–Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri, Visiting Fellow, Neukom Center for the Rule of Law, Stanford Law School; Incoming Professor of Law, Western Sydney University; Email: rasurri@stanford.edu
Venezuela’s recent political events have left observers perplexed. The country had become a consolidated autocracy under Nicolás Maduro, and until late 2025 it was unclear whether the regime would experience significant change. Then, following an escalation in the Trump Administration’s rhetoric and actions against Maduro, a U.S. special raid operation on January 3, 2026, resulted in his capture and interim replacement by then Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez.
Whilst a large majority of Venezuelans and the political opposition aspired to a democratic transition–with opposition leader María Corina Machado widely expected to lead or play a central role in that process- the U.S. government opted to leave the Chavista authoritarian regime in power under Rodríguez’s leadership, under the premise that her government would work with the Trump Administration to bring “stabilization, recovery, and transition” to Venezuela.
Eight months in, this process continues to unfold in a non-linear, haphazard, often unpredictable way. Venezuela is not under an actual occupation and, initial claims notwithstanding, the Trump Administration does not “run” the country. The government and key state positions have not been taken over—all branches of power remain under control of the Chavista regime, with Delcy Rodríguez staying indefinitely as interim President and her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, as President of the National Assembly. Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution remains nominally in force; state institutions are still controlled by the Chavista regime; the country’s institutions and political life continue to operate using Venezuelan constitutional and legal rhetoric, and even the flawed response to the catastrophic earthquakes of June 2026 –and the subsequent reconstruction effort– remained the responsibility of the government, despite receiving external assistance.
At the same time, the United States continues to play a deciding role in Venezuelan political life. Among the best examples are the oil sector’s recovery –including a recent highly controversial oil deal– and facilitating a new round of talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition with the ostensible intention of enabling a democratic transition. The latter effort now has led to negotiations to reform the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), appoint new justices, and renew the composition of the National Electoral Council.
The United States thus defines the parameters under which the Rodríguez government acts regarding key political and economic decisions, effectively constraining its authority. Venezuelan institutions still act, but they do so under conditions defined externally by the U.S. as dominant external power. Whilst it is tempting to see these events solely through the lens of transition, major decisions like the ‘oil deal’ in relation to Venezuela’s oil sector; the reorganization and reform of the Supreme Tribunal, and the electoral authorities would have consequences that are independent from – and may transcend – an eventual democratic transition.
In fact, the most critical milestone for a democratic transition -a free and fair election- remains uncertain. We cannot yet know or predict its timing, conditions, and most importantly, its transitional effect. Despite notable efforts, we could end up with the perpetuation of Venezuela’s authoritarian regime, with some modifications. Without restoring the country’s electoral integrity -systematically violated by the Chavista regime for years- Venezuela could end up with an election that falls short of the standards required for a democratic transition. In that scenario, the United States would have guided Venezuela’s economic recovery and helped rebuild the country’s state capacity, while allowing the regime to continue functioning without more significant commitments to democratic rule.
Constitutionalism under Tutelage
Venezuela in 2026 is experiencing what I describe as constitutionalism under tutelage. Under this arrangement, an external “tutor” power establishes, disposes, and enforces the conditions and boundaries under which another state ‘under tutelage’ exercises its bounded sovereignty and authority. The tutored state’s constitutional and legal institutions remain in place, serving as mechanisms to organize and articulate these constrained decisions at the domestic level.
I borrow the term tutelage (tutelaje) from the International Relations literature and jargon. This is a loosely defined, contested term that is nevertheless employed by IR scholars and global politics analysts to refer to “the state of being protected or controlled by another person, organization or country.” The tutelaje monicker has already been used to refer to the relationship between the United States and Venezuela by politicians, analysts, and scholars. Thus, speaking of ‘constitutionalism under tutelage’ is linked to a broader discussion about the nature, conditions, and implications of the current relationship between the United States and Venezuela.
The ill-defined, evolving nature of the relationship makes it difficult to pin down some enduring features, but some traits can be discerned. First, in constitutionalism under tutelage, we can identify a vertical relationship of ruling and constraint, one that implies a hierarchy between the foreign power (the U.S. in this case) and the country whose government is under control (i.e. Venezuela). The relationship is not one of states acting as equals, engaging in agreements out of their own will, and in exercise of their sovereign power. Instead, the tutored government and its institutions find themselves under the selective constraint of an external power, which acts as an informal authority or check upon the exercise of its sovereignty and domestic authority.
Second, the relationship between the dominant power and the state under control could be formalized via a variety of instruments, but in constitutionalism under tutelage the informal dimension may play a particularly important role. In the Venezuelan case, the informal dimension is manifested through personal relations involving U.S. officials, the Venezuelan government, the opposition, energy actors, international actors, and so forth. Whilst this is to some degree function of the Trump Administration’s approach to foreign relations more generally, and to Venezuela’s political context, focusing on informality when studying external influences in constitutional politics under transition is crucial.
