—Fionn Parker, Bachelor of Civil Law candidate, Oxford University, whose research focuses on constitutionalism and institutional design
Vietnam’s GDP grew by an impressive 8% in 2025. 2026’s ambitious target rate of 10% will be difficult to achieve, especially given recent geopolitical and energy-market headwinds. Even so, one would not put it past this new ‘Asian tiger’, whose significant growth is underpinned by manufacturing strength and integration in global technology supply chains.
Simultaneously, Vietnam continues to practice a socialist brand of authoritarianism, under which the Communist Party maintains absolute political power through constitutionally enshrined institutional supremacy. While the 2013 Constitution formally recognises rights such as speech, association and political participation, these are not meaningfully respected in practice due to the lack of separation of powers, the limitation of electoral competition by Party-controlled candidate selection, and a communitarian philosophy which means that rights can ‘legitimately’ be — and often are — arbitrarily violated in the name of Party interests. As a result, Freedom House scores Vietnam 20/100 on its Freedom in the World Index.
This coexistence between economic development and authoritarianism raises a familiar question for constitutional scholars: if sustained, what will be the consequences of this rapid economic growth for the emergence of democratic rights within Vietnam’s authoritarian regime? This blog warns against overt optimism, arguing that economic growth can be sustained under authoritarianism and that stronger democratic rights protection depends on further political factors.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, South Korea and Taiwan experienced significant economic growth of 8-10%, which preceded democratic transformation. This trend has shaped the dominant view of Asian development, which holds that long-term economic development in the region drives increased political participation.
The logic of this thesis is that economic development creates an emergent, educated middle class with independent economic power. As Sen famously argued, this economic empowerment gives citizens greater skills, incentives and opportunities to advocate for democratic rights such as free speech and political association. This dynamic catalysed democratic reform in South Korea, where social movements for change were driven by a new middle class with greater incentives and power to advocate for democratic rights.
Under conditions of positive economic development, increased civilian political consciousness is also often met by more receptive institutions. Institutional incentives are reshaped as economic restructuring requires public participation to avoid economic management difficulties and social disruption. Redistributed economic power also reduces authoritarian capacity for repression. Shaped by these incentives and evolving power dynamics, authoritarian leadership in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s made gradual concessions to the rights claims of social movements, ultimately leading to the consolidation of stable constitutional democracies.
However, while one might hope for a similar trajectory in Vietnam, there is reason to doubt this linear schematic. Vietnam practices socialist party-state constitutionalism more reflective of China than the past militaristic regimes in South Korea and Taiwan. Socialist constitutional regimes are defined by centralised political authority, the Party’s leading role across state, society, and the economy, and the framing of rights as contingent on state priorities. China is thus a more relevant comparator for Vietnam, and China’s history problematises the typical development-democracy narrative.
Over the past 30 years, economic development in China has driven strong pressures for democratic rights, including increased education, social diversity, and expectations of future growth.
Yet unlike in South Korea and Taiwan, the regime response has been containment and suppression, rather than accommodation. This containment is sustained by increasingly complex mechanisms of economic and social control. Information is heavily regulated through the media. Economic activity is channelled into state-compatible forms as Party members are integrated into business leadership. Ongoing dependence on state structures is maintained through close regulation of business practices and conditional access to capital.
Acemoglu and Robinson argue that this model is unsustainable: democracy will eventually emerge, or the Chinese economy will collapse. They argue that the creative destruction necessary for economic advancement requires democratic freedoms such as free speech and political association.
Yet historical narratives might not be decisive in the 21st century, where advanced forms of social control coexist alongside an increasingly interconnected global economy. Defining features of this social control under the authoritarian socialism of Vietnam and China include an extensive surveillance network, pervasive propaganda and censorship through social and mainstream media, and the integration of party leadership into all layers of private and public life. This state power over civil society enables ongoing repression of the calls for democratic freedoms that economic development tends to drive.
Simultaneously, the thin aspects of constitutionalism necessary for sustained growth are present. Anti-corruption agencies in China and Vietnam seek to limit the overt rent-seeking that might undermine growth. Access to information necessary for creative destruction is present but limited to specialised industries serving global markets without the need for wholesale informational and speech rights. Similarly, minimal property and business guarantees can provide sufficient stability for a flourishing market economy. In short, growth can persist under partial constitutionalism without wholesale democratic transformation.
Thus, despite Vietnam’s impressive recent economic growth, we should not be overly optimistic about its consequences for greater recognition of democratic rights. Vietnam’s economy is still well behind China’s, which provides a model for sustained growth in at least the short to medium term through state control without comprehensive freedoms.
Ultimately, further political factors beyond economic growth — most saliently state power, path dependency, and regime incentives — are decisive in influencing how governments respond to the rights pressures that growth creates.
First, a strong state, relative to the population, can maintain authoritarian control even as civil society becomes wealthier. The pervasive social control mentioned above, combined with the continuing importance of state-owned enterprises and state-linked economic coordination, suggests that the authoritarian power dynamic in Vietnam is likely to be maintained at least in the medium term.
Second, path dependency theory suggests that, in moments of critical juncture, states typically resort to historically preferred institutional patterns. Vietnam has never had a multi-party, liberal constitutional democracy. Even South Vietnam during the Vietnam War was mostly under authoritarian and military rule backed by the United States.
Finally, the regime must have incentives to accommodate the calls for democratic reforms that economic growth drives. These incentives include global political trends away from authoritarianism, the risk of economic failure and mismanagement without democratic reform, and the likelihood of holding onto power in a transitional order.
The lack of these further conditions has militated towards the perseverance of authoritarianism in Vietnam. For example, in the 2013 process of constitutional redesign, the state faced strong pressure from civil society to recognise greater civil and political freedoms. While these were not fully repressed, they were also not meaningfully responded to. The episode illustrates the article’s central point: economic and social pressure may generate democratic-rights claims, but authoritarian institutions can absorb those claims without meaningfully accommodating them.
Ultimately, Vietnam’s trajectory will not be guided by growth alone, but by how its institutions respond to the pressures that growth creates. Vietnam’s strong state power, authoritarian history, and the lack of practical incentives to support democratic reform suggest we should not be overly hopeful about democratic transformation in the wake of impressive recent economic development.
Suggested citation: Fionn Parker, Economic Development and Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Vietnam: A Path to Democracy? Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, May 27, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/economic-development-and-authoritarian-constitutionalism-in-vietnam-a-path-to-democracy/