—Victoria Miyandazi, Assistant Professor in Public Law, University of Nottingham (UK)
[Editor’s Note: This is one of our ICONnect columns. For more information on our 2026 columnists, see here.]
On 3 February 2026, my attention was drawn to a consultative meeting convened by Kenya’s Chief Justice, Martha Koome, with Senior Counsel Philip Murgor, Senior Counsel Ahmednasir Abdullahi, Senior Counsel Nelson Havi, and the President of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), Faith Odhiambo. The meeting sought to address concerns about access to justice, corruption in the administration of justice, and broader systemic barriers affecting efficiency, integrity, and public confidence in the rule of law.
The optics were striking. The Chief Justice was engaging some of the judiciary’s fiercest critics, particularly Ahmednasir Abdullahi and Nelson Havi, both of whom have repeatedly alleged systemic corruption within the judiciary. Abdullahi has popularised the term ‘JurisPesa’, a phrase that has entered Kenya’s legal lexicon as shorthand for bribery within the courts. He has faulted the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) for shielding corrupt judges, including those in the Supreme Court, either in its constitutive persona or individual membership.
The meeting followed the 23 January 2026 partial lifting of a two-year ban (for only the case in question) imposed by the Supreme Court on Abdullahi and members of his law firm. In January 2024, the Court barred him from appearing before it, noting the ‘irony’ of his continued filing of cases before a court he publicly accused of corruption and incompetence.[1] The decision was challenged before the High Court by both Abdullahi and the LSK (Petition E026 of 2024), raising constitutional concerns, including freedom of expression. There were, nevertheless, objections regarding the breach of the doctrine of stare decisis, questioning whether a lower court could entertain cases based on decisions of the highest court in the land.[2] The ban attracted sharp commentary, including the observation that ‘[t]hose so thin-skinned that they cannot withstand scrutiny, whether fair or foul, do not deserve to occupy high office.’[3]
Shortly after the 3 February meeting, the JSC wrote to a Chief Magistrate concerning bribery allegations raised publicly by Nelson Havi on social media. These developments resurfaced key questions that have occupied much of my recent research: what does effective judicial anti-corruption reform actually look like? Which approaches are better suited for tackling judicial corruption, especially in hybrid regimes like Kenya?
What the Scholarship Tells Us
Judicial corruption is neither uniquely Kenyan nor episodic. Comparative scholarship consistently shows that it undermines equality before the law and exacerbates access to justice deficits. Pedersen and Johannsen argue that judicial corruption is frequently underreported and requires a multimethod research approach – combining quantitative data, case analysis, qualitative interviews, and contextual studies – to capture its scale and causes.[4] In my own work with Duncan Okubasu, we observe that in hybrid democracies especially, judicial approaches to combat corruption, maintain integrity and foster public trust must tactfully also navigate political contestation, constitutional fragility, and institutional vulnerability.[5]
Importantly, corruption in the judiciary is often systemic rather than merely individual. Charles R. Ashman’s classic account, The Finest Judges Money Can Buy, reminds us that corruption requires networks – brokers, intermediaries, and enablers.[6] Where judicial discretion is broad, opportunities for corrupt influence multiply. As Stratos Pahis notes, every discretionary judicial decision is a potential opportunity for corruption. His study of corruption cases involving U.S. judges reveals institutional weaknesses in detection and reporting mechanisms, particularly where incentives to expose misconduct are weak.[7]
The lesson is clear: combating judicial corruption requires more than disciplining individual judges and addressing issues relating to ethics and integrity.[8] It demands structural reform, credible reporting systems, effective whistleblower protections, and institutional transparency.
Institutional Reform Efforts to Tackle JurisPesa
Kenya’s 2010 Constitution is not silent on integrity. Chapter 6 establishes standards of leadership and accountability, while Article 76 prohibits state officers from accepting benefits that compromise their duties. The Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations 2020 reinforce these obligations, explicitly prohibiting bribery and the acceptance of gifts or benefits that undermine integrity. Articles 168 and 172 of the Constitution assign the Judicial Service Commission the mandate to receive complaints against judges, investigate them, and initiate removal proceedings. The JSC also disciplines magistrates, registrars, and judicial staff. In design, therefore, Kenya possesses a robust normative framework.
The more difficult question is how effectively these mechanisms function in practice.
On 25 March 2025, Chief Justice Koome announced a strategic shift toward an intelligence-led anti-corruption model in partnership with the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) and the National Intelligence Service. The approach aims to identify corruption patterns and hotspots proactively rather than reactively. She also rolled out Court Integrity Committees across court stations to provide collaborative platforms for raising and addressing ethical concerns. These strategies show that corruption prevention requires institutional design, not merely punitive responses.
One of the most consequential judicial corruption cases under CJ Koome’s tenure involved High Court Judge Juma Chitembwe. Following public exposés by former Nairobi Governor Mike Sonko, including video and audio recordings, the JSC initiated removal proceedings on its own motion. A tribunal chaired by Justice Mumbi Ngugi found Chitembwe guilty of four out of six allegations of corruption and misconduct. The Supreme Court later dismissed his challenge to the tribunal’s findings (Petition E001 of 2023). The case demonstrates some level of institutional resolve. Yet it also revealed structural vulnerabilities. Four prior complaints against the judge had reportedly been withdrawn. This raises questions about witness protection, fear of retaliation, evidentiary burdens, and whistleblower safeguards. While the JSC permits anonymous complaints, its public-facing guidance on protection mechanisms remains sparse, offering only general reassurance that complainants may seek protection from ‘relevant government agencies’.
