—Kristof Heidemann, PhD researcher under the supervision of Prof. Janne Salminen and Dr. Hanna Malik (LL.M.), Faculty of Law, University of Turku
The 2025 Canadian Federal Election saw Mark Carney emerge as Prime Minister, leading a narrow Liberal Party minority in the House of Commons. While this set-up has so far proved to be politically complicated (e.g. the recent budget was only able to pass with supporting measures of NDP and Green MPs), but basically functional, multiple recent party-crossings of formerly Conservative MPs to the Liberals (Michael Ma and Chris d’Entremont) have put the Carney government just one vote short of a majority government, and there are hints suggesting that this scenario will manifest in the not-too-distant future.
This post argues that increasing political polarization will make the appearance of similar situations more likely in the future, both in Canada and other democracies around the globe in the process also creating chances for extremely wealthy actors to obtain significant influence on politics and push forward their special interests. In practice, this could result in the creation of an oligarchical filibuster that (fatally) undermines governments without stable majorities, unless protective measures are implemented. As for the design of such measures, since anti-defection laws are in many ways problematic, the best way forward currently seems to be obliging substantially increased transparency regarding the finances and affiliations of MPs after they have crossed the floor.
A Canadian Case Study
The practice of party floor-crossing is surprisingly common in the Canadian parliament compared to other countries, with over 300 examples to date, 80 of which happened in the last 25 years. Many of the MPs involved lost their seat during the subsequent election (especially if the move was generally considered to be primarily motivated by opportunistic career-advancement rather than substantive policy), and even though attempts have been undertaken, so far no anti-defection legislation has passed.
Perhaps the most notable case to date involved former Liberal David Emerson, who in order to keep a ministerial role decided in 2005 to join the newly elected Conservative Harper government after he had only weeks earlier promised to be their “worst nightmare” (while some Liberal MPs had argued that the behavior was in breach of the conflict of interest code for members of the House of Commons and the Ethics Commissioner performed a legal probe of the matter, both Harper and Emmerson were in the end cleared of the charges).
This example exposes a certain amount of hypocrisy within the ranks of Canadian Conservatives who have decried the recent defections as a sign of a lack of respect for the will of the voters and symptomatic of a leadership of “dirty backroom deals”. For one reason or another, current Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre did not offer such a strong-worded critique (or any critique for that matter) when Liberals crossed the floor to the Conservatives during the Harper years and in 2012, even personally (together with the vast majority of the Conservative and Liberal Caucuses) voted against a bill proposed by the New Democratic Party (NDP) addressing the problem.
Polarization as Fuel
While historically party switches that altered the status of the government have been relatively rare in most democracies, this may be about to change, given that across multiple western nations both affective (=emotional) and ideological polarization have connectively and consistently increased during recent years (though with a substantial variation in degree, with some national examples in which depolarization seems to have taken place). Polarization leads to increased party loyalty in the electorate, which in turn shrinks the number of voters willing to switch their ballot across elections. With a reduced number of “floating” voters, election results necessarily will become narrower, heightening the potential for significant party crossings that alter the existence of parliamentary majorities, thereby increasing the incentive for political actors to pursue such strategies. To be fair, in a certain sense (elite) polarization can make party defections less likely by causing the election of representatives who are ideologically farther away from the opposing camp than otherwise would be the case, broadening the leap-distance necessary for the crossing. While this holds for idealistically driven representatives, the recent Canadian examples show that even in an increasingly polarized society and political culture, floor crossings will happen by representatives looking for “practical” ways to serve their (and their constituents’) interests.
This holds true especially in current circumstances, with economic inequality parallelly widening across the West, progressively expanding the (monetary) power of a class of extremely wealthy actors who are not traditionally known for lacking scruple in defending their interests politically. Some parts of the oligarchical toolbox are widely discussed these days, however, the unique risks associated with floor crossings have up until now failed to attract the warranted public attention.
Associated oligarchical dangers
While some lobbying practices are legitimate in a democracy, the partially hidden influence of corporate actors, both through direct and indirect means, on political processes across the Western world has reached a concerning stage. The problem is most notable in the U.S., where multiple observers and politicians have determined the conditions of an oligarchy already to be met, but (to a lesser extent) also in countries such as e.g. Germany, Japan, the U.K., Canada, and Australia (all of which also lack general anti-defection regulations at the national level).
