This is the second installment of the joint ICONnect/IberICOnnect symposium on the IACtHR Advisory Opinions on the climate emergency and the right to care. For the introduction, see here.
Bárbara Pincowsca Cardoso Campos, PhD in Legal Sciences from the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (Colombia), Professor at the Universidad Católica de Pereira (Colombia).
The Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 on “Climate Emergency and Human Rights”, adopted on May 29, 2025, by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), stands as one of the most significant pronouncements in the Court’s history and, arguably, in contemporary international law. Requested by Chile and Colombia, the Opinion sought to determine the obligations arising from the American Convention on Human Rights and the Protocol of San Salvador in the face of the climate emergency, as well as to define their legal scope.
Far from being a mere interpretative exercise, this decision marks a turning point in how international human rights law engages with the environmental and climate agenda. For the first time, the Court formally recognizes the existence of a global climate emergency that directly affects the enjoyment of human rights and the rights of nature. It further establishes that States must adopt immediate, effective, and scientifically grounded measures to protect individuals, communities, and ecosystems from its impacts. Indeed, this is the first time an international human rights tribunal has explicitly recognized binding obligations in relation to the climate crisis.
In this text, I focus on three “thermometers of debate” that best illustrate the significance of Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 and its impact on the legal discussions currently shaping the inter-American and global arenas.
First thermometer of debate: unprecedented participation
The scale of the process leading to OC-32/25 highlights the depth of the regional discourse surrounding it. This initiative witnessed the largest participation in the history of the Inter-American System, encompassing both written and oral contributions. In total, 236 briefs and observations were submitted by a diverse array of stakeholders, including states, international organizations, Indigenous peoples, rural communities, social movements, academic institutions, and youth organizations. Additionally, two public hearings took place in Bridgetown (Barbados), Brasília, and Manaus (Brazil) during April and May 2024. The choice of these locations was far from coincidental, as each territory faces significant threats from the climate crisis, thus infusing the proceedings with profound political and geographic significance. The final tally is telling: 613 participants actively engaged in this process, underscoring the widespread social and academic consensus on the urgent need for a robust legal response to the climate emergency (para. 8)
This level of participation also explains why the decision has been widely celebrated as a legal victory, particularly among social organizations, Indigenous peoples, youth, and climate activists from the Global South, who viewed the pronouncement as a collective triumph and a crucial step toward confronting the climate crisis through a framework grounded in human rights, science, and justice.
Second thermometer of debate: tensions within the Court
The vibrancy of the debate was not limited to social participation—it also unfolded within the Court itself. The judges’ votes reveal that the Court was not unanimous on some of the Opinion’s most ambitious points.
One of the most significant developments was the recognition of Nature as a subject of rights, a normative innovation that strengthens the legal protection of ecosystems amid the climate emergency. The majority held that acknowledging Nature as a collective subject of public interest, consistent with the evolution of the corpus iuris of the Inter-American system, provides States with more coherent and effective legal tools to address the planetary crisis (para. 279-286).
The Court also recognized as jus cogens the prohibition of anthropogenic conduct causing massive and irreversible harm to the vital balance of the ecosystem. According to the tribunal, the obligation to avoid such irreversible damage constitutes an imperative norm of general international law that admits no exceptions or contrary actions by States (para. 287-294).
The IACtHR’s decision to grant this prohibition the status of jus cogens carries significant legal implications. Given its breadth, this issue became central to the doctrinal debate among the judges in OC-32/25. Indeed, the recognition of Nature’s legal personality and the jus cogens status of the prohibition against irreversible environmental harm are not only widely celebrated and discussed in academic circles, but they also reveal profound divisions within the Court. Both matters were approved by a narrow margin, with a vote of four to three, and dissenting opinions were provided by Judges Nancy Hernández López, Patricia Pérez Goldberg, and Humberto Sierra Porto.
Third thermometer of debate: the expansive justiciability of economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights (ESCER)
Another major development in OC-32/25 concerns the recognition of the “right to a healthy climate” (paras. 298–304). In this decision, the Court revisits its established jurisprudence recognizing the right to a healthy environment as an autonomous right, but takes a further step: based on the interpretation of Article 26 of the American Convention and Article 11 of the Protocol of San Salvador, it explicitly establishes the “right to a healthy climate” as a distinct and autonomous human right, separate from the general right to a healthy environment.
The Court defines this right as the right of every person to live in a climate system free from dangerous anthropogenic interference, recognizing it as a fundamental right that protects both present and future generations, thereby enshrining the principle of intergenerational equity (paras. 300, 311-313).
