–Fernando Romani Sales, PhD candidate in Constitutional Law at the University of São Paulo (USP),[1] and Maria Fernanda Silva Assis, MSc candidate in Law at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG)[2]
[Editor’s Note: This is a two-part discussion on the threats that the so-called “political neutrality” in education poses to academic freedom and the democratic system.]
Across the world, various sociopolitical actors and forces have called for “political neutrality” in education. In May 2026, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (STF) declared unconstitutional a law that prohibited “gender-related pedagogical activities” in public schools in the state of Espírito Santo. Among the Court’s arguments were that the statute violated the freedoms to teach and learn, as well as the pluralism of ideas and pedagogical approaches (STF, 2026). In the United States, hundreds of courses are at risk due to the implementation of university policies that restrict teaching on gender and race (The Texas Tribune, 2025).
This two-part discussion aims to examine the threats posed by the so-called “political neutrality” in education to academic freedom and, above all, to democracy. We argue that demands for “political neutrality” in education have two main dimensions: neutrality in academic activities (namely, teaching, research, and the dissemination of knowledge and ideas by professors, researchers, and students), and institutional neutrality, referring to political neutrality exercised by educational and research institutions themselves. This text focuses on the first dimension; the next one will address institutional neutrality.
Demands for “political neutrality” in academic activities stem from a fragmented collective perception that higher education in different parts of the world has been “contaminated” by practices of “ideological indoctrination,” thereby undermining pluralism within universities (Democracy Reporting International, 2023; Díez-Gutiérrez et.al., 2025; The White House, 2025). According to a range of actors, the proposed remedy is “political neutrality” on the part of academic actors, along with calls for a “balance of viewpoints” on politically sensitive topics (such as the Israel–Palestine conflict, issues of gender, sexuality, race, and religious debates).
This argument is appealing, particularly because it is framed to supposedly preserve social and political pluralism. It also appears to offer a practical realization of academic freedom: after all, genuinely free teaching and research environments would seem to be those in which diverse viewpoints can coexist without any single theoretical perspective becoming dominant.
The Fallacy of Neutrality
The notion of political neutrality is a fallacy. Substantive neutrality (content neutrality) does not exist. It presupposes that it is possible to avoid making political choices, broadly understood, about fundamental questions of teaching and research: What should be taught? How should it be taught? To whom? At what moment? (Ghirardi, 2012) Every decision regarding curricula, course syllabi, or research agendas inevitably involves political choices. A course on legal careers that does not engage with issues of gender and race reflects a political choice, just as a course that explicitly adopts those analytical lenses reflects another. Moreover, in certain fields of knowledge, especially the Humanities and Social Sciences, a proper understanding of the content of various concepts depends on making political judgments (Bustamante, 2025), as exemplified by the very notion of the rule of law.
Unsurprisingly, some movements advocating “political neutrality” in education have pursued legal strategies to block specific teaching approaches. In Brazil, the “Escola Sem Partido” (School Without Party) movement (Miguel, 2016) and the Professors for Freedom (Docentes pela Liberdade) organization (Barbosa, 2021) advocate for such neutrality, working with conservative political parties to pass state and municipal laws prohibiting discussions of gender in public primary and secondary education (Moura and Silva, 2020). These laws were subsequently struck down by the Brazilian Supreme Court for violating the freedoms to teach and to learn, as well as the principle of pluralism of ideas and pedagogical approaches (STF, 2020).
In another sense, demands for “political neutrality” reflect a return to strands of modern thought that assumed it was possible to develop and apply neutral research methods, in which the subject and object of inquiry could be fully separated (Damásio, 2012). This modern rationality, however, has been widely challenged since the twentieth century by Black, feminist, LGBTQIA+, and decolonial movements. These perspectives argue, among other points, that the supposed neutrality of such methods often masks the positionality of those who developed them—predominantly white, heterosexual men from the Global North.
Disciplinary Standards vs. the “Empire of Opinions”
Another consequence of calls for “political neutrality” in education is the claim that teaching and research should reflect a “balance of opinions,” often based on the assumption that academia is ideologically skewed. The danger of this reasoning lies in the false equivalence it draws between scientifically grounded knowledge and personal opinion (McIntyre, 2018).