Largely unwritten, the deeper architecture of the relationship could be hard to observe, with decisions often happening without proper transparency or accountability. This makes it hard to study, as tends to be the case with informality and the relational dimension of public life in general, as scholars have documented in different areas of constitutional politics and legal processes, from parliamentary proceedings to judicial selection and performance. Yet, at the same time, the agreements by virtue of the tutelary relationship are often translated into a wide range of formal instruments–such as new or reformed legislation, executive decrees and so forth—and other acts, such as appointments, licenses or contracts. The coexistence of formal and informal arrangements is characteristic of informal constitutionalism.
This is relevant to understand the current dynamics of the Venezuelan transition. For example, in the case of the ‘oil deal’, Venezuelans did not know about this monumental decision until the announcement by, first, the Trump Administration, and then their own government. Little was known about how the deal came into place or its key terms – even if efforts were made subsequently to explain what had been agreed and to what effect. Most importantly, nothing was explained about why it made sense as a matter of policy versus other alternatives to (re)develop the Venezuelan oil industry, or whether and why the deal was constitutional or legal at all. This opacity is particularly problematic, as the commitments made in the oil deal may organize and constrain Venezuela’s future long after the current political moment.
Key Conceptual Boundaries
Constitutionalism under tutelage coexists with, but is distinct from, other situations of external influence. It should not encompass, for example, post-conflict cases where there is an external international administration formally governing the territory – despite their efforts to create or otherwise reform the intervened state’s structures of authority. I am also excluding the case of protectorates, i.e. situations where “the legal basis is a treaty concluded between the two States, by which the protector is bound to defend the protected State against aggression and other violations of law”. Various situations generally described as international tutelage in the 2000s have been referred to as the ‘new’ protectorates, but these are not technically such.
I am also excluding situations of colonial rule. Despite new scholarship describing the relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela as a ‘semi-colonial tutelage’, a colonial enterprise refers to a different way of establishing and articulating control. In those situations, usually there is an occupying force, replacing local authorities or otherwise ruling alongside them, enacting direct administrative rule over the population in part (or all) of the state’s territory. By contrast, constitutionalism under tutelage assumes that the government and domestic state apparatus remain largely intact, even if under constrained authority. The government under tutelage remains in charge of most government-related decisions, with the external force’s selective involvement. There is domestic constitutional and legal continuity, as is the case in Venezuela, where the 1999 Constitution remains in force and is essential to the operation of the tutelage arrangement.
Moreover, constitutionalism under tutelage is related to, but different from imposed constitutionalism. The latter term refers to a variety of scenarios that involve the drafting or adoption of a new constitutional framework under the influence of an external power following major conflict, typically after a foreign occupation or radical regime change. In the distant past, it referred to the unilateral imposition of an entire constitutional order, although more recent examples have reflected a greater degree of complexity in terms of who imposes, how, and to what degree local authorities can resist external influence, among other features. This complexity has been unpacked by scholars interested in dissecting the conceptual and empirical underpinnings of imposed constitutionalism.
This literature offers valuable lessons to make sense of constitutionalism under tutelage. For example, in imposed constitutionalism a key question is ‘who imposes’. Just as in Feldman’s seminal piece -explaining how the imposition of constitutional equality in Iraq resulted from the agreement of groups with different agendas that nevertheless had key points in common, i.e. the “unlikely bedfellows of the human rights left, the neoconservative democracy exporters, and the evangelical right” – the Venezuelan case also shows a very complex picture. Behind the “Trump Administration” and its decision to intervene in Venezuela, capture Maduro and so forth, lies a coalition with multiple interests, including elected and administration officials, democracy advocates, diaspora groups, energy interests, and so forth. They are all interested in democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela for different reasons and ends and might agree or disagree to a greater or lesser degree with the decisions made for their own interests. At the same time, as Arato has noted, the domestic scene can also be complex. ‘Imposed constitutionalism’ typically also has to contend with local forces – as in the Venezuelan case. Yet, in Venezuela, we also see greater leeway by the government and local elites vis-à-vis the United States that one might assume for the cases of externally imposed constitutionalism. The resulting order, thus, is co-produced, although under an asymmetry of power.
Finally, I want to recall that the Venezuelan case of constitutionalism under tutelage also needs to be in conversation with the scholarship on authoritarian constitutionalism and constitutions in authoritarian regimes. The Venezuelan regime remains a consolidated autocracy under Rodríguez, and whether the country will experience a democratic transition remains very hard to predict. As mentioned above, whilst the United States has a nominal commitment to a democratic transition in Venezuela, the Rodríguez government’s commitment to democracy is dubious. The efforts of stabilization and recovery currently carried out could end up propping up Venezuela’s authoritarian regime, creating commitments and relations at the external and local levels that could make the path to re-democratization difficult. Moreover, as external conditions are translated by Venezuela’s authoritarian government into law, policy, and other formal decisions, this nascent framework may entrench parts of a new political or economic order that could be hard to overcome or change by an eventual democratic regime.
Understanding Venezuela’s nascent constitutionalism under tutelage, its distinctive features and implications, could be relevant for other cases in the not-so-distant future. Venezuela’s complex politico-constitutional reality could also happen elsewhere, in a geopolitical era increasingly characterized by the erosion of the rules-based order and a return of realpolitik to the global arena.
Suggested citation: Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri, Constitutionalism under Tutelage, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Sept. 24, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/constitutionalism-under-tutelage/