—Milton César Jiménez Ramírez, Professor and Researcher, Universidad de Caldas, Colombia
The phenomenon wherein power becomes increasingly concentrated, ultimately overshadowing the mandates of Congress and the judiciary, can be captured by the concept of mega-presidentialism. This approach centralizes political attention and social ideals around the president, often aligning with their personal and partisan interests. It frequently capitalizes on exceptional powers during periods of social and political crisis. This style of governance can be described as strongman rule (caudillismo), characterized by the misuse of the rule of law and a distortion of constitutional provisions, traditions, and institutional dialogue, often approaching or even surpassing the thresholds of authoritarianism. It embodies the practical realization of hyper-presidential systems, marked by strategies that further erode the separation of powers, particularly during situational crises or times of intense political division. In this piece, I build upon this concept to help understand the strategies of government pursued by the last two Colombian administrations.
During the pandemic, the government of Iván Duque (2018-2022) made extensive use of the emergency powers granted by the state of exception declared in 2020 to tackle the health crisis. The restrictions imposed on citizens’ rights during this time were exploited by the government to bolster its institutional and political dominance while reducing political and social oversight. This phenomenon is evident in at least three distinct forms.
First, the normalization of extraordinary powers and the restructuring of the legal system through decrees with the force of law—often of an administrative nature and repeatedly justified by the public health crisis—have come to the forefront. The government issued nearly 200 decrees that changed the management of public finances, the enforcement of the right to petition, and access to justice, while also attempting to unfairly restrict the right to protest. This shift reduced the functions of the legislative branch, as what was once an exception became standard. The president made decisions for all branches of government, effectively minimizing their deliberative roles, political oversight, and the legal regulation of fundamental rights. Although the president did not explicitly challenge the Constitution, he de facto displaced its authority.
Second, the glorification of the presidential figure, although a common feature of hyper-presidentialism, elevates this new phenomenon to even higher levels. Beyond the president’s approval or popularity, which in Duque’s case was 30% (similar to that of President Petro), the media was overused, and public space and opinion were saturated with government information and its claimed achievements. The president exploited his position to offset his political disapproval. Ironically, while widely criticized for poor administrative management, he gained more power, which diminished social and political oversight and shifted collective issues into the hands of a political minority distant from the social majority. This created a form of material immunity against opposition.
Third, the intensification of the monopoly on force and the repression of protest was a common measure to illegitimately maintain public order and challenged the commonly accepted prevalence of civilian power over military power. The President continuously exalted the armed forces and offered a violent response to citizen criticism, seeking to nullify their discourses and dominate public opinion. To do this, he resorted to using segregationist language, labeling those who protest (opposition, students, etc.) as enemies. He defines the opposition as a sponsor of defiance against authority.
Along these instantiations of mega-presidentialism, President Duque employed other strategies usually linked to the excessive control of power in Latin America such as the co-optation of oversight bodies through political alliances that facilitate merely apparent control exercised by fellow party members or political sectors aligned with the government, and the challenges of sensitive judicial decisions such as the pre-trial detention against former President Alvaro Uribe ordered by the Supreme Court.
One might assume that mega-presidentialism is merely an extension of the hyper-presidentialism observed during severe crises, such as a pandemic, which allows for the disproportionate exercise of exceptional powers enshrined in the constitution. However, it can also thrive in contexts where there is a desire to manipulate the constitution and democracy to ensure the continuity and outcomes of a government, particularly in a climate of intense political polarization. Indeed, the administration of Gustavo Petro has invoked the concept of “the people,” claiming to represent the social majorities he believes support him, along with the need to enhance their participation. Two specific cases exemplify Petro as a mega-president. In both instances, constitutional norms are weaponized, and a radical form of democracy is promoted to undermine the opposition while elevating the president’s interpretation as the constitutional guarantor.
First, there is the call for a popular consultation. Decree 639 of 2025 marked a pivotal shift in the constitutional understanding of the separation of powers, following the government’s promotion of various social reforms—such as constitutional changes concerning peasant rights and agrarian jurisdiction, as well as reforms in taxation and pensions, which showcased its institutional capacity to approve impactful proposals—the Petro administration advocated for a labor reform aimed at optimizing worker remuneration. However, this bill was ultimately rejected by the Senate of the Republic. The government contended that the bill had not been adequately debated, asserting that the legislative branch’s intention was to obstruct government action and undermine the “working class.” Consequently, it was deemed necessary for the public to vote on the desirability of the reform.
A popular consultation is a mechanism for civic participation that, to be initiated by the government, requires the approval of a majority in the Senate and a favorable vote of half plus one of the valid votes, provided that at least one-third of the electorate (approximately 14,000,000) participates. The use of such mechanisms is a viable option, even as a means to resolve conflicts between the executive and legislative branches. However, in this instance, the government attempted to delegitimize the Senate by depicting it as a mere adversary. The participation mechanism was employed under the threat of a massive popular vote. The government exceeded its authority by calling a popular consultation with twelve (12) questions, despite the Senate’s vote against its convocation (49 votes in favor, 47 against), rendering the decree clearly unconstitutional. This situation reflects a trend of mega-presidentialism in that it (i) assumes a judicial role by unilaterally declaring irregularities in the Senate’s voting process; (ii) directly violates the constitution, as Article 104 explicitly requires the Senate’s prior and favorable opinion for convening a popular consultation; and (iii) reinterprets the constitution by positioning itself as its sole interpreter and defender, prioritizing social interests over the established institutional framework.
