—Firat Efe, Post-doctoral researcher, Department of Political Science, Comenius University in Bratislava; Nikolai Merrill, MA Student, University of Freiburg; and Marius Wuttke, MA Student, Chulalongkorn University Bangkok, FLACSO Argentina, Humboldt University of Berlin
The election of Péter Magyar as the new Prime Minister of Hungary, ousting longtime incumbent Viktor Orbán, has rekindled debates revolving around the (de)autocratization in the Visegrád-four countries (V4), Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. Whilst Magyar’s election has been a cause for cautious optimism, democratic backsliding continues in other parts of the V4. This poses the question: which trajectories might the rule of law, constitutionalism and (il)liberalism take in this region in the future?
Against this background, the HARVEST project at the Department of Political Science at the Comenius University in Bratislava hosted an international seminar, discussing constitutionalism, (il)liberalism, and the rule of law in the V4. Principal investigator Max Steuer shared insights regarding the rule of law in Slovakia, whilst postdoctoral researcher Fırat Efe provided insights from a transnational perspective, highlighting current trends throughout the entire V4. Professor Dimitry V. Kochenov delivered a keynote speech on the conceptualization of rule of law in legal scholarship and its implications for the European Union.
Constitutional amendments as a vehicle for illiberal change
Max Steuer pointed out that Slovakia receives less international attention than countries such as Hungary in discussions revolving around democratic backsliding, even though similar tendencies can be observed in current Slovak politics. He argued that several structural factors have made Slovakia particularly vulnerable to illiberal dynamics, exemplified by a comparatively weak tradition of stable democratic governance shaped by earlier authoritarian experiences, as well as a constitution that can be easily amended by a three-fifths parliamentary majority. Building on research conducted with Professor Darina Malová (Malová & Steuer, 2026), Steuer described how political actors may use temporary parliamentary majorities and shifting coalitions to push through constitutional changes that serve short-term political goals, rather than long-term constitutional stability. In this view, this dynamic can gradually transform the constitution into an instrument of partisan competition.
To illustrate this point, Steuer referred to debates on constitutional amendments concerning the definition of marriage and the protection of so-called traditional family values. These examples illustrate how cross-party coalitions may be sufficient to achieve constitutional change in the absence of a stable constitutional consensus. At the same time, Steuer pointed out that Slovakia still retains institutional mechanisms capable of resisting illiberal tendencies, particularly highlighting the role of the Constitutional Court as an important safeguard of the rule of law.
Looking ahead to the local and regional elections scheduled for 2026, Steuer argued that supporters of liberal democracy need to connect abstract constitutional principles more closely to issues that directly affect citizens’ everyday lives. Specifically, environmental protection and living standards could be policy areas that might make democratic values more tangible.
Tensions underpinning the Rule of Law in the EU – from enlargement to the “European Death Machine”
Professor Dimitry V. Kochenov addressed two distinct but related aspects of European Union governance: migration control at the external borders and the legal framework of EU enlargement. Although these topics are usually treated separately, he used them to illustrate broader tensions within the EU’s rule of law framework, especially with regard to accountability and the practical functioning of legal responsibility.
Concerning migration governance, Kochenov described a system in which legal responsibility is highly fragmented across EU institutions, Member States, and third countries. This dispersion of authority creates structural difficulties in attributing liability for human rights violations occurring in the context of border control operations as previously discussed by Kochenov & Ganty (2024). A central concern is the increasing reliance on informal arrangements and non-binding instruments with third states. One of these third states highlighted during the conference is Libya which has a long-standing role as a key actor in the externalization of migration. In the largely EU-funded Italian-Libyan cooperation, international legal frameworks have been disregarded to a significant extent (Loschi 2023). These non-binding instruments with third states operate outside the standard mechanisms of transparency, parliamentary scrutiny, and judicial review. These instruments enable the externalization of migration control while simultaneously reducing the scope of legal accountability within the EU system. Financial and operational tools that are formally framed as development or cooperation measures were also discussed as being integrated into migration management, further blurring the boundaries between policy fields and weakening the enforceability of fundamental rights obligations.
Established in 2015, The European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) which combines development and stabilization policies with migration control measures is such an example. In doing so, in addition to blurring the boundaries between different EU policy fields, it also contributes to the construction and reproduction of specific anti-migration narratives (Pacciardi, 2025). Agencies involved in border management were portrayed by Kochenov as operating within complex chains of shared responsibility that make effective judicial oversight difficult, thereby contributing to a persistent gap between formal legal standards and their practical enforcement. With its growing power in recent years and its role within EU migration policy, Kochenov discussed FRONTEX as a main example. One of the main factors contributing to the blurring of the boundaries between EU border-management practices and the legal obligations arising from EU fundamental rights law and international human rights and refugee law is the weak implementation of oversight and accountability mechanisms (Gkliati & Kilpatrick, 2021).
The discussion of EU enlargement law focused on the legal structure of accession under Article 49 TEU and the evolution of enlargement methodology over time. The discussion highlighted that the European Union’s treaty framework doesn’t prescribe a single procedural model for accession but allows for political flexibility in how compliance with EU law and values is achieved. The contemporary enlargement approach of extensive pre-accession conditionality and prolonged monitoring by the European Commission contrasts with earlier enlargement practices of post-accession transitional arrangements. In the former model, political agreement on accession was followed by the gradual implementation of the existing body of EU rules and policies during lengthy transition periods. The Southern Enlargement including the accession of Spain and Portugal offers a good example of this practice which required only basic democratic standards as conditions for membership (O’Brennan, 2008). The speaker highlighted that this approach can no longer be applied as easily. Already during the EU accession negotiations with the Western Balkan states, the requirements had become more stringent with a significantly greater emphasis on the rule of law (Hoxhaj 2024).