If judicial corruption is underreported, as scholarship suggests, then robust, low-threshold reporting systems and meaningful witness protection become indispensable.
The ASGF: A Sector-Wide Approach
At the sector level, the National Council on the Administration of Justice (NCAJ) launched the Anti-Corruption Strategic Guiding Framework (ASGF) in 2025. Structured around five pillars – coordination, legal reform, efficiency, digital innovation, and sustainability – the framework recognises that corruption is systemic and requires coordinated reform across institutions. For the judiciary, the ASGF emphasises enforceable timelines in corruption cases, specialised anti-corruption courts, strengthened performance indicators, digitised case management systems to reduce discretion-based vulnerabilities, harmonised data sharing, and standardised sentencing guidelines. It embeds monitoring, evaluation, and learning as core features of reform, aligning domestic efforts with Africa Agenda 2063 and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. This reflects a considered approach that understands that integrity reform must be iterative, data-driven, and institutionally owned.
Yet a significant omission remains.
Despite the ASGF’s comprehensive scope, there is limited transparency concerning the work of the Judicial Service Commission in handling corruption complaints against judges and judicial officers. While the framework’s appendices provide statistics on corruption cases processed by the Milimani High Court and Magistrates’ Anti-Corruption Divisions between 2019 and 2024, and reference data from institutions such as the EACC, they do not disclose the number of corruption complaints received and acted upon by the JSC itself. This absence is notable. The JSC is the constitutionally mandated body responsible for judicial discipline and removal. Without publicly available, disaggregated data on complaints, investigations, and outcomes, accountability risks appearing incomplete. Transparency about internal disciplinary processes is not a peripheral matter – it is central to rebuilding public confidence. However, the JSC’s 2024/25 Annual Report indicates that 214 petitions against judges were under consideration during the reporting period (with 82 being concluded), including 68 relating to alleged breaches of the Code of Conduct, such as bribery and corruption. In addition, 67 new disciplinary cases were filed during that period. The report also notes progress in the development of a JSC Anti-Corruption Policy and an investigations procedures manual.
Where Reform Must Go Next
The February 2026 meeting on corruption and access to justice concerns was symbolically significant. It suggested institutional openness to dialogue, even in the face of sharp public criticism. But symbolism must translate into sustained structural reform. Comparative scholarship suggests several key imperatives: (1) strengthening whistleblower and witness protection with clear, accessible procedures and visible safeguards; (2) lowering reporting thresholds so that individuals can provide tips without bearing unrealistic evidentiary burdens; (3) enhancing transparency in JSC complaint handling through, for instance, the regular publication of disaggregated statistics on complaints received, screened, investigated, dismissed, or upheld – accompanied by brief summaries of the petitions/complaints concluded and a guilty verdict delivered; (4) deepening digital integration to reduce discretion-based vulnerabilities; and (5) institutionalising independent monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
Kenya’s judiciary has made meaningful strides, from intelligence-led strategies to sector-wide reform frameworks and a high-profile disciplinary proceeding. Yet judicial integrity reform is not a single event. It is a continuous process requiring transparency, courage, and institutional humility. Effective reform requires transforming whispers in court corridors about bribery and corruption into safe reporting channels, rumours into investigated facts, and public cynicism into institutional trust.
The fight against ‘JurisPesa’ will not be won through bans, rhetoric, or exposés alone. It will be won through systemic design, transparent accountability, and sustained commitment to constitutional integrity.
Suggested citation: Victoria Miyandazi, ‘JurisPesa’: Confronting Corruption in Kenya’s Judiciary, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Feb. 18, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/jurispesa-confronting-corruption-in-kenyas-judiciary/
[1] Letter from L M Wachira (Registrar of the Supreme Court of Kenya) to Mr. Ahmednasir Abdullahi SC,18 January 2024.
[2] Kamau Muthoni, ‘Judges Say Ahmednasir Can Only Challenge Ban before Supreme Court’, The Standard (online, 2024) <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001490548/judges-say-ahmednasir-can-only-challenge-ban-before-supreme-court>.
[3] Macharia Gaitho, ‘CJ Played into Ahmednassir’s Hands’, Nation (online, 22 January 2024) <https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/cj-played-into-ahmednassir-s-hands-4499858#story>; John Kamau, ‘Ahmednassir, Judges and Freedom of Expression’, Nation (Nairobi, 21 January 2024); Makau Mutua, ‘The Folly of Banning Ahmednasir’, Nation (Nairobi, 28 January 2024).
[4] Karin Pedersen and Lars Johannsen, ‘When Corruption Hits the Judiciary: A Global Perspective on Access to Justice and Corruption’ (2023) 13(4) Oñati Socio-Legal Series 1258–1280.
[5] Victoria Miyandazi and Duncan M Okubasu, ‘Judiciary Chiefs in Hybrid Regimes: Kenya’ (2025) 23(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 240–262, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moaf016.
[6] Charles R Ashman, The Finest Judges Money Can Buy: And Other Forms of Judicial Pollution (Nash Publishing, Los Angeles 1973).
[7] Stratos Pahis, ‘Corruption in Our Courts: What It Looks Like and Where It Is Hidden’ (2009) 118(8) The Yale Law Journal 1900–1943, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40389524.
[8] F O Okiri, L W Ngugi and J O Wandayi, ‘Strengthening Integrity & Preventing Corruption in the Judiciary in Kenya’ (2019) 10 Beijing Law Review 131–152, https://doi.org/10.4236/blr.2019.101008.