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Of Constitutional Firsts and Troubled Judicial Waters in Ghana

By November 28, 2025Developments

Maame A.S. Mensa-Bonsu, Associate Professor of Law and Head of Department, Department of Law and Public Policy, Ashesi University, Ghana

On 17th November 2025, Justice Paul Baffoe-Bonnie was sworn in as Ghana’s new Chief Justice (CJ), replacing Justice Gertrude Torkornoo who became the first Chief Justice in the country’s history to be removed from office. That removal process has been among the most bewildering, reality TV public life Ghana has ever known. After setting out the drama in the briefest detail possible, I offer some reflections and unsolicited advice to the new CJ.

In March 2025, President Mahama referred three petitions alleging financial impropriety and abuse of power by CJ Torkornoo to the Council of State for advice whether a prima facie case had been made out against her. It responded in the affirmative. Mahama then established the constitutional Panel of five and suspended Torkornoo as CJ pending the determination of the petitions. Torkornoo unsuccessfully sought, first, an injunction against the Committee, then a declaration she was entitled to waive the constitutional requirement that Panel proceedings be in camera. Later, she held a press conference complaining about the process and accusing panel members of bias.

On receiving the Panel’s report, President Mahama issued a warrant removing Torkornoo as Chief Justice and Justice of the Supreme Court. Torkornoo insisted that as she was removed based on administrative matters only the CJ deals with, she could not be removed as a judge based thereon. Her posture notwithstanding, she has remained off the Court. With the dismissal of her Ecowas application for provisional measures, the former CJ has run out of rope and must accept the end of her judicial journey.

The removal process was high drama, high tension, and polemical. Torkornoo had been repeatedly accused of skewing justice in favour of the government and the now-opposition’s conduct during the removal process confirmed as plausible what many had previously thought was sour grapes.  Still, the removal has been seen as politically motivated and there is anxiety that Mahama has set a dangerous precedent for every government to remove the CJ they inherited.

Was the removal politically motivated? Undoubtedly. Torkornoo had made an enemy of the new ruling party, particularly with a series of legally untenable acts/decisions leading up to the elections which made her political affinity obvious.  Political motivation is not ipso facto a problem, however; public life is generally politically motivated. Few beneficial government projects are so devoid of political motivation that politicians would insist on them against societal resistance.

The President behaved unobjectionably, his every step in accordance with article 146. The fault lies squarely with the former CJ and Justice Date-Bah, former Supreme Court judge.  It was offered in Torkornoo’s defence that the improprieties were too trivial to merit removal, and further that the policy under which she improperly expended public funds on her family’s holidays preceded her.

Inheriting a policy does not make it less improper. The true mark of character is that one does the right thing even when all about you condone, even exhort, wrongdoing. Nor is the argument about their weightlessness any more exculpatory. If financial impropriety is proved in a Chief Justice and she remains at post, society loses the moral authority to punish an impoverished citizen who eats via theft. Financial impropriety is avoidable. Theft, even if rooted in desperation, is also avoidable. It is the singularly unjust society for whom holiday-related financial impropriety imputes no misbehaviour to its culprit, but desperation-rooted theft is a moral failing deserving of punishment. As Brown et al  note, ethical leadership is “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct among followers through two‐way communication, reinforcement, and decision‐making.” When the CJ does not live up to the standard that we (not she) want the entire judiciary to live up to, we must either say that she has failed in her leadership, or we must revise our standard downwards for everybody else.

A CJ should eschew any impression that she is incompetent in constitutional matters. To assert that a constitutional requirement is a privilege for her benefit with which she is at liberty to dispense is to betray an unforgivable incompetence in the basic tenets of constitutional theory. Every constitutional provision creates a right in the whole society to what it contains. Her view of the desirability of the secrecy is no more relevant to its status than a suicidal person’s view of their life impacts the state’s duty to protect it. Moreover, what should citizens who disagree with constitutional provisions or court orders do? By her example, disregard them. In holding press conference on a matter the Constitution forbids her from speaking, the CJ did not behave as the head of a constitutional court ought.

In 2006, Justice Date-Bah, in Agyei-Twum v AG, declared that article 146 intended to contain a condition precedent for the setting up of the panel which the framers forgot to put in; that a prima facie case should be established against the CJ. So, with an abracadabra and a wave of his wand, Date-Bah wrote the condition in and tasked the President upon consultation with the Council of State to make it. Date-Bah’s concern with how easily a CJ could be removed under the original article 146 was justified. But the effect of his interference illustrates why I insist judges should not amend constitutions.  He focused on stymieing frivolous petitions and missed the impact on the Constitution’s separation of powers configuration.

Two questions are raised by a petition to remove the CJ: (i). Are the accusations weighty enough to justify the CJ’s removal if true?  (ii).  Are they true?  Date-Bah, by his interference, moved (i) out of the Panel’s reach and into the President’s lap with no parameters to limit his choices. Thus, if he chose, he could declare a prima facie case established on an accusation that the CJ looked unheroic in the judicial wig.  The panel can now only answer (ii). It is not Mahama who has put the security of the CJ’s tenure at risk; it is Date-Bah. With the President’s ability now to threaten a swift removal, all but the most upright, most fearless and most content to retire CJ are amenable to executive influence. Our quest for constitutionalism has been gravely compromised, not by the politicians whose fides we know well to distrust, but by the judges in whom we had placed much of our hope of limited government.

As Finnis argues, the primary features of a system in which the Rule of Law inheres have second order requirements. An independent, competent judiciary is imperative to the consistent application of laws. Judicial independence in turn requires insulation from retribution or reward from the executive. In placing the determination of a prima facie case on the President, Date-Bah singlehandedly erased the prop upon which the judiciary stood equal to the executive.

It is now vital that the Bench be reassured that this unprecedented event is not part of a concerted campaign against judges unsympathetic to the current government. However justified the removal of Torkornoo was, it is not the sort of event after which there are no ripples. Just as removing a tumour can both save one’s life and cause paralysis, touching the foundational power distribution of the Constitution has serious side effects. 

The judiciary is the last bastion of the constitutional state. If the people lose faith in it, they will topple it – or cheer for the person who does. When, in 1982, three respected High Court judges were abducted and killed, the judiciary saw an exodus of judges and struggled for decades thereafter for talent. Thirty years of the1992 Constitution later, faith in its capacity to safeguard the quality of the citizen’s life has grown appreciably.  It is most unwise to jeopardise that faith now by cowing the judiciary.

Baffoe-Bonnie CJ takes office in uncharted waters. How he handles the very shaken, but no less valuable mantle will determine how well the judiciary will recover from this disruptive event. If he handles it well, the removal will stand as a reminder to every judge to live right and use their power responsibly. If he mishandles it, he will teach judges that a party card is a handier tool than a library of authorities. May the latter not be what we remember his tenure for.

Suggested citation: Maame A.S. Mensa-Bonsu, Of Constitutional Firsts and Troubled Judicial Waters in Ghana, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Nov. 28, 2025, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/of-constitutional-first-and-troubled-judicial-waters-in-ghana

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