— Maria Fernanda Silva Assis, MSc candidate in Law at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG)[1], and Fernando Romani Sales, PhD candidate in Constitutional Law at the University of São Paulo (USP)[2]
The starting point of this text, as well as our previous one, is the growing number of demands from various sociopolitical actors calling for an alleged “political neutrality” in education. We challenge this argument in two parts, drawing on a distinction we consider essential: demands for political neutrality in the conduct of scholars in the performance of their academic activities (teaching, research, publishing, and the dissemination of ideas and knowledge), and demands for neutrality in the public positioning of academic institutions. In the first text, we challenged neutrality in the conduct of scholars; here, we turn to institutional neutrality.
Examples illustrating this diagnosis include a public manifesto issued by Brazilian scholars denouncing attacks on universities and calling, among other measures, for institutional neutrality: “Universities should be plural forums where different ideas are contested. For this to occur, institutions must not conflate their functions with political activism. The principle of institutional neutrality holds that universities should avoid adopting official positions on political or ideological issues” (Folha de São Paulo, 2026). In their view, faculty and researchers should be able to express their personal convictions and influence public opinion, but in their names, instead of the institutions to which they are affiliated.
In the U.S., the Trump administration issued a series of demands to public schools and universities, under threat of budget cuts, citing the need to combat alleged “ideological indoctrination” in education (The White House, 2025). These demands included requiring educational institutions to dismantle DEI policies, remove courses addressing race and gender from their curricula, and ensure that scholars refrain from political expression (NPR, 2025). In the UK, a recent study found that one-fifth of universities adopt institutional neutrality policies, refusing to take a stance on contentious issues (Inside Higher Education, 2026).
Institutional neutrality as an illusion
The claim that institutions of higher education should refrain from adopting public political positions is illusory. In shaping their institutional practices and priorities, universities inevitably make political choices and engage in conduct that reflects commitments to particular values (Soucek, 2026). Indeed, their very institutional mission may itself convey positions on political, economic, social, and religious issues.
Designing curricula, shaping student and faculty admissions policies, selecting priority projects and programs for resource allocation, and adopting policies governing academic speech are among the institutional practices that reveal which social, political, or economic issues a university understands as connected to its mission, and in what ways. These institutional choices are, of course, not neutral (Soucek, 2026). When a university adopts affirmative action policies or invests in programs promoting research on renewable energy sources, it communicates through action that it recognizes the need to remedy longstanding structural injustices affecting vulnerable social groups and the harmful environmental impacts of fossil fuels.
In practical terms, what distinguishes the adoption of such institutional practices from a statement delivered by a university official, on behalf of the institution, celebrating Black History Month or endorsing initiatives aimed at mitigating the effects of global warming? Ultimately, the substance of both acts – institutional practices and public statements – conveys a remarkably similar message. To expect or accept that universities may adopt institutional practices reflecting social, political, and economic commitments, while denying them the capacity to express similar commitments through public speech, is, at the very least, contradictory.
The case for institutional neutrality also becomes difficult to sustain when one considers the values behind universities’ missions. In constitutional democracies, both public and private universities are expected to respect human rights and to affirm democracy itself as a foundational value, as required by domestic constitutional norms and principles of international law. That kind of commitment, again, is not neutral, as it entails choosing among competing values, defending minorities and vulnerable groups, and actively repudiating authoritarianism in its various manifestations.
In private universities, moreover, the institutional mission may take on even more specific contours, reflecting particular preferences concerning political, economic, social, or religious issues. Consider, for example, Catholic universities. Their institutional identity embraces religious values that may, at times, indicate a preference for particular positions on controversial issues of the day (Post, 2023). In other words, when their very existence reflects commitments to relevant religious, political, and social matters, it is not reasonable to expect that their silence in public debate equate to neutrality. In a debate about reproductive rights, for instance, we can picture very clearly what the views of a Catholic university may be or not.
In sum, whether through their conception of their institutional mission or through their institutional practices, universities inevitably express positions and value judgments concerning controversial issues in public debate. Such choices will inevitably generate disagreement and dissent (AAUP, 2025). However, this does not necessarily imply the exclusion of divergent viewpoints among faculty, researchers, or students (Post, 2023). The emergence of such an effect depends on a variety of additional factors, as we argue below.
A rhetorical appeal to the risks of censorship and silencing
Advocates of institutional neutrality argue that when universities adopt an official position on contentious political matters, they signal to their internal community that dissenting views are unwelcome (Packer, 2026; Pluralismo Acadêmico, 2026). Following this line of reasoning, institutional statements give rise to two related risks: (i) self-censorship among faculty members and students engaged in research or studies that depart from the position endorsed by the institution and, consequently, (ii) a chilling effect on free speech.
However, the correlation between the adoption of official positions on controversial political issues and the infringement of academic freedom or free speech is, in these terms, largely abstract. Such an effect is far from self-evident or necessary. It depends, instead, on empirical verification and on its interaction with other factors (Post, 2023), such as the existence of institutional protections for dissenting faculty members and adherence to the disciplinary norms and procedures governing knowledge production. For example, an institutional statement celebrating Pride Month would, in itself, be unlikely to result in the censorship of minority viewpoints held by those who disagree that the event should be commemorated (AAUP, 2025). By contrast, if such speech were accompanied by retaliatory measures or by rules restricting dissenting academic work or expression, it could then give rise to a chilling effect or self-censorship.
