–Mesenbet A. Tadeg (Ph.D.), Chrystal Visiting Assistant Professor, Grinnell College, Department of Political Science
Introduction
Ethiopia is in a critical constitutional moment. The political change in 2018 and the rise of the Prosperity Party, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, have precipitated constitutional shifts in the country. The Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC) was created in 2021 and given the mandate to resolve deep-rooted political divisions in the country and chart a viable constitutional path. While the purpose of the ENDC seems much wider, its key role will be to provide a roadmap on areas of consensus for constitutional reform.
The idea of constitutional reform started early during the transition period in 2019. A national committee, largely composed of independent researchers representing different political views, was loosely formed under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice. The committee held a series of consultations on the key features of the reform, including the potential restructuring of the current 1995 ethnic federal constitution. The committee’s deliberations and resources were supposed to serve as inputs for constitutional reform, but its mandate ended with no meaningful output.
As the ENDC continues its final phase of deliberations, speculation remains over what key issues a new Constitution of Ethiopia will address. The Commission has tried to galvanize public support through grassroots community dialogues and discussions with political parties, civil society organizations, academics, and several other groups. However, the exclusion of key political actors—including armed groups and influential opposition parties—has raised serious questions over its credibility. The proposed ideas for constitutional reform considered briefly in this article are based on the preliminary deliberations of the ENDC and my observations of the ongoing political debates in Ethiopia.
1. Modifying the Ethnic Federal State Arrangement
The 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia represents one of the final constitutional frameworks influenced by the post-Soviet era. Emerging after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it was heavily shaped by the Marxist-Leninist political thought of the then-ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The political architecture of the 1995 text directly reflects this ideology. Rather than opening with the standard democratic invocation of “We the people,” the preamble begins with “We the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia,” explicitly establishing these ethnic groups as the ultimate sovereigns. Consequently, the 12 regional states within the Ethiopian federation are organized along strict ethnic lines. As political scientist Francis Fukuyama has noted, while political tribalism remains an enduring organizing principle, it raises serious questions about whether such a model can effectively sustain constitutional democracy.
It is undeniable that the current Constitution has achieved some measure of progress in fostering a multinational federal state by granting explicit recognition to linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity. However, this ethnic-based federation suffers from deep flaws. By recognizing political units almost exclusively through the lens of language, the framework undermines constitutional safeguards for minority groups, as well as political or cultural entities that do not share a single language as their defining political identity. Moreover, the entrenchment of this ethnic arrangement has grown increasingly detrimental to Ethiopia’s national unity, social cohesion, peaceful coexistence, and territorial integrity. Ethnicity has come to dominate public life, reinforcing authoritarian political practices rather than consolidating the democratic trajectory of the state. A new Constitution of Ethiopia must address these structural challenges by allowing greater flexibility in how regional states are designated and formed, which would go a long way toward mitigating these tensions. Furthermore, the status of Addis Ababa and highly diverse regions like Dire Dawa must be accommodated within this framework and administrative arrangements that are not exclusively tied to language or ethnicity should be envisaged. Ultimate success hinges on a robust debate regarding these federal structures within the ENDC, requiring political actors across the country to compromise and build a genuine national consensus.
2. Revising the Right to Secession
Perhaps one of the most unique aspects of the Ethiopian Constitution is its explicit recognition of the right to secession in Article 39 of the Constitution. It provides that “every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession.” The requirements for cession are not, in fact, too cumbersome. They only require a 2/3s supermajority vote from the state council of the region requesting secession and a majority popular vote in a regional referendum. In theory, subject to the fulfillment of these conditions, any region has the right to secede from the federation.
The text of the right to secession in the 1995 constitution is a direct extension of its Marxist-Leninist historical roots, drawing inspiration from the Soviet constitutional model. In contemporary constitutional design, such a stipulation is exceedingly rare. The danger that this unhinged right to secession poses to a fragile polity like Ethiopia is clear; it consistently undermines territorial integrity and risks the total political fragmentation of the state. Emerging comparative experiences show a distinct shift away from secession clauses, relying instead on the robust protection of individual and group rights and basic freedoms.
A new constitution for Ethiopia should pivot toward providing constitutional guarantees that secure the rights of minority ethnic groups to practice their language and preserve their culture, without tying those rights to state dissolution. The political realities of Ethiopia’s 30-year constitutional experiment have proven that the right to secession is practically unrealizable. The more plausible approach for the new constitution should be a more pragmatic one focused on the constitutional recognition and integration of ethnic groups rather than their separation. Many democratic states grappling with deep societal diversity, such as Canada and South Africa, successfully rely on the constitutional principles of diversity, equality, and human dignity as their foundational guarantees, offering a viable blueprint for Ethiopia’s future.