Prof. Kochenov also pointed out that the conflicts between the European Commission and Poland and Hungary over the rule of law might have created a point of no return. The experience of rule-of-law backsliding in Hungary and Poland contributed to a further tightening and operationalization of rule-of-law conditionality in EU enlargement by shifting the emphasis from formal compliance towards demonstrable and sustainable implementation before accession (Knežević Bojović & Ćorić, 2023). The Commission might therefore no longer be able to support Ukraine’s politically motivated accession without full compliance with rule-of-law standards (Kochenov & Basheska, 2025).
Prof. Kochenov concluded his keynote speech with a skeptical evaluation of Ukraine’s prospects for EU accession in the near future and raised the question of whether it is morally justifiable not to be fully honest about the country’s chances of a rapid accession to the EU.
Diverging trajectories of the rule of law across the V4 countries
Efe presented the current trends in the rule of law in the V4. Using the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) data (Coppedge et al., 2026), he presented the trends of equal distribution of resources, equal protection of rights, judicial control of the executive, and rule of law in the V4 (Figures 1 through 4 respectively).
The y axis of the figures represents the V-DEM score of the respective index and the x axis represents the time in years. According to Figure 1, Czechia, leading throughout the graph with a stable score of ~0.95, is followed by Poland (~0.87), Slovakia (~0.82), and Hungary (~0.63) in 2025. Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland share a visible decline in 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively. While the latter two countries seem to improve later on, Hungary has yet to show an improvement.
Figure 2 presenting the equal protection of rights index shows that Czechia leads with a score of 0.955 followed by Poland (~0.91), Slovakia (~0.75), and Hungary (~0.65) in 2025. The consistent downturn in Hungary is noteworthy. Despite the illiberal PiS government having been in power for many years, Poland’s equal protection of rights score shows a steady increase throughout the measurement period. Slovakia, on the other hand, continues to decline despite occasional increases in the equal protection of rights.
Figure 3, the judicial control of the executive index, shows that in 2025, Czechia leads with a score of ~0.96 followed by Slovakia (~0.81), Poland (~0.71), and Hungary (~0.68). In contrast to the previous two graphs, Poland, and not Hungary, is the sharpest declining country when it comes to the judicial controls over political power. We observe two groups in this graph: Czechia and Slovakia exhibiting higher levels of control of the judiciary while Poland and Hungary demonstrate diminished accountability.
Lastly, Figure 4 showing the rule of law index places Czechia’s score (~0.94) on top, along with the similar directions of movement as in Figure 3. Poland, while being historically distinguished from other countries, seems to be delayed in its recovery from illiberalism. The recent uptick Poland’s score isn’t enough to place it above Slovakia from 2020 through 2023 (~0.9). As per the latest measurement, Poland scores ~0.87, Slovakia ~0.73, and Hungary ~0.6.
The trajectories across these countries underline the importance of various safeguards against the rise of illiberalism. High levels of equality both in redistribution and in protection of rights in Czechia leave little room for exploitation of at-risk segments of society. PiS government’s well documented extension of social rights enfranchising larger masses (Bill & Stanley, 2025:19) is presumably the reason that Poland scores an increase in equality of rights index. Another such safeguard is a strong civil society, exemplified by Czechia (Frič, 2024) and Poland (Ekiert & Kubik, 1999), as opposed to Hungary where civil society has been restructured through legal intervention (Coman et al., 2026:822).
Efe argued that these counter forces might have limits. Poland’s limited recovery following an illiberal spell raises the question whether it is indeed possible to restore the rule of law completely after such a period. Particularly, the ‘judicial control of the executive’ score after two years of “liberal” governance, which is barely above the canonically illiberal case of Hungary, is worrying. He concluded that the V4 countries continue to be fertile sites for the study of illiberalism not only because they had illiberal governments, but also because the recipe for a full recovery from illiberalism may be uncovered in those countries.
How to go forward? Closing debate by participants
Following these three interventions, the group discussed various topics touched on by the three speakers. Participants debated the importance of academics and scholars connecting transnationally to develop answers towards trends of autocratization, the role of sovereignty, and possible future scenarios for the V4.
The main topic of discussion, however, revolved around the role of the European Union in border security and how the tensions underpinning its understanding of the rule of law can be adequately addressed. Suggestions varied, with several group members reaching the conclusion that broad, structural reform is needed. In particular, participants suggested giving more powers to the European Parliament. Particularly, the ability to propose laws and to recall the Commission were discussed. This, so it was argued, would in part lead to a less dispersed mode of authority, thus making it easier to hold those governing accountable for human rights violations committed in the context of border security.
Suggested citation: Efe Firat, Nikolai Merrill, and Marius Wuttke, Constitutionalism, (Il)liberalism and the Rule of Law in the Visegrád Region, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Sept. 18, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/constitutionalism-illiberalism-and-the-rule-of-law-in-the-visegrad-region/