—Lorenza Carucci, PhD candidate in Constitutional and Public Law, University of Turin
On March 22nd and 23rd 2026, the Italian people rejected, by a clear majority (53,3% vs 46,7%), a constitutional reform proposed by the Meloni government. The result was welcomed by the parliamentary opposition and the National Association of Magistrates (hereafter ANM) as a clear sign of resistance to an illiberal shift. Most blog posts covering this referendum accepted this narrative (see Lobina, even in this blog, and on a slightly different tone Delledonne & Martinico). This post goes against the tide and shows that the Italian debate was far more nuanced and that there were valid reasons to welcome this reform as a reasonable choice. It retraces the reform’s institutional origins, analyses its main content, and assesses the key arguments that shaped both the campaign and its outcome.
A historical overview
In order to understand the Nordio reform (named after its proponent, the Italian Minister of Justice), it is important to embark on a short historical detour. The reform proposed by the Meloni government aimed to amend certain aspects of the constitutional framework governing the Judiciary (Title IV of Part II of the Italian Constitution). This reflects the specifics of the Italian system of justice. In Italy, judges and prosecutors belong to a single judicial order: they are recruited through the same public competitive examination, undergo a common training programme, and, most importantly, are members of the same self-governing body, the High Council of the Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, CSM). This means that judges and prosecutors participate in decisions concerning their respective careers, including professional performance assessments and disciplinary decisions.
Such an institutional arrangement reflected the inquisitorial model of criminal procedure in force in 1948, inherited from the Fascist period. However, with the adoption of the 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure, a system with a predominantly adversarial orientation was introduced. This shift raised concerns regarding the compatibility between the unity of judicial and prosecutorial careers and the principle of judicial impartiality, particularly following the explicit constitutional recognition of this principle in Article 111 IC (following Constitutional Amendment No. 2 of 1999).
For this reason, since the 1990s, governments across the political spectrum have regarded the separation of careers of judges and prosecutors respectively as a priority. Two attempts at constitutional reform were engaged in over the past three decades (in 1997 and 2011), but neither proved successful.
The issue of “career separation” has been closely intertwined with the reform of the CSM, a connection that has become even more pronounced in the aftermath of the 2019 ‘Palamara affair’, which brought to light the existence of opaque networks between judicial factions and political actors capable of influencing the Council’s decision-making processes. In response to concerns over the influence of such factional dynamics, the legislature has repeatedly intervened by amending the electoral system governing the selection of the CSM’s judicial members (Santalucia). The most recent reform was enacted by the Draghi government precisely in response to the Palamara scandal (the so-called Cartabia reform), although it did not succeed in achieving its intended goals (see Merlo).
In any case, the ANM has systematically resisted all these reforms, framing them as attempts to compromise judicial independence (see, for example, here).
The content of the Meloni reform
The Nordio reform sought to address the abovementioned issues by proposing three main measures: (1) the establishment of two parallel self-governing bodies (High Councils), one for judges and one for prosecutors; (2) the selection of their members by lot; and (3) the creation of a separate body for disciplinary proceedings, the High Disciplinary Court.
The two High Councils were to be composed as follows: both would be presided over by the President of the Italian Republic; each would include an ex officio member, the President of the Court of Cassation for the Judges’ CSM, and the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation for the Prosecutors’ CSM. Two-thirds of the members would be “gowned”, selected by lot from among all judges or prosecutors respectively, while the remaining one-third would consist of lay members drawn randomly from a list of qualified experts (full professors in legal subjects and lawyers with at least 15 years of experience), elected by the two Houses of Parliament in joint session.
Indeed, the main innovation compared to the original model – whose essential features were otherwise preserved – lay in the method for selecting non-ex officio members: the election would be replaced by a selection by lot.
As for the High Disciplinary Court, it would have been composed of 15 members selected as follows: nine magistrates drawn by lot from among those with at least twenty years of service who perform, or have performed, functions at the Court of Cassation (six judges and three prosecutors); three lay members appointed by the President of the Republic; and three lay members drawn randomly from a list of qualified experts elected by two Houses of Parliament in joint session.
The debate
The referendum campaign has been very polarized: the “no” side, led by the ANM and supported by opposition parties, and the “yes” side, a cross-cutting movement including not only the majority’s parties, but also supporters from left-wing parties and associations of criminal attorneys.
The “no” side warned of a risk of illiberal backsliding, claiming that splitting the CSM would severely weaken judicial independence, since it might have been the first step to bring public prosecutors under the authority of the Minister of Justice. They argued that selection by lot would eliminate accountability between the CSM gowned members and their electorate (i.e., the judicial order) and viewed the High Disciplinary Court as part of a punitive scheme. They also asserted critically that too many aspects of the reform were left to the ordinary legislation.
