—Daniel Capecchi Nunes, Professor of Administrative and Constitutional Law, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro; and Isabela Almeida do Amaral, PhD in Public Law, State University of Rio de Janeiro and Associate Researcher, Brazilian Chapter of ICON-S


On a Tuesday afternoon in Goiânia, two days after the first round of Brazil’s presidential election, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro took the microphone beside a newly elected ally and explained what a right-wing majority in Congress was for. It would serve, he said, “to change the Constitution, to redemocratize this country”. Bolsonaro had finished the first round narrowly ahead of President Lula, with 47.03% of the valid vote to Lula’s 45.16%. He did not say which provisions he had in mind.
The content was vague. The word was not. In Brazil, redemocratização is not a neutral term. It refers to the transition from military rule to democracy and, above all, to the political process that produced the 1988 Constitution. To call for a new redemocratization is therefore to suggest that democracy has been lost again, and that the Constitution itself is somehow part of the problem.
In this post, we suggest that Brazil does not need a refoundation, nor the rhetoric of one. The 1988 Constitution is better understood as an unfinished constitutional promise of freedom and equality for all. What Bolsonaro offers is a counter-promise: to restore democracy by weakening parts of the constitutional order that have recently defended it.
That language also comes with a history. Jair Bolsonaro spent years attacking the electoral system and the Supreme Federal Court (STF), and was later convicted for his role in a plot to overturn the 2022 election. Flávio Bolsonaro now inherits that political movement while campaigning on a promise to “redemocratize” the country through constitutional change.
The remark immediately drew questions about what, exactly, Flávio Bolsonaro intended to change. The next day, he offered a list. According to Congresso em Foco, he was referring to judicial reform, a lower age of criminal responsibility, changes to a recent tax reform and ending presidential re-election. Anything beyond that, he said, was speