—Ubaid Mir, lawyer and independent researcher based in Jammu and Kashmir
Recently, NALSAR University of Law published its Annual Survey of State Laws in India – 2023. This post argues that this Survey demonstrates that recent constitutional practice, particularly the use of gubernatorial discretion, reinforced by judicial ambivalence, is transforming Indian federalism from a cooperative system into a coercive structure.
The Indian Constitution ostensibly establishes India as a federal polity where power is shared between the Union and the State governments with constitutionally demarcated lines along which the respective government can pass legislation.
India’s Federal Structure
There have been various terms used for the specific type of federalism established by the Indian Constitution – quasi-federal and cooperative federalism are the two terms used most prominently.
Granville Austin has argued that the Indian Constitution establishes a cooperative federal structure which involves “a strong central, or general government, yet it does not necessarily result in weak provincial governments that are largely administrative agencies for central policies.”
K.C. Wheare has described the Indian federation as “quasi-federal” due to the fact that it deviates from the traditional notions of federalism, established by the US Constitution.
The provisions dealing with emergency powers, where the constitutional structure exhibits a pronounced leaning towards the Centre, are pinpointed as examples of India’s quasi-federalism. Therefore, the view is that the Indian system is federal under normal circumstances and unitary during a declared emergency.
S.C. Gangal went further to argue that India’s system reflects “decentralised unitarism” where even provisions operating during normal times, like Articles 200, 201, and 249, demonstrate the constitutionally sanctioned reach of the Union in States’ affairs.
However, the general consensus among the scholars and analysts of the Indian Constitution is that it is based on a quasi-federal and cooperative federal system.
While these competing descriptions – quasi-federal or cooperative reflect different emphases, they converge on one reality that the Constitution builds on an asymmetry that can tilt toward central dominance. What the Survey reveals is that this tilt has turned into a structural lean.
The Survey demonstrates that recent practices involving the office of the Governor have enabled the Union to exert sustained influence over States’ legislative processes. Moreover, the fiscal domination of the Union Government over the State Governments is also bound to raise eyebrows about whether the system is based on cooperative or – instead – coercive federalism.
The Governor: Constitutional Sentinel or Political Agent?
In a truly cooperative federation, the Governor is supposed to act as a constitutional bridge between the Centre and the State as a neutral arbitrator.
In the Indian federal structure, the Governor holds a unique position. The Governor is formally appointed by the President, which in practice means by the Union Council of Ministers, yet they are supposed to act on the aid and advice of the State’s Council of Ministers.
The Advisory Panel on the Union-State Relations, commonly known as the Sarkaria Commission, recognised the danger of politicisation of the Governor’s position as a result of these arrangements and that they might be inclined to act on the instructions of the Union, rather than on the aid and advice of the State’s Council of Ministers. This is because under Article 163(1) of the Indian Constitution, the Governor is constitutionally authorised to exercise certain functions in his discretion, independent of the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
Moreover, Article 163(2) of the Indian Constitution states that the decision of the Governor while acting under his discretion “shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called into question.”
Although the Governor is merely a formal head appointed by the Centre, with the actual executive power lying with the State’s Council of Ministers, the Governor can, under his discretionary powers, act as an agent of the Union and impede the constitutional functioning of the elected State government.
This gradual politicisation of the Governor’s office has turned what was meant to be a constitutional sentinel into a political instrument, with profound implications for India’s federal structure.
Discretion under Article 200: Constitutional Loophole as Political Weapon
The politicisation of the Governor’s role is apparent in the exercise of discretion under Article 200 of the Constitution, a provision that empowers the Governor to assent to, or withhold bills passed by the State legislature, or reserve them for the President’s consideration – a constitutional tool that is increasingly being used as a political lever.
Article 200 contains no time limit for gubernatorial action when withholding or reserving a Bill for the President’s consideration. This silence has proven to be a serious loophole in India’s federal design, allowing Governors to withhold assent indefinitely, suspending the legislative will of elected State Assemblies without rejecting it outright.
The NALSARSurveyhighlights how such gubernatorial inaction has become a regular mode for interference in opposition-ruled States.
In Chhattisgarh, the Governor withheld assent to reservation bills for months, which led the elected State government to approach the High Court challenging the delay in assent to bills.
In Himachal Pradesh, the Governor withheld assent and subsequently reserved a bill, repealing an act that granted a pension to those jailed during the 1975 emergency, for Presidential assent.
The Survey also notes that in Punjab, the Governor reserved key bills for Presidential consideration, culminating in the Supreme Court’s intervention.
The prolonged withholding of multiple Bills by the Governor in Tamil Nadu, in some cases for over a year, ultimately triggered Supreme Court proceedings.
In Kerala, several bills, including those seeking to replace the Governor as Chancellor of Universities, remained pending for extended periods, which led to a political deadlock. The matter also came up before the Supreme Court.
The survey also highlights similar patterns of gubernatorial inaction in West Bengal.