Academic knowledge differs from common sense precisely because of the methods and procedures through which it is produced. It is, and should be, regulated by disciplinary standards, which emerge from the internal norms of epistemic communities that validate, contest, and advance knowledge (Post, 2012). A core pillar of academic freedom, in this sense, is the guarantee that such standards are developed, criticized, and updated by members of the academic community themselves, rather than imposed by external actors driven by political, economic, or religious interests.
In turn, these disciplinary standards are not content-neutral, as they may themselves be contested within the academic community due to differing epistemological perspectives. While we acknowledge that such norms can be challenged individually—particularly in light of the possible presence of structural injustice—it is not feasible to contest all of them simultaneously. First, the very norms that inform academic practice can serve as paradigms for identifying, criticizing, and revising discriminatory or unjust conventions. Second, these standards are grounded in a procedural consensus regarding the methods and practices that define academic knowledge and confer upon it a degree of reliability. This property—reliability—is not shared by mere opinions. Indeed, within the broader arena of public discourse, even the notion of truth itself is frequently contested (Post, 2012).
From this perspective, the demand for a “balance of viewpoints” is also fallacious, as it implies that academic knowledge and unsubstantiated opinion should occupy equal space in teaching and research. If such logic were adopted, classrooms would need to devote equal attention to scientifically established understandings of the Earth’s shape and motion and to unsupported claims such as flat-Earth theories. Similarly, evolutionary theory, overwhelmingly supported by scientific evidence, would have to be treated on par with creationism, a religious belief lacking scientific grounding. One of the basic requirements for academic knowledge production, therefore, is distinguishing good ideas from bad ones on the basis of the methods and disciplinary standards accepted by the academic community (Post, 2015).
Neutrality as a Threat to Democracy
Perhaps the most significant risk posed by “political neutrality” in academic activities concerns its implications for democracy and human rights. As noted, “neutral” approaches have already led to demands to exclude discussions of gender and race from education. Such exclusions clearly undermine democratic conceptions of social pluralism and core human rights principles, which recognize that structural inequalities and historical processes of oppression, such as slavery and ethnic genocide, have resulted in widespread human rights violations.
In this sense, “neutrality” is also ahistorical, as it seeks to disregard the historical trajectories, power structures, and political contexts that shape sociocultural realities at local, national, regional, and global levels. Defending democracy and a culture of human rights is itself a conscious political choice. “Neutrality,” by contrast, threatens this commitment by creating space for the spread of authoritarian ideas and practices within and beyond educational settings.
Accordingly, the academic work is closely related to the problem of political dissent, since critical inquiry serves as a means of objecting to illegitimate public and governmental agencies and claims (Butler, 2009). Universities and the academic community are therefore potential defenders of democracy and human rights (Ignatieff, 2018). This highlights the importance of leaving some matters to be decided only by the academic community, such as what is to be taught and researched, and how. Such decisions, as previously emphasized, must be made in accordance with the disciplinary standards that guide academic activity, thereby enabling universities to fulfill another democratic role: that of making their audiences better judges of truth, capable of applying it effectively to other areas of life (Dewey, 1976).
Scholars as Human Rights Defenders
Once it is accepted that “neutrality” undermines both academic freedom and the democratic regime itself, the question arises: what stance should scholars and universities adopt? Scholars should not only refrain from adopting a posture of neutrality but should instead take an active role in defending human rights. This does not necessarily imply advocating for partisan political engagement. Rather, respect for human rights and the rule of law should be understood as an expected stance of scholars committed to preserving democracy. This constitutes a political commitment that extends beyond scholars’ roles in the classroom or in academic research, repositioning them as central actors in the development of high-quality democratic education (Stone, 2022).
This argument raises an important debate within academic freedom concerning the limits of scholars’ speech. Such discussions are often controversial due to the blurred relationship between academic freedom and free speech (Sultana, 2018), as well as the lack of consensus, conceptual clarity, and appropriate standards for adjudicating borderline cases. In this context, one of the authors of this post offers a recent contribution on how scholars’ speech should be addressed within the framework of academic freedom.
The central argument is that scholars’ speech should be protected by academic freedom rather than free speech when exercised within the scope of their professional duties. Accordingly, state or institutional sanctions should be limited to instances in which a scholar’s conduct demonstrably fails to meet the standards of their disciplinary expertise in the performance of academic functions, rather than targeting their political views. This normative-theoretical framework proposes that scholars’ speech, referred to as “Freedom of Academic Speech”, encompasses three key dimensions: (1) disciplinary expertise speech, i.e., speech related to the knowledge expertise of each scholar (Post, 2012); (2) university governance speech, i.e., speech related to the action, policy, or personnel of a scholar’s home institution (Finkin, 1988); and (3) public political speech, i.e., speech that is neither related to disciplinary expertise or institutional governance (Finkin and Post, 2009).