In contrast, the arguments of the “yes” side interpreted all the proposals in an explicitly anti-factional light. First, splitting the CSM into two parallel bodies would have formalized the separation between judges and prosecutors, while preserving for both the traditional self-government model. Second, the selection by lot was seen as a tool to shield the CSM from the influence of ANM factions and thereby strengthen the internal independence of the judiciary. According to “yes” supporters, the ANM placed too much emphasis on the representative nature of the CSM, but this representation should be understood as institutional rather than political (Gustapane). The CSM is not – and should not be – a parliament of judges, since its role is to carry out high-level administrative functions. Finally, the High Disciplinary Court was viewed as a means to make the disciplinary system more effective and rigorous, which has often been criticized as overly lenient.
Brief reflections in the aftermath of the vote
The fear of an illiberal drift constituted the leitmotif of the “no” campaign and ultimately proved to be a successful strategy.
On the merits, as mentioned, the reform was not properly a brand-new solution quickly put together by a populist Government; rather, it sought to address specific longstanding problems in the functioning of the CSM, made only more evident by the Palamara scandal. Nevertheless, the “no” camp repeatedly argued that these issues did not constitute the primary shortcomings of the Italian judicial system and that, in any event, the separation of judicial and prosecutorial careers could be achieved at a statutory level, without amending the Constitution.
However, regarding the substance of the reform, two critical aspects appeared to remain unsolved at the constitutional level: on the one hand, the introduction of an asymmetrical lottery system for the selection of judicial and lay members of the two newly envisaged High Councils; on the other hand, the concrete functioning of the High Disciplinary Court, particularly with respect to the admissibility of appeals before the Court of Cassation against its decisions.
These issues might have been addressed later on at the implementation stage, although this was lambasted by the “no” side as an example of uncertainty that might have entailed potential detrimental consequences. This critique, however, appears excessively severe for at least two reasons. First, it overlooks that, even in the current system, the Constitution only sets out the fundamental features of the CSM, leaving detailed regulation – such as its composition, electoral system, and internal organization (including the disciplinary section) – to ordinary legislation (in practice, these are found in Law No. 195/1958). Second, it fails to consider that such legislation is subject to a dual safeguard: the promulgation by the President of the Republic, who may refer the bill back to Parliament if he or she identifies clear signs of unconstitutionality; and, above all, review of the constitutionality of such legislation by the Italian Constitutional Court. This complex system of checks and balances appeared to be deliberately downplayed by the “no” camp in order to convey a sense of imminent danger.
At the same time, the Government’s approach to the reform fuelled alarmist rhetoric among its opponents, influencing the vote outcome. The proposal was approved without amendments through a ‘shielded’ parliamentary process, which totally excluded dialogue with oppositions. This problematic context, along with the sharp conflict with ANM, shifted attention from the substance of the reform towards the Government’s presumed intentions and fostered a highly polarised campaign. The “no” camp invoked the defence of the Constitution, capitalising on the particular sensitivity of the Italian electorate to far-reaching constitutional amendments (see for broader analysis Poggi), and channelled public frustration with the Government onto this reform.
An analysis of the vote indicates that 60% of the “no” votes were driven by the desire to preserve the constitutional text crafted by the Constituent Assembly, even more so than by political affiliation (see here). This finding invites reflection. On the one hand, it highlights the risk that an excessive sacralization of the Constitution may lead to its effective ossification. On the other, it suggests that systemic reforms should preferably be adopted directly by Parliament, avoiding recourse to instruments of direct democracy, which are inherently more susceptible to emotional dynamics. From this perspective, it would be advisable to recover the consociational spirit underlying the constitutional revision procedure set out in Article 138 IC, which envisages the popular referendum as an extrema ratio and not as a rule (triggered only where a reform does not obtain a two-thirds majority at the second reading stage in Parliament and is approved solely by an absolute majority).
In sum, the referendum outcome left a few certainties. No genuine illiberal backsliding is underway yet, as the result of the vote, together with the high level of public participation, constitutes a clear indication of the vitality of Italian democracy (so also Delledonne & Martinico). For the time being, the Constitution remains untouched, but the judicial system still exhibits both inefficiencies and clear operational limits in its self-governance structures, which undeniably need to be addressed sooner or later. Above all, the vote consolidated the emergence of a new ‘political’ actor which, as a matter of fact, is the true winner of this referendum campaign and now claims a legitimate role in shaping future judicial reforms: the ANM.
In the immediate aftermath of the vote, thus, the debate about the organization of the judiciary and prosecutors appears far from settled. The reform – despite its rejection – nonetheless succeeded in bringing to the fore a set of long-standing concerns, which resonated with a substantial portion of the electorate and signaled a widespread demand for change. This raises a crucial question: does the referendum outcome mark a definitive closure of the path toward reforming the constitutional framework of the judiciary, or does it rather leave room for some of these proposals to resurface in future debates, maybe at statutory level?
Suggested citation: Lorenza Carucci, Democratic Triumph or Missed Opportunity? Rethinking Italy’s Rejection of Constitutional Reform, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Apr. 30, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/democratic-triumph-or-missed-opportunity-rethinking-italys-rejection-of-constitutional-reform/