These instances demonstrate how the constitutional silence on the temporal limit for gubernatorial discretion under Article 200 has evolved into a sustained political practice that undermines the legislative sovereignty of the States and corrodes the federal foundations of the Indian Constitution.
Apart from the tensions between the States and their Governors, the survey also highlights a trend of “holding welfare funds at knifepoint” by the Union Government, which are increasingly becoming “coercive instruments for political conformity.”
Judicial Ambivalence towards Gubernatorial Discretion
The judiciary has played a significant role in mediating these constitutional confrontations between the States and their Governors, though with mixed results in the Punjab, Tamil Nadu, and 2025 Reference cases.
In State of Punjab v Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab (2023), the Supreme Court held that the Governor is bound by the phrase “as soon as possible” mentioned in the first proviso to Article 200, thereby signifying the need for expediency of gubernatorial action on bills. It further held that when the Governor withholds assent to a Bill, the recourse is to send the bill back to the State legislature with comments, and the Governor cannot “virtually veto the functioning of the legislative domain.” (para 25)
The Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v The Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) held that, as a general rule, the Governor is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in reserving a bill for the assent of the President (Para 308), barring a few exceptions (para 300, 356). This placed reasonable curtailment on the discretionary powers of the Governor as the court held that ‘there is no pocket veto available to the Governor’ under Article 200 (para 197).
It went a step further than the Punjab judgement to lay down a tentative timeline for the Governor to act on bills (para 434.XIV). Furthermore, it was held that the act of withholding assent and reserving the bill for the consideration of the President is subject to judicial review (para 367).
This judgment can be viewed as remedying the loophole in the federal polity of India. However, this judicial assertion of constitutional accountability was short-lived. Just a month after this judgment was pronounced, the President referred fourteen questions to the Supreme Court, most of which dealt with the matters already resolved by the Tamil Nadu judgment.
The resultant advisory opinion held that the Governor, acting under Article 200 of the Indian Constitution, is acting on his discretion and is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers (para 95). Further, the opinion also diluted the Tamil Nadu ruling by declining to impose a timeline for gubernatorial action under Article 200 (para 125, 126).
This interpretation effectively legitimised the constitutional loophole that enables the indefinite suspension of democratic accountability, and enables “a de facto Union veto over state legislation.”
Together, these developments reveal that the federal safeguards built into the Constitution are being reinterpreted through practices that privilege centrally consolidated power over regional federalism.
It points to a deeper structural evolution of the Indian polity from cooperative federal structure to coercive federalism, where constitutional legality becomes a tool for centralisation rather than federal balance of power.
From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism
In the context of the evolving Indian polity, coercive federalism can be defined as a mode of intergovernmental relations characterised by the central government’s substantial growth in power relative to the States and former’s ability to override State authority to impose national policies, standards and ideology.
This system marks a shift from cooperative federalism, which relies on fiscal incentives – “carrots” to a more assertive framework that employs regulatory frameworks – “sticks.” While in the United States, this coercion was effected through the use of unfunded mandates, statutory preemptions, and the weaponisation of fiscal control, to ensure the supremacy of federally implemented policies and decisions, in India, it is the Constitution that is weaponised to enforce a coercive form of federalism.
In India, this transition is increasingly evidenced by a structural lean toward central dominance, where the Union leverages fiscal superiority to hold welfare funds at knifepoint and utilises the office of the Governor to intervene in States’ legislative processes.
Ultimately, coercive federalism transforms States from partners in a cooperative federal relation into administrators of national policy, effectively eroding the constitutionally protected sphere of States’ decision-making to achieve political and ideological conformity.
Abrogation of Article 370 and the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir provide a stark example of this centralising and coercive trend. The actions of the Governor and the Union government together raised profound questions about the federal principles underpinning the Indian constitutional framework.
Furthermore, in defiance of the federal principles, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was not only bifurcated into two separate entities without consultation with an elected government, but its status was also downgraded to that of a centrally administered Union Territory, an act carrying deep implications for the balance of power between the Centre and States in India.
Conclusion
Therefore, what comes to the fore in view of the above developments and constitutional practice is that the Indian polity’s federal architecture, once designed to reconcile unity with diversity, is being reconstituted through coercive means.
What was once a system of shared authority has transformed into one of hierarchical control, where the Centre dictates, and the States must comply. The politicisation of the Governor’s office, judicial hesitation to uphold constitutional limits, the instrumental use of legality to centralise power, and the use of grants and aid as a Damoclean sword, together reveal a deep constitutional drift towards coercive federalism.
Despite the persistence of the language of cooperation, the federal structure is being replaced by command and coercion, a transformation that marks not just a crisis of federalism, but its systematic reconfiguration.
If this trajectory continues, the ideals of Indian federalism will persist in name only but not in practice.
Suggested citation: Ubaid Mir, Cooperative Federalism to Coercive Federalism: How Gubernatorial Discretion in Practice is Rewriting Indian Federalism, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Jan. 30, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/cooperative-federalism-to-coercive-federalism-how-gubernatorial-discretion-in-practice-is-rewriting-indian-federalism/