As argued, these three dimensions should be analyzed in relation to the core academic functions of (a) teaching, (b) research, (c) institutional participation, and (d) public engagement. For each of these dimensions, specific regulatory criteria should be developed to ensure a more robust and nuanced protection of scholars’ speech. In this sense, the “academic standards” or “professional norms” should serve as the regulatory criterion to (1) disciplinary expertise speech. They are the parameters developed by the academic community itself, through the expertise of each field, to distinguish accepted academic knowledge from invalid ideas (Post, 2012).
At the same time, a “non-incitement to violence standard” should serve as the regulatory criterion for the (2) university governance speech, that is, scholars should be free to engage in governance debates and advocate for workplace improvements, including through strikes, provided their actions remain peaceful. This standard protects the physical integrity of all members of the university community, including scholars. Just as scholars must not incite violence on campus, they, along with students and staff, should also be treated peacefully by university authorities and security forces.
Finally, a “democratic values protection standard” should serve as the regulatory criterion for (3) scholars’ public political speech, imposing two key limitations. First, such speech must not promote the dismantling of democratic governance. Scholars should not endorse attacks on or the abolition of democracy. This does not preclude expressing support for or opposition to particular politicians, candidates, or governments; rather, it concerns broader claims, such as advocating the end of democratic rule, supporting coups, or endorsing political or physical violence to remove democratically elected leaders. Second, scholars must refrain from engaging in hate speech, understood as offensive expressions or manifestations of hatred directed toward specific groups or individuals with the intent to harm, dehumanize, discriminate against, or stigmatize them (Papcunová, 2023). One example of the last limitation to academic speech would be the defense of Finnis (2001) against homosexuality: “homosexual activity is wrong, along with all other non-marital sexual activity, because it undermines the goods of marriage.” This is a clear example of hate speech, as it directly attacks a specific group with the intent to discriminate against them, in violation of the recognition of a human right.
As a general rule, we argue that the legitimate authority for applying these criteria should lie primarily with the academic community itself, in accordance with the principle of professional self-regulation. This is justified insofar as the academic community possesses the greatest and most appropriate expertise to evaluate its own work. Moreover, one of the core pillars of academic freedom is precisely to protect scholars and institutions from external threats based on private interests.
Conclusion
Demands for “political neutrality” in academic activities ultimately reflect a broader political struggle over competing visions of society, education, and science that certain sociopolitical groups seek to advance within educational institutions. Framed as a response to alleged ideological indoctrination, neutrality invokes the language of pluralism while, in practice, undermining it and enabling the censorship of specific perspectives.
Its risks include not only the erosion of academic knowledge, through what may be called an “empire of opinions”, but also recurring violations of academic freedom and, ultimately, the weakening of democracy and the human rights framework.
By targeting academic activities, these demands call into question the individual dimension of academic freedom, undermining the freedoms to teach, learn, research, publish, and disseminate knowledge. We argue that scholars and students should actively engage in protecting human rights and the democratic order. This is a political commitment against neutrality and, moreover, against authoritarian rule. In the next piece, we address the threats that “political neutrality” represents to the institutional and collective dimensions of academic freedom and how to face them.
Suggested citation: Fernando Romani Sales and Maria Fernanda Silva Assis, “Political Neutrality” in Education? Part I: The Fallacy of Neutrality in Academic Activities, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, May 29, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/political-neutrality-in-education-part-i-the-fallacy-of-neutrality-in-academic-activities/
[1] He was a full-time PhD visiting researcher at King’s College London (KCL), School of Education, Communication & Society. MSc in Law and Development from the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV). Program Officer at the Coalition for Academic Freedom in the Americas (CAFA) and researcher at the Center for the Analysis of Liberty and Authoritarianism (LAUT).
[2] B.A. in Law from the Federal University of Lavras (UFLA). Researcher at the Center for the Analysis of Liberty and Authoritarianism (LAUT) and member of the Coalition for Academic Freedom in the Americas (CAFA).