Although the popular consultation was not held—because the opposition and other sectors challenged the decree before the Council of State, which provisionally suspended it, leading the government to repeal the norm—the pressure on the legislative branch was concerning. Ultimately, the Senate resumed the legislative process and approved the reform as a response to the citizenry and to halt any attempt to proceed to an electoral contest. In any case, the door was left open for this to become a recurring practice, as has been announced by the Domestic Affairs Ministry Armando Bendetti, regarding health reform yet to be discussed in Congress.
The second manifestation of mega-presidentialism in the Petro government relates to the proposal for a national constituent assembly. The 1991 Constitution provided an imperfect framework for controlling power and guaranteeing some fundamental rights. Nonetheless, it has marked a significant step toward the consolidation of democracy and the protection of human rights. Despite this achievement, Gustavo Petro has consistently pursued the possibility of convening a national constituent assembly—either to reform or replace the current constitution. This initiative aims not only to address the social demands raised during the 2021 protests but also to advance key issues such as the implementation of the 2016 peace accords between the State and the FARC guerrillas, climate change initiatives, and guarantees related to education, health, and universal wages.
Initially, a constituent process was proposed according to the requirements of Article 376 of the Constitution, which involves passing a law in Congress, conducting prior constitutional review, and holding a popular vote with at least one-third of the electoral census. However, due to the lack of a concrete proposal and criticism from the opposition, President Petro began to suggest the idea of a permanent constituent moment, or the “living constituent power of the people,” which could meet and continually decide on any matter. This implies a broad invocation, but one that could undermine the procedural requirements the people must follow to organize and express their power. Mega-presidentialism dismisses the procedural limits of the constitution and promotes abstraction as a realm where it can operate freely.
The proposal for a constituent assembly, and even for a permanent popular assembly, did not find a relevant institutional traction. However, in 2025, just after the failed popular consultation and the approval of the labor reform by Congress, the government returned with the proposal of a constituent assembly under a creative interpretation of the constitution that displaces the legislative branch: the people, convened by the government, can collect the support of millions of citizens and call a constituent assembly without legislative intervention, all to secure an institutional framework that allows for the changes the nation requires.
Mega-presidentialism, as a sociological concept, not only reveals a way to operate executive power in the context of division and confusion but also shows how the chief executive actively fosters them. It marks a departure from constitutional politics and the established constitutional regime toward a president-centric paradigm. This system encourages polarization rather than pursuing social objectives; instead, it leads to ineffective governance. The environment it engenders is marked by institutional tensions. The rhetoric employed is incendiary, saturating and manipulating the media while framing and defining issues within the digital landscape. Rather than concentrating on effective public administration, it resembles an ongoing political campaign. This phenomenon emerges from a historical context characterized by a lack of accountability and an inability to deliver effective public service or promote collective well-being.
In Petro´s case, the government ignored the clarity of the constitutional mandate requiring the approval of a law to convene the people. It insisted on the autonomy of its proposal from constitutional rules, promoting the inclusion of an extra ballot in the next popular elections (the “eighth ballot,” referencing the “seventh ballot,” a social movement that influenced the 1991 Constitution). This was meant to allow the people, through a political act, to decide if they wanted the constituent assembly. The government believed that if the people expressed a strong opinion, the legislative branch would be compelled to convene the assembly. Its goal was to create a political act to pressure a legal outcome, even if it disrupted the constitutional order. This demonstrates an interest in fostering ongoing conflicts where government wishes are imposed, even if it involves pursuing unconstitutional paths.
In conclusion, mega-presidentialism functions as a double-edged phenomenon; it weaponizes the concept of “the will of the people” by merging it with the will of the President, while also exploiting crises to solidify its power. On one side, when faced with political dissent or government challenges, the administration claims that institutions block the fulfillment of the people’s desires, creating barriers that the government cannot overcome. Consequently, citizens are encouraged to eliminate these obstacles by changing the constitutional framework and electorally supporting the president, who positions herself as the only figure capable of interpreting and defending her constitutional mandate. On the other side, when popular support wanes, it reveals how entrenchment becomes the ultimate goal. The administrations of Duque and Petro exemplify this complex phenomenon.
Suggested citation: Milton César Jiménez Ramírez, Mega-Presidentialism in Colombia: The Accumulation of Power in the Governments from Iván Duque to Gustavo Petro, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 23, 2025, at:http:/www.iconnectblog.com/mega-presidentialism-in-colombia-the-accumulation-of-power-in-the-governments-from-ivan-duque-to-gustavo-petro/