Therefore, the best way to protect these freedoms is not to demand that universities refrain from taking positions on contested political issues, but rather to ensure that they adhere to the disciplinary standards and procedures that guide the production and dissemination of knowledge. Along these lines, distinctions among academic activities may legitimately be drawn on the basis of their content, not according to ideological or partisan criteria, but rather according to standards of professional quality (Post, 2015). If doing the opposite, by regulating speech or restricting academic activities in ways that violate academic freedom standards, then the university in question is failing the achievement of its own mission, which is to discover and communicate the truth, thereby cognitively empowering participants in public discourse (Post, 2015). To fulfill their democratic roles, universities must sustain an environment in which positions diverging from their institutional views may receive support and expression (Butler, 2017).
Taking a stance: when and on what grounds should academic institutions act?
Even policies of institutional neutrality and those who advocate for them acknowledge that there are circumstances in which it is legitimate and appropriate for universities to adopt an institutional position. In their view, such action is warranted when the contentious issue at stake affects either academic freedom or the institution’s mission, defined as knowledge production and dissemination (The University of Chicago, 1967; Pluralismo Acadêmico, 2026; Fire).
Nonetheless, that argument gives us a fictitious conception of neutrality. When a university articulates its understanding of its institutional mission, it inevitably makes judgments about which values to prioritize and which not (Soucek, 2026). Such judgments are, of course, not neutral. They necessarily entail decisions concerning, for instance, the intended scope of the university’s role – whether the institution conceives of itself as pursuing a global mission or as primarily oriented toward the needs of its local community – as well as the normative commitments that will guide the exercise of its core functions, including, for example, commitments to equity and diversity.
Besides, distinguishing when academic freedom and institutional mission are at stake or not isn’t that simple. Dealing with most contemporary campus controversies requires interpreting the university’s mission and the values underlying it (Post, 2023).
As we argued in the first text, scholars should act as defenders of human rights and the rule of law; educational and research institutions must do the same. The responsibility of these institutions is, in fact, even greater than the individual actions of scholars in defending the democratic regime. This point relates to the collective dimension of academic freedom, namely that the production of specialized knowledge, as well as the actions of scholars and institutions, should be directed toward the common good, understood as the public interest in the sociopolitical, economic, and environmental development of the societies in which these actors operate (Finkin, Post, 2011; Butler, 2017).
Beyond the legal obligations established by national, regional, and global human rights frameworks for scholars and academic institutions, they also have an ethical duty not only to refrain from remaining silent in the face of violations and social injustices, but also to actively promote a democratic culture grounded in the defense and implementation of human rights. As noted above, actions and speeches in this regard are far from neutral. Rejecting neutrality as a realistic possibility, institutions of higher education should openly and responsibly assume the task of choosing among competing values, together with the consequences that such choices may entail.
Conclusion
Our conclusion is that demands for neutrality in education are both a fallacy and an illusion. They rest on the incoherent premise that the choices and actions of scholars and academic institutions—whatever their content—are devoid of judgment and entail no commitments to political values.
If all academic and institutional choices necessarily reflect political valuations, it is untenable to demand neutrality in the design of curricula, research agendas, course syllabi, faculty and student selection processes, resource allocation, disciplinary policies, and the composition of governing bodies, among other domains. If the decisions and practices that underpin the work of scholars and institutions are not neutral, why should their public discourse be?
As we have argued, the claim of political neutrality in education is not only unsustainable but also dangerous, as it may legitimize practices of academic censorship. Framed as a defense of sociopolitical pluralism and balance among viewpoints, appeals to neutrality have enabled the suppression of discussions and practices related to gender, race, and religion—issues deemed politically sensitive—within academic spaces and the public sphere. Moreover, such appeals rest on the misleading assumption that academic knowledge, grounded in disciplinary methods and rigor, can be equated with personal opinions that do not adhere to those standards.
Beyond these risks, political neutrality also enables silence from scholars and academic institutions in the face of social injustices and attacks on human rights and the rule of law. By contrast, the role of educational actors is precisely to act and speak out in defense of these values, whether grounded in the legal obligations that bind them or in the ethical commitments that should guide the academic profession.
Suggested citation: Fernando Romani Sales and Maria Fernanda Silva Assis, “Political Neutrality” in Education? Part II: The Illusion of Institutional Neutrality, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, May 30, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/political-neutrality-in-education-part-ii-the-illusion-of-institutional-neutrality/
[1] B.A. in Law from the Federal University of Lavras (UFLA). Researcher at the Center for the Analysis of Liberty and Authoritarianism (LAUT) and member of the Coalition for Academic Freedom in the Americas (CAFA).
[2] He was a full-time PhD visiting researcher at King’s College London (KCL), School of Education, Communication & Society. MSc in Law and Development from the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV). Program Officer at the Coalition for Academic Freedom in the Americas (CAFA) and researcher at the Center for the Analysis of Liberty and Authoritarianism (LAUT).