This new right has distinctive features related to its functions, components, and the dynamics necessary to maintain its balance (para. 299). In its collective dimension, it safeguards the shared interest of current and future generations—human and non-human alike—in maintaining a stable climate system. In its individual dimension, it guarantees each person the opportunity to thrive in an environment free from dangerous climate disruptions (paras. 298–316). The Court also emphasizes that this right requires States to adopt specific measures to address, protect against, and mitigate the effects of climate change.
The recognition of the right to a healthy climate fits within one of the most persistent debates in the Inter-American System: the direct justiciability of ESCER. Whether these rights can be directly enforced before a court has long been a contentious issue. Since Lagos del Campo v. Peru, the IACtHR has consolidated the view that Article 26 of the American Convention—on the “progressive development” of rights—is not merely a programmatic statement but a clause containing substantive obligations, serving as an autonomous source of rights subject to judicial enforcement. Based on this interpretation, the Court has recognized the direct justiciability of several ESCER, such as the rights to health, food, water, and, now, a healthy climate.
However, this position remains controversial within the Court, as reflected in the votes of Judges Nancy Hernández López and Patricia Pérez Goldberg—and possibly that of Judge Humberto Sierra Porto (not yet published at the time of writing)—who argue that this understanding strains the foundational architecture of the Inter-American System and exceeds the limits of State consent.
This debate encapsulates one of the fundamental dilemmas faced by the IACtHR: the tension between the need to ensure effective protection and the obligation to adhere to the conventional framework established by States. On one hand, the Court’s proactive stance seeks to address urgent crises—such as the climate emergency—by ensuring that rights do not become illusory, grounded in the idea that human rights treaties must be interpreted as living, evolving instruments. On the other hand, advocates of judicial restraint maintain that the system’s legitimacy depends on respecting the limits of jurisdiction conferred by States.
Although it is not my purpose here to explore both sides in depth—my position aligns clearly with the former view—I conclude by highlighting several elements that support the Court’s reasoning in this Opinion.
First, recognizing the right to a healthy climate as an independent right helps prevent it from being overshadowed or diluted within the broader framework of the right to a healthy environment. While both rights share a common foundation, the former’s autonomy allows for a better specification of State obligations and direct enforceability (para. 300).
Second, this recognition underscores the need to differentiate State responsibilities in environmental and climate matters. Although related, these agendas are not identical. As Christian Courtis and Gonzalo Sozzo have noted, traditional environmental policy focuses on conserving natural resources—such as water, air, and biodiversity—whereas the climate agenda demands structural transformations in production and consumption patterns, including a transition toward non-fossil energy sources. The climate issue, though partially convergent with environmental protection, thus constitutes a distinct legal challenge requiring tailored responses.
Third, the acknowledgment of this right strengthens State accountability in an area where responsibilities often disperse. The IACtHR made clear that States must assess and control the climate impacts of high-risk activities, including the obligation to conduct climate impact assessments before authorizing projects that could significantly affect the climate system (paras. 358–363).
Fourth, the recognition of the right to a healthy climate carries both symbolic and normative weight. Beyond the region, the Court sends a powerful message: the right to a stable and safe climate is not a political aspiration but a justiciable human right under the Inter-American protection system. In doing so, the Court establishes a legal language that places the climate crisis squarely within the human rights agenda.
Advisory Opinions, in this sense, do more than interpret norms—they build conceptual and narrative frameworks that shape future legal developments. By providing a shared legal vocabulary and solid argumentative foundation, such decisions contribute to a jurisprudential grammar that enables the articulation of climate justice through human rights. Their most significant contribution may lie in having established within international law the notion that climate change constitutes a violation of fundamental rights, demanding a response proportionate to its magnitude.
By recognizing the rights of Nature, elevating ecosystem protection to the highest level of international law, and consolidating the right to a healthy climate alongside concrete State obligations, the Court not only broadens the scope of protection but also sets a roadmap for the future. This framework offers legal tools to demand State action, promote legal reforms, and strengthen the role of civil society, peoples, and communities in the collective defense of a sustainable, just, and livable future for all.
Suggested citation: Bárbara Pincowsca Cardoso Campos, When climate reached the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: notes for understanding Advisory Opinion OC-32/25, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Nov. 19, 2025, at: https://www.iconnectblog.com/symposium-on-the-inter-american-court-advisory-opinions-regarding-the-climate-emergency-and-the-right-to-care-part-2-when-climate-reached-the-inter-american-court-of-human-rights-notes-for-understandi/