which democratic self-defence can still be effective. The Court therefore describes the party ban as a preventive measure and associates it with the maxim “Wehret den Anfängen” (Resist the beginnings). This permits early action against parties hostile to the constitutional order.
This, however, does not justify any automatic preference for initiating ban proceedings. A democratic state must not wait until its capacity for self-defence threatens to become ineffective; nor may it use a party ban to remove an unwelcome political competitor from the democratic arena. The instrumentalization test proposed here is designed to navigate these two risks. It is not an additional substantive requirement under Article 21(2) GG. Rather, it is intended to structure the political decision as to whether ban proceedings should be initiated at all.
II. An Instrumentalization Test
As mentioned, the instrumentalization test concerns the preliminary political decision on whether to initiate ban proceedings. The following five criteria structure this sphere of discretion and are illustrated through selected comparative examples. These examples do not constitute a comprehensive comparative study; rather, they highlight different risks and limits of party bans.
Criterion 1: A Real Threat and a Legitimate Protective Purpose
The instrumentalization test must begin by asking whether initiating ban proceedings serves a genuine purpose of protecting the democratic order. It is not necessary at this stage to establish all the requirements of Article 21(2) GG. There must, however, be sufficient factual indications that legally protected interests of the free democratic basic order are affected; mere political rivalry, electoral success or the inconvenience of a party are not sufficient.
The Herri Batasuna/Batasuna case shows how clearly such a protective purpose can emerge. There, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) focused in particular on the connection between the affected party with the Spanish terrorist organization ETA and support for a political strategy linked to violence, and considered the dissolution of the parties compatible with Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
In the case of the AfD there are judicially confirmed factual indications that can support a genuine purpose of protecting the democratic order. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) classified the AfD as a “suspected case” (Verdachtsfall), a classification upheld by the Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia; after the Federal Administrative Court rejected the complaint against the refusal to grant leave to appeal, the judgment became final. In February 2026, the Administrative Court of Cologne temporarily barred the BfV from classifying the AfD as a “confirmed right-wing extremist endeavour”; at the same time, it continued to find a strong suspicion of activities directed against the free democratic basic order.
There is therefore at least a sufficiently robust factual basis for assuming a genuine purpose of protecting the democratic order. This does not mean that the requirements for prohibiting a party are fulfilled. It means only that consideration of ban proceedings is not based solely on political rivalry, but can be linked to judicially confirmed factual indications of potentially unconstitutional activities.
Criterion 2: Objectivity and Equal Treatment
The decision to initiate ban proceedings must be based on objective and politically neutral criteria. Electoral success, political inconvenience or opposition status must not be decisive; what matters are attributable objectives and actions and their significance for the democratic order. This corresponds to the particular importance of equality of opportunity among political parties and the principle of state neutrality.
The Herri Batasuna case again shows that the decisive factor must not be a political conviction (there, the demand for Basque independence), but rather concrete activities attributable to the party.
Developments in Georgia are particularly sensitive in this respect. There, the ban application initially targeted three major opposition parties or alliances. In April 2026, the ban sought was widened to four parties with the addition of the Federalist Party; in September 2026, “Gakharia for Georgia” was also included, so that the ban sought now extends to five opposition parties. This gradual expansion makes it especially important to ask according to which general and politically neutral criteria parties are selected and particular conduct attributed to them. For the AfD, therefore, neither electoral success nor opposition status can be decisive. What matters are concrete and attributable objectives and actions.
For the purposes of the instrumentalization test, however, an additional question remains: would the same standards be applied regardless of the political orientation of the party concerned? Objectivity and equal treatment do not require identical treatment of every radical party. They do, however, require a justification that can be followed on the merits as to why the most severe instrument of party law is being considered against this particular party.
Criterion 3: Independent Institutional and Judicial Control
Ban proceedings begin with a political decision, but its factual basis and final decision must not depend exclusively on the political actors who initiate the proceedings. Given the severity of a party ban, institutional separation, reliable fact-finding and independent judicial review are indispensable. The Federal Constitutional Court emphasized this particularly clearly in the first NPD proceeding: the use of undercover informants (V-Leute) at the party’s leadership level raised such fundamental questions concerning the party’s freedom from state influence and the reliability of the factual basis that the proceedings were discontinued.
The Georgian situation demonstrates the opposite structural risk. Key facts for the later ban application were collected and assessed by a parliamentary committee of inquiry shaped by the governing majority; its report subsequently formed a central basis for the ban application. Where the parliamentary majority is simultaneously acting against its political competitors, there is a risk that political assessment and factual determination become intertwined.