Corporate influence has historically been targeted at legislators in a sophisticated manner, and it would be naïve to assume that donors will never seize on opportunities to achieve the result of creating or toppling a governmental majorities at comparatively low cost. Indeed, for example, in India, the practice of bribing legislators to buy party switches was a problem for decades, which is why the country today has perhaps the most extensive anti-defection legal history in the world.
It does not require a great deal of imagination to contemplate corporate interests being enticed to turn the majority-situation upside down by targeting one or two suitable legislators, combing tools such as (depending on the regulations in the country in question) promises of campaign support or lucrative industry positions after leaving politics (or for family members, etc.), investments into the district of the representative, positive coverage in privately owned media/ communication outlets, etc. From the viewpoint of such superrich corporate actors influencing the political sphere, it is simply cost-efficient to spend a comparatively small amount of money to prevent far more costly governmental action that would increase regulatory obligations and their tax burden.
Of course, such dangers exist in any parliamentary system. Nevertheless, with a sizeable majority, it becomes harder for oligarchical interests to find a sufficient number of legislators susceptible to this kind of corporate pressure and the potential to leave their party. Factors such as representing a competitive district in which changing to a different party ticket seems beneficial or at least not obviously detrimental for reelection, representing a district highly dependent on e.g. specific industries or in urgent need of investment (e.g. a Tesla fabric as a job booster), a certain amount of Machiavellian opportunism in favor of personal advancement, conflicts with the own party leadership, etc. are factors that can render disruptive party crossing far more attractive to some MPs than to their average party colleague, but parliamentarians meeting such a profile are not limitless. Moreover, the risk of exposure as well as the costs of such an undertaking increase significantly the more members an oligarch needs to convince to make such a move, and each defecting legislator becomes less consequential individually, meaning that incentives such as position in government or in the new party, personal media attention, etc., will not exist to the same extent.
Since billionaires, most visibly Elon Musk, have recently once more proven their desire to meddle with politics and military operations on a global scale, and corporate networks, especially the Atlas Network and industry-specific organizations (e.g. for the tobacco or the fossil fuel industry), act on cross-national level, and multiple governments become increasingly reliant on corporations even in the sphere of national security, the problems are bound to increase in the future unless broad, effective action is urgently taken.
Solutions?
The problem with anti-defection laws is that it is next to impossible to establish the criteria for defection and the following inferred penalty without leaving major loopholes while trying to preserve legislators’ autonomy to a reasonable extent. While the tool potentially shifts power away from corrupt outside influences, it also diverts it from individual legislators towards party elites who can adapt it to stifle inner-party opposition and spread division among political opponents, especially when an independent review of the criteria by an institution outside the direct control of the governmental majority is absent.
A defection-definition that is so broad as to make voting against the own party line entirely impossible severely undermines the legislature’s check and balance function to hold the executive accountable and therefore would also run into constitutional restraints of the free mandate conceptualized according to the Burkean tradition that is foundational to most modern democracies, meaning that it would likely require politically difficult constitutional changes. Furthermore, it hampers the deliberative function of parliament, given that it discourages individual legislators from deeply engaging with the questions of the day.
Instead, mandatory heightened transparency obligations (going further than regular MP-requirements), regarding both finances and affiliations, for defecting legislators (and their nuclear family), causing changing majority situations in parliament after their floor crossing, could be an alternative worthwhile considering. While undoubtedly a restriction on the personal privacy rights of the MPs in question, this would be justified by the prevailing public interest in a legitimate democratic process, especially when a government’s existence is at stake. The investigation of the financial records, as well as contacts, of the legislator concerned should be undertaken by an independent body, and the decision regarding the publication or non-publication should be open for judicial control upon request of a sufficient number of opposing legislators.
Should such efforts prove futile and inadequate, it may be necessary to try to implement constitutional changes which require that whenever a governmental majority lives or dies by floor-crossing, a new election becomes mandatory as the only legitimate way to proceed, which assures that the sitting government adequately represents a majority of voters.
In conclusion, in light of the recent Canadian floor crossings, the rise of polarization and a substantial increase of oligarchical influences, defenders of democracy around the globe should urgently work towards implementing measures ensuring transparency regarding the finances and affiliations of MPs after they have crossed the floor to prevent parliamentary majorities from existing at the mercy of oligarchical players without any form of democratic accountability.
Suggested citation: Kristof Heidemann, Mark Carney, Floor Crossings, and the Danger of an Oligarchical Governmental Overthrow, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Jan. 14, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/mark-carney-floor-crossings-and-the-danger-of-an-oligarchical-governmental-overthrow/