—Verónica Undurraga Valdés, professor at the Adolfo Ibáñez University Law School in Chile
Anyone who lived in or visited Chile in 2019 witnessed mass demands for social change. A small increase in public transportation fares catalyzed powerful, previously hidden emotions to spill into the public sphere. No political leader or party banner represented this improvised collective movement, captured in the most repeated graffiti of those days: “until dignity becomes custom.”
The upheaval was unexpected and brought new insights into Chile’s social inequality and long‑awaited private and public conversations on national identity, justice, and human rights. At the same time, the serious violence of some protests, as well as the transformative proposals and excesses of the 2020-22 constitutional process, terrified a significant portion of the political and social elite, narrowing the space for furthering democratic dialogue even as the country confronted overdue debates. Six years and two failed constitutional processes later, hopes for change have curdled into latency: people have withdrawn into their close personal relationships, deepening their detachment from society. A disquieting irritation seems to have become the new Chilean mood.
The 1980 Constitution, enacted by the dictatorship and amended under democratic governments, remains in force. It remains to be seen whether four years of constitutional debate weakened it or, on the contrary, endowed it with belated legitimacy. One would expect judicial interpretation to be enriched by the debates of recent years. At the same time, the courts will need to take on the task of rescuing and further developing those constitutional rules and principles that can ensure a well-functioning constitutional democracy.
Days before the ratifying referendum on the 2022 constitutional proposal, Congress lowered the quorum for reforms to the 1980 Constitution to four‑sevenths of its members. The measure sought to encourage rejection of the draft produced by the Constitutional Convention and to pursue gradual changes to the existing Constitution. Today, the charter’s legitimacy will hinge on whether reforms are built by cross‑party consensus. However, increasing polarization and dramatic shifts in voting—driven by weak ideological attachment among newly enfranchised compulsory voters—create the risk of serial, non‑consensual amendments whenever one bloc reaches the threshold. This is no abstraction: in both constitutional processes, left and then right forced through drafts without agreement from the minority. Diego Pardo-Álvarez warns that the current constitutional context in Chile is conducive to an authoritarian reversal, recalling that constitutional reform has been the preferred instrument of contemporary authoritarian regimes.
It is into this unsettled constitutional landscape that José Antonio Kast will take office on March 11, 2026, after defeating President Boric’s labor minister, communist Janet Jara. Kast is a fervent conservative Catholic and a disciple of Jaime Guzmán, the principal ideologist behind the 1980 Constitution. Kast was formerly a member of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI), a party founded by Guzmán to defend the legacy of the military government. Kast later left the UDI and founded the Republican Party, arguing that the traditional right had betrayed its founding principles. During his years as a UDI militant, Kast unsuccessfully contested the party leadership. Former colleagues portray him as obstinate and critical of mainstream right‑wing politicians, displaying a moral righteousness that made him an uncomfortable presence and marked him as something of an outsider. Yet even detractors acknowledge his ideological consistency and tenacity.
Kast won with a smart campaign built around the claim that the left’s disastrous administration requires an “emergency government” to address organized crime, the economy, and immigration. Yet the data do not sustain a generalized emergency: major crimes and homicides have trended down; irregular entries have declined alongside stronger institutional capacity; and the economy projects moderate growth with contained inflation and rising investment. Fiscal risks persist—there is a high structural deficit—yet gross public debt has stabilized after two decades of ascent. While serious challenges remain, the evidence falls short of a national‑emergency diagnosis.
Kast has long been the foremost representative of the hard right in Chile. He has explicitly backed members of the armed forces imprisoned for the most egregious crimes during the dictatorship. More recently, he has done the same with police officers under investigation for human rights violations during the 2019 upheaval. Nonetheless, he has pursued his career through traditional institutional channels. He may allude to authoritarian ideas, but his speech style resembles a rather uninspiring church sermon, far from the incendiary rhetoric of Milei or Trump.
