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Habermas: The Last Towering Philosopher and Public Intellectual of our Era, A Jurisprudential Obituary Part I

By April 21, 2026Developments

Leonardo García Jaramillo, Full Professor, Policy and Development Area, Universidad EAFIT, Medellín, Colombia[1]

To Cristina Lafont,

“Was für eine Philosophie man wähle, hängt davon ab, was man für ein Mensch ist”.

Fichte

“Habermas was a wonderful person and an outstanding philosopher who expanded our understanding of justice”.

Martha Nussbaum

Like other major authors, Jürgen Habermas (Düsseldorf, June 18, 1929 – Starnberg, March 14, 2026) enjoys the unfortunate distinction of being cited more often than actually read. The reason might lie in Sunstein’s accurate assessment: “In sports, you might say, with a certain tone of voice: ‘Magic’, ‘MJ’, or ‘LeBron’. In philosophy, or academia more generally, you say, with that same tone of voice: ‘Habermas’”.[2]

Regardless of whether this is true, a definitive era of post-World War II thought comes to an end with Habermas’s passing. As one of the leading social theorists, public intellectuals, and philosophers in his native Germany and in Europe, but also in the United States and Latin America, he leaves us a legacy that has had a threefold influence: Not only has it permeated the disciplines of sociology, law, and philosophy, but it has also reshaped their very foundations. Any analysis of the legitimacy of law must engage with the structures of communicative rationality and address the normative framework on which the contemporary rule of law bases its self-understanding. His critical sympathies with the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and, more broadly, his writings on contextual issues related to war, bioethics, and real democracy have also had a notable impact on professional politicians. Through his prolific involvement in major media debates, he also formed public opinion. In fact, he was said to be the philosopher who shaped the culture of debate itself.

Habermas comes from a conservative, middle-class family in North Rhine-Westphalia. Contrary to what has been stated in numerous obituaries, Habermas was not placed in an artillery division during World War II. He avoided being sent to the front lines by chance because he was not home when they came to draft him. His father worked as an economic advisor in a town near Cologne and, as Winkler recounts, served the Nazi party. He rose to the rank of commander in the Wehrmacht, the Nazi armed forces.

Safeguarding democracy, which was suddenly achieved in the postwar period, was his life’s work. He remained faithful to the end in the eradication of dogmatism and fanaticism. He drew that lesson not only from Nazism but also from “left-wing fascism,” against which he had already warned as early as 1967. One of the concerns that motivated his work was to prevent the resurgence of nationalism in which he grew up. The historical experience of living under the Nazi regime shaped Habermas’s views on national identity. In the face of nationalisms that define cultural identity based on ethnicity or blood, he developed the concept of “constitutional patriotism,” coined by the political scientist Dolf Sternberger. Modern democracy must be based on adherence to constitutional values and principles. Indeed, the legitimacy and stability of these regimes depend on the constitution superseding the nation as the locus of collective identity. If, as he argues, the relationship between nation and constitutional democracy is historically contingent, democracies do not need a religion, a way of life, or shared cultural values to give meaning to and ground their collective identity. 

Habermas passed away at the age of 96. His wife, Ute, who passed away in June 2025, was always a key collaborator. He sought her approval “sentence by sentence (See: “Ein wunderbarer Mensch”). Habermas is survived by two of his three children. Their daughter, Rebekka, professor of contemporary history at the Georg-August University in Göttingen, passed away in December 2023 after a long illness.

The Journey of a Reason Turned Toward the World

Habermas earned his doctorate in 1954 at the University of Bonn. A deep and enduring concern for the political circumstances of his time emerged during his first job as a freelance journalist for newspapers and cultural magazines near the end of his studies in the early 50s. An exceptionally versatile writer, his academic work also allowed him to establish his role as a public intellectual on solid grounds. A critic of “derailed” capitalism, he addressed major German issues, such as the historical uniqueness of the Holocaust and reunification, but also global matters, such as bioethics (genetic engineering and stem cell research), wars in Kosovo and Iraq, terrorism, and NATO weakness under Trump. Jointly with three colleagues from the “Normative Orders” Research Center at Goethe University, he signed a brief statement with “Principles of Solidarity” in the wake of Hamas’s terrorist attacks in 2023. They argued that Israel’s military response, “justified in principle,” must be guided by “the principles of proportionality, “avoidance of civilian casualties,” and “conducting the war with the prospect of a future peace.”

Habermas’ initial articles included film and art criticisms, book reviews, and reports on lectures. Some of these theoretical studies on history and intellectual profiles were republished from 1980 to 2013 in 12 volumes in the series “Short Political Writings” at Suhrkamp. His scholarly career commenced in 1956 with a research assistantship at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, then the intellectual home of Horkheimer and Adorno. However, he never abandoned this line of work that established him as one of the most prolific and influential public intellectuals in Western history. In 1961, submitted his habilitationsschrift at the University of Marburg, qualifying him to become a professor. This research, titled “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere”, turned into his first book, published in 1962. After a brief professorship at Heidelberg University, from 1961 to 1964, he was appointed to Horkheimer’s chair of philosophy and sociology at Goethe University in Frankfurt. Between 1971 and 1981, he paused his teaching duties to research and serve as director of the (now extinct) Max Planck Institute for the Study of Living Conditions in the Scientific-Technical World, in Starnberg.

To properly understand the origins of his work, one must consider his rejection of the positivist conception of the social sciences. Positivism is reductionist and ultimately detrimental to the progress of the social sciences because it asserts that only empirically verifiable, causal hypotheses constitute true knowledge. Consequently, knowledge becomes limited to causal explanations that can be formulated as laws or basic principles. The risk of viewing the social sciences as purely “technical” is that experts will base policy decisions solely on efficiency, disregarding moral concerns and democratic debate. Positivism falsely naturalizes the social world by ignoring how experiences, subjectivity, and individual interests can structure the objective realm relevant to its study.

Furthermore, by reducing knowledge to what is rather than what ought to be, positivism adopts a value-neutral stance. This leads to the fallacy that knowledge´s role is purely descriptive and technical, and that it lacks, or does not necessarily embrace, a normative element in social analysis. In rejecting scientism, objectivism, and value-neutrality, respectively, Habermas took a stand against the purely observational or descriptive perspective of the social sciences. He argued that social inquiry must transcend the objectivist illusion that treats social reality as a mere aggregate of reified objects. By reclaiming the normative dimension of knowledge, he seeks to counter the expansion of instrumental reason and prevent the colonization of the “Lifeworld” (“Lebenswelt”). Social sciences do not just observe a world of objects; they participate in the ongoing self-reflection of a society striving for communicative freedom.

Social Theory, “Discourse Ethics,” and the Discursive Theory of Law and Democracy

Habermas’s philosophical work rests on three pillars: social theory, “discourse ethics,” and the discursive theory of law and democracy. His most significant contribution to philosophy, sociology, law, and democratic theory is the “Theory of Communicative Action” (1981). The conceptual structures developed in these fields all rest upon it. At its core is the idea that human interaction is essentially communicative, and that language cannot be understood as merely an instrument subject to speakers’ intentions. Interactions mediated by language have a not purely instrumental or strategic rationality.

Rationality within communicative interactions implies that human beings capable of speaking are subject to specific demands or duties. Every speaker is obliged to enforce four validity claims: “Comprehensibility” (Verständlichkeit): The duty to speak and use language in a way that others can understand. “Truth” (Wahrheit): The speaker’s relationship with the objective world according to the obligation to ensure what is said is real, true, and verifiable. “Normative rightness” (Richtigkeit): The requirement that a statement comply with a current norm or that the norm on which it is based is fair and legitimate. In “strong communicative action” speakers must be able to provide normative reasons. “Truthfulness” (Wahrhaftigkeit): Refers to the speaker’s relationship with their subjective world, as well as their duty to be honest and ensure that they truly mean what they say and that their expressed intentions match their inner thoughts. Whether a decision is just or correct depends on its ability to withstand open criticism within a community that engages in rational dialogue.

Habermas returned to Frankfurt in 1983, where he remained –with periods as a visiting professor in the United States– until his retirement in 1994. His greatest mature work was published in 2019, a 1.700-page exploration of the history of philosophy over the past 2.500 years. This work demonstrates how Western philosophy has incorporated religious content, transforming it into knowledge capable of rational justification. The central theme of the work is the relationship between faith and reason. This “contribution to the genealogy of post-metaphysical thought”, as he declared in the prologue, implies that philosophy abandons the search for “absolute truths.” Modernity placed philosophy before the impossibility of explaining the totality of the universe from a single principle (God, Being, or the Spirit). Postmetaphysical thought focuses on practical reason and language because truth is discovered through consensus and deliberation.

The use of the adverb “Auch” (“also” or “furthermore”) in the original title (“Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie”) is not a minor element. It specifies that this is just another possible interpretation of the history of philosophy. This adverb, missing in the Spanish translation, is rightly retained in the English version (“Also a History of Philosophy”), as well as in Italian, “Una storia della filosofia” (Milan, Feltrinelli), and French, “Une histoire de la philosophie” (Paris, Gallimard). At first glance, the use of this adverb reveals a humble gesture insofar as every history of thought necessarily reflects the author’s perspective. However, his approach to the history of Western philosophy is unique. The project was sparked by deep concerns about the philosophical dismantling of the “critical self-understanding of modernity”. Several facts demonstrate that the great political achievements of modernity are under threat, and that the intellectual climate is generally turning against Enlightenment principles. Habermas is most struck by the superficial rejection of an entire era. The intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment cannot be dismissed as just another period of human history.

This monumental work, published when he was 90, was, however, not his latest book. In 2022, he published “A New Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Deliberative Politics,” in which he revisits the theme of his first book. In 1964, Habermas warned of the decline of the public sphere, a process he termed “refeudalization.” In this process, the distinction between the “public” and the “private” fades; critical discussion is replaced by the manipulation of public opinion through public relations and the mass media; and the public ceases to be a critical entity and becomes merely a consumer of culture and propaganda. In his latest publication, Habermas critically reflects on the new threats that digital communication poses to deliberative politics. While the internet democratized access to the public sphere, it eroded the editorial filters and media institutions that previously helped ensure a common ground of truth. The challenge of social media is that it has turned us all into “authors” before we know how to play that role rationally and constructively. Legitimacy of laws depends on an inclusive discussion process oriented toward mutual understanding.

Because of his powerful linguistic imagery, Habermas succeeded in crystallizing concepts and categories that, in recent decades, have helped to shape our understanding and guide our course of action in the philosophical and political spheres. Notably: “communicative action,” “discourse free of domination,” “problems of legitimation in late capitalism,” “discourse ethics,” “constitutional patriotism”, “deliberative democracy”, and “public sphere,” as well as the structural distinctions between “System and Lifeworld”, and “Instrumental Reason vs. Communicative Reason”. These categories constitute a conspicuous segment of the intellectual heritage of contemporary philosophy and culture. Certainly, very few like him deserve their own lexicon.

Through his academic work and role as a public intellectual, he became a global authority on the historical interpretation of political events. Evidence of this standing includes his numerous honorary doctorates, the translation of his 60 books into more than 40 languages, and prestigious awards such as the order “Pour le Mérite” for sciences and arts –Germany’s highest Order of Merit–, the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade, the Kyoto Prize, and the Prince of Asturias. He was also awarded the Holberg Prize –often described as the “Nobel Prize” for the humanities and social sciences.

Suggested citation: Leonardo García Jaramillo, Habermas: The Last Towering Philosopher and Public Intellectual of our Era, A Jurisprudential Obituary Part I, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Apr. 21, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/habermas-the-last-towering-philosopher-and-public-intellectual-of-our-era-a-jurisprudential-obituary-part-i.


[1] I am deeply grateful to Cristina Lafont (Northwestern University) and Arnulfo Mateos (Heidelberg University) for their critiques and comments on the first draft.

[2] Cass Sunstein, “On the Death of Jurgen Habermas”. Manuscript. Spanish version published, in https://lacritica.ar/post/un-dia-para-lamentar-un-heroe-para-celebrar/ (Leonardo García Jaramillo, transl.).

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