3. A New Constitutional Court for a New Constitution
The current 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia envisages for a constitutional review process under the House of Federation, the upper house of the parliament in Ethiopia. Unlike the lower house, the House of Peoples Representatives, which has legislative powers, the upper house has the power to interpret the constitution and invalidate unconstitutional laws. But for many Constitutional lawyers in Ethiopia, the House of Federation is seen as a political organ established for solely political purposes of managing and resolving disputes among the federal units. Its structure and functions are inaccessible and completely different from a constitutional court. A new constitution that formally embraces a constitutional court will go a long way in making constitutional protections accessible for human rights litigation and ensuring the basic and fundamental rights of individuals and groups. While the Current Supreme Court of Ethiopia does have the expertise and experience required to do the job, the fact that the Court is already overwhelmed by several cases that do not involve constitutional issues makes the prospect of a new Constitutional Court more plausible.
4. Explicit Recognition of Justiciable Human Rights
One of the positive aspects and manifestations of the current Constitution of Ethiopia is its generous provision of human rights. A significant portion of the Constitution (1/3) covers the protection of fundamental human rights. But the actual application of these rights in the domestic courts of Ethiopia has been a major challenge. One of the key challenges to the justiciability of human rights in the Constitution is the lack of clear constitutional clause to this effect in the Constitution. Moreover, the fact that the Constitution mandates the House of Federation with the power to interpret the Constitution has undermined the inherent power of ordinary courts for judicial review. The practice of courts in this regard, including in strategic human rights litigation cases, shows that a lack of clear mandate to the courts to adjudicate human rights provisions in the Constitution has made the judicial review power of courts ambiguous and unpredictable. The new Constitution of Ethiopia should address this by providing a clear constitutional mandate for courts to adjudicate disputes involving human rights issues. This will have the potential to consolidate the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.
5. Reforming Land Ownership
Article 40 of the Constitution of Ethiopia places land under public ownership of the state. This is also another manifestation of the leftist feature of the current Constitution. The issue of land ownership has been a thorny issue in Ethiopia that has triggered a significant amount of debate. But questions remain if this is a viable path for a constitutional democratic republic that aspires to protect private property and basic economic freedoms of individuals. Critics also argue that the current public ownership of land has created deeper land use fairness and mismanagement issues that fuels corrupt practices by state officials. This has become rampant in many regions in the country, especially in the capital, Addis Ababa. Moreover, it is believed that the lack of productivity in the agricultural sector has been attributed to the inherent flaws of the lack of land ownership that disincentivizes local farmers to produce. While the economic virtue of private ownership of land is something that needs to be debated, a constitutional reform should envision the possibility of private ownership of land either through a referendum or some form of direct participation of the public.
6. Introducing a Presidential System
Recent reports have indicated that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is in favor of a Presidential system of government rather than the parliamentary system of government that the current constitution envisages. It is unclear what the objective of adopting a new Constitution with a presidential system as opposed to a parliamentary system of government would achieve for the consolidation of constitutional democracy in Ethiopia. One of the issues that was often raised is the need to have more direct access for citizens to elect the head of government, which may mitigate the highly party-oriented and ethncized political landscape in Ethiopia. Another issue that could have more significance is the idea of providing term limits, which is more often associated with the Presidential system of government. The downside of this prospect of a presidential system under the new Constitution is the fear that more concentration of power on the executive could be counterproductive to the prospect of the consolidation of constitutional democracy in the country. Any prospect of a new constitution in Ethiopia should anticipate and balance these constitutional outcomes.
To conclude, the political outcome of the national dialogue process, with all is limits, can provide a significant constitutional foundation for Ethiopia’s democratic trajectory. But it can do so when there is a political will to address the pitfalls of the leftist ideological roots of the Constitution and integrate basic and fundamental principles of a constitutional democracy. Ethiopia should seize this constitutional moment to lay down solid foundation for upholding fundamental human rights and basic democratic principles.
Suggested citation: Mesenbet A. Tadeg, Constitutional Reform in Ethiopia: Challenges, Options, and Pathways Forward, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Sept. 11, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/constitutional-reform-in-ethiopia-challenges-options-and-pathways-forward/