In Germany, by contrast, findings of the BfV are subject to judicial review; only the Federal Constitutional Court decides whether a political party is unconstitutional. It is therefore crucial that fact-finding, the political decision to submit an application, and the final decision on the ban remain institutionally separate and subject to judicial control.
Criterion 4: Proportionality of Initiating Ban Proceedings
For the final decision under Article 21(2) GG, the Federal Constitutional Court does not require a separate proportionality test; the relevant considerations are integrated into the substantive requirements. For the preliminary decision whether to initiate ban proceedings, however, classical proportionality analysis provides a useful structure.
Suitability: Ban proceedings must be capable of protecting the democratic order, taking possible counterproductive effects into account. In Turkey, proceedings against the Justice and Development Party (AKP) ended in 2008 with a reduction of state funding rather than a ban; the Venice Commission also warned that even initiating ban proceedings may affect the political climate. In Belgium, organizations associated with Vlaams Blok were convicted, yet the movement continued as Vlaams Belang. These examples show that legal exclusion does not always eliminate a political movement and may produce counter-effects.
Necessity: The question is whether less restrictive but comparably effective means are available. Article 21(3) GG allows exclusion from state funding; measures against individual party officials and specific violations, and in special cases Article 18 GG, must also be considered. It must also be established whether unconstitutional statements are attributable to the party itself rather than isolated members.
Proportionality in the strict sense: The seriousness of the threat must be weighed against the democratic costs of initiating the most severe instrument of party law. The more intense and concrete the threat, the stronger the case for proceedings. Conversely, a party ban as an ultima ratio should not be initiated for isolated conduct attributable only to individuals. The decisive question is whether the seriousness and systematic nature of the threat are proportionate to the severity of the interference.
Criterion 5: Scrutiny of Partisan Self-Interest
Finally, it must be examined whether initiating ban proceedings is linked to the partisan self-interest of those initiating the proceedings. The assessment should not focus on a subjective intention to cause harm, which is difficult to prove, but rather on objective conflicts of interest: Who initiates the proceedings, against whom are they directed, and what political advantage might the applicants derive from excluding the party concerned?
The developments in Georgia make this question particularly important. The ban initiative launched by members of the governing majority was gradually expanded and now targets five major opposition parties. This objectively creates a situation in which the political forces seeking the ban could themselves benefit from the exclusion of major competitors from political competition. This clearly reveals political instrumentalization.
The German institutional structure differs in this respect: an application may be submitted only by the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, or the Federal Government, not by individual political parties (section 43(1) of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (BVerfGG)). Moreover, no single parliamentary group holds a majority of seats in the Bundestag. Partisan self-interest is therefore not excluded, but it is more strongly constrained institutionally.
III. Dum tempus est: Militant Democracy at the Right Time
Militant democracy must guard against two opposing dangers. Georgia demonstrates how a party ban can become an instrument for entrenching political power where the governing majority, the process of fact-finding and an interest in excluding political competitors are closely intertwined. The experience of the Weimar Republic, by contrast, reminds us of the opposite risk: democratic self-defence may lose its purpose if anti-democratic forces have already reached a position in which effective countermeasures are scarcely possible. It is precisely this historical experience that underlies the preventive character of Article 21(2) GG. The Federal Constitutional Court therefore invokes the maxim “Wehret den Anfängen” (Resist the beginnings) and warns against waiting until a concrete danger has fully materialized
The instrumentalization test seeks to navigate between these two risks. Where political instrumentalization can be sufficiently excluded, a genuine purpose of protecting the democratic order exists and less restrictive means are not comparably effective, submitting an application to the Federal Constitutional Court may constitute an exercise of rule-of-law scrutiny. The test does not prejudge the outcome: whether the requirements of Article 21(2) GG are fulfilled remains a matter for the Federal Constitutional Court alone.
For the debate surrounding the AfD, the decisive question is therefore not only whether a party ban is available as an ultima ratio, but also when the constitutionally provided mechanism of review can still be effective. The instrumentalization test aims to protect against abuse without allowing rule-of-law restraint to turn into political inaction. Militant democracy requires not only the right instruments, but also the right timing. If this window of opportunity is missed, even its sharpest weapon may come too late. Dum tempus est: while there is still time.
Suggested citation: Anna Phirtskhalashvili, The Double-Edged Sword of Militant Democracy: Party Bans and the Risk of Political Instrumentalization, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 16, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/the-double-edged-sword-of-militant-democracy-party-bans-and-the-risk-of-political-instrumentalization/