—Benedetta Lobina, re:constitution fellow and UCD Sutherland School of Law
On 30 October 2025, the Italian Senate approved a new constitutional reform of the judiciary, which separates magistrates into two distinct career paths (judges and prosecutors), remodels the existing judicial self-governance system, and creates a new High Disciplinary Court. Ultimately, I argue, this is a dangerous reform, which additionally falls short of addressing the most pressing concerns related to the justice system. Instead, it deflects attention to matters of little relevance to the general public, while raising concerns over the government’s true intentions, especially given inflammatory declarations made by some of its highest ranking officials. Its ultimate approval (or failure) will have to be decided by popular referendum in 2026.
1. The proposed changes
Constitutional amendment n. 1353-B (pending referendum) modifies several articles of the Constitution (Articles 87, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 110), to separate the career paths of judges and prosecutors, which at present are grouped collectively under the umbrella of “magistrates”. As such, prosecutors will no longer be able to become judges later in their careers (and vice versa), thus removing a possibility which the government considered as detrimental to public trust in the judiciary. Accordingly, the National Council of the Judiciary (CSM), the governing body that ensures the autonomy and independence of the judiciary and is in charge of employment, promotions, and disciplinary actions vis-à-vis judges will be split into two separate bodies, with a new appointment system. Instead of electing their peers to each new CSM, the judges/prosecutors that will make up 2/3 of each new CSM will be randomly selected through sortition by lot, i.e. drawn from all eligible candidates. The Italian Parliament will also use sortition to appoint the lay members of each CSM (the remaining 1/3) from a list drafted by MPs (a process which will require further clarification through ordinary legislation).
The new CSMs will also be stripped of disciplinary powers. Instead, a High Disciplinary Court (ACD) has been constituted under Article 105 of the Constitution. Its membership will also include professional (i.e. judges/prosecutors) and lay members drawn by lot. The decisions of the ACD can be appealed before the same court, but not before the Court of Cassation – despite Article 111 of the Constitution granting this Court jurisdiction over all appeals in Italy, with very narrow exceptions.
2. A “historic milestone” or a sign of backsliding ahead? Analysing the reform
Although Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni saluted the success in the Senate as a historic milestone towards a more efficient, balanced, and citizen-friendly justice system, a closer analysis exposes several shortcomings.
The judicial reform has been vastly unpopular with magistrates themselves, culminating in strikes earlier in the year. Their fear is that the text that was ultimately approved in October opens opportunities for political exploitation and overreach, including because its nature as a constitutional amendment means that many of the practicalities will have to be defined through ordinary legislation. Given the current political configuration of the Parliament and outspoken governmental hostility towards judges (see discussion below), there is a concern that new rules to be adopted would be unfavourable to the judiciary.
The separation of the career paths will require the definition of new rules about the two different professions and their roles, development, appointment processes, and so on. Magistrates have expressed concerns that the idea of isolating the public prosecutor service is often vulnerable to politicisation and that this service might become too close to the police in the adjudicative process, therefore compromising impartiality and undermining due process. While its external independence is currently guaranteed in the Constitution by the principle of unity of the judiciary, overseen by an equally unitary CSM, the new council for the public prosecutors could be placed under more stringent executive control.
The right to self-governance is further threatened by the new appointment system, which feigns neutrality via sortition, but actually removes the judiciary’s ability to elect its own representatives. Magistrates will no longer be represented by those who are considered more suitable to the role based experience, authority, but also organisation and mediation skills, potentially undermining the CSM’s historical and constitutional position as a strong independent power within the state.
The most problematic aspect of the reform is the new disciplinary system. Here too, concerns exist over the appointment by lot system, and the fact that the operations of the new system (including penalties and what constitutes sanctionable behaviour) will have to be defined at a later stage. Furthermore, the ACD’s role as both a court of first and second instance poses threats to judicial independence (as noted in the European Commission’s 2024 Annual Rule of Law Report). A substantial body of European jurisprudence on disciplinary regimes (see here for an extensive overview) has highlighted the growing phenomenon of instrumentalization of this tool as a means to curtail judicial independence. The ambiguity pertaining to the functioning of the ACD raises important questions over the amendment’s compliance with the principles set out by the European Courts in this regard.
The above concerns are further heightened by the discourse that has surrounded the reform since its inception. The Meloni government has often described judicial review of its actions as an undemocratic overreach. To name just a few examples – after a Rome court ruled against Italy’s immigration deal with Albania, Meloni labelled the decision (and therefore the judge) “prejudiced”, accusing the judiciary as a whole of creating sterile “opposition” instead of “help[ing] to give answers”. The Prime Minister also criticised a Court of Auditors decision related to the construction of a bridge connecting Sicily to the mainland by calling it an encroachment on the government’s jurisdiction, crucially adding that the reform of the judiciary hereby discussed would be “the most appropriate response to [such] intolerable overreach”. Moreover, it has furthered the Berlusconian mythology whereby “magistrates have even brought down governments”, in an alleged reversal of the principle of checks and balances and separation of powers where the political sphere has to put constraints on a draconian judiciary.
However, suggesting that the actions of the executive and legislative branches are above scrutiny by the judicial bodies is a fundamental misunderstanding of Italy’s own constitutional democracy, which is unequivocally predicated on the respect of the rule of law (see Constitutional Court case 379/1996). Such delegitimization, with its possible related chilling effect on judges, benefits the government, which has been using this as a strategy to reject oversight and pander to the electorate. In this climate, it is hard to believe that the government has been acting in good faith to create a ‘better’ functioning judiciary and prosecutorial service, and the frequently reiterated aspiration to curb the powers of the judiciary does not bode well when it comes to further refinement of what disciplinary proceedings might entail, for example. After all, although the government doesn’t have a large enough majority to pass constitutional amendments without the need for referenda, it has proven stable enough to pass ordinary legislation, and thus it will play a crucial role should the popular vote seal the success of the reform.
What is more, the reform of the judicial careers appears trivial in the broader context of the Italian justice system. The Italian judiciary operates sub-optimally (to name one example see the “Italian torpedo”). Year after year, the Commission’s Annual Rule of Law Report remarks upon shortages of magistrates and court staff, overworked judges, extremely lengthy proceedings, and digitalisation lags. The present reform simply does not address these issues.
Moreover, despite the government’s claims about the vital importance of the reform, in reality its scale and effect would be extremely limited. The number of prosecutors who became judges in the past five years (supposedly destabilising the public’s trust in the entire institution) amounts to 0.8% of the profession, and the reverse was chosen by merely 0.2% of judges. The figures had already been in freefall (less than 20 career changes per year from 2019 to 2021), and reached today’s negligeable numbers following the judicial reform of 2022, which enhanced the distinction between prosecutorial and adjudicatory magistrates by means of ordinary legislation (see Zanchetti and Vivone).
Conclusion
The reform of the judicial system is yet another milestone for the Meloni government, yet, whether that pushes Italy closer to the supposed goal of improved impartiality and due process is doubtful. It includes significant blind spots ripe for abuse, it was framed in hostile tones by its proponents, and fails to target the real issues affecting the majority of stakeholders, including ordinary Italians. The upcoming referendum, expected to take place in the Spring of 2026, although hard to predict, will be an important test of trust for the government, as well as potentially opening larger questions about Italy’s continued adherence to constitutional values, which this reform undermines.
Suggested citation: Benedetta Lobina, Italy’s Judicial Reform: Weakening the Judiciary in the Name of Impartiality, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Dec. 9, 2025, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/italys-judicial-reform-weakening-the-judiciary-in-the-name-of-impartiality/