That Kast has operated within institutional boundaries does not dispel concerns that he may slide into authoritarian populism or even trigger democratic backsliding. Crisis rhetoric has often been deployed by authoritarian governments—Hungary is a salient example—to expand presidential power. Kast has said he will pursue radical changes largely through administrative authority, because “Congress is relevant, but not that important.” There is no doubt that the presidency in Chile enjoys broad administrative powers and that controls have worked well so far, so the comment could be completely innocent. Yet there was widespread speculation about whether he sought to emulate Trump and “govern by decree.” In another parallel with far‑right leaders—Trump or Abascal of Vox—though in a more guarded register, Kast has insinuated doubts about the impartiality of the Electoral Service (Servel), an institution with broad cross‑partisan prestige. More troubling, Arturo Squella, president of the Republican Party, stated that an “emergency government” would contemplate states of constitutional exception, including a state of siege, to pursue organized crime—remarks that the president‑elect did not repudiate when asked about.
Taken in isolation, these declarations might seem insufficient to ground prevailing fears. But as Wojciech Sadurski warns, democratic backsliding is characterized by the interaction of actions that, taken separately, appear innocuous, and protests over them may sound exaggerated or even paranoid. Concerns are hardly assuaged by Kast’s post‑election itinerary. He posed with Milei’s chainsaw, a symbol of state dismantling; praised Bukele as a model for fighting crime; and met Orbán, underscoring affinities on migration and family policy. He also traveled with Abascal to a Political Network for Values summit, where he denounced a culture dominated by “extreme environmentalism, radical animalism, ideological feminism, and radical indigenism.”
Kast qualified these gestures, stating that he was there to learn, not to copy, because Chile’s context is different. He has also said that the political figure he most admires is Giorgia Meloni—whom he also visited— suggesting a more pragmatic, less extreme playbook. Whether he will be able to overcome his self-righteousness, and his longstanding non-negotiating stance remains to be seen.
An early sign of pragmatism—unforgivable to his most conservative ranks—emerged during the campaign. Kast repeatedly deployed the emergency script to avoid having to pursue his historic anti‑gender agenda, which had contributed to his earlier defeat and to the rejection of the 2023 proposal, where Republicans embedded a “right to life of the unborn” clause. In an emergency government, he would have no time to spend trying to repeal the laws that partially decriminalized abortion, legalized same-sex marriage, and recognized gender identity—or so he said. At the same time, he has chosen as head of the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity a religious conservative and an activist of the pro-life movement.
In recent years, Kast has faced competition from Johannes Kayser, a YouTuber who left the Republican Party and founded the Libertarian National Party in 2024. Kayser’s style is transgressive and polarizing, and he deploys it with great media savvy. He entered the presidential race and, at certain moments in the polls, even surpassed Kast, though he ultimately ended up playing into Kast’s hand: in contrast to Kayser’s provocations, Kast appeared comparatively moderate. Kast aligns more naturally with the sober temperament of the Chilean electorate, but Kayser remains a threat to his leadership. This dynamic could push Kast to radicalize his positions to prevent Kayser from gaining ground—particularly if Chileans begin to normalize the politics of aggression that have proved electorally profitable internationally, and if Kast fails to deliver on his too ambitious presidential promises, an outcome that seems highly likely.
If Kast learned from the failure into which Republicans drove the last constitutional process, he should—rather than moving further to the extremes—lean on the traditional right and build a more solid base. Thus far, relations with the rest of the right, including partners in the governing coalition, have been uneasy. In forming his cabinet, he relied largely on independents and technocrats in his personal circle, many without prior political experience.
Kast will require substantial political skill, not only to manage domestic dynamics but also on the international front, where Chile must maintain good relations with both China and the United States, its two principal trading partners—a task made increasingly difficult by the pressure the United States is exerting on Chilean authorities. To navigate this terrain, Kast will need experienced political advisors and a strong capacity for negotiation. One can only hope that he will safeguard democratic institutions and advance his goals of public security and economic development in a manner compatible with the rule of law and the rights of all who live in Chile.
Suggested citation: Verónica Undurraga Valdés, From Upheaval to Uncertainty: Chile’s Constitutional Stalemate and the Rise of an “Emergency” Government, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Mar. 04, 2026 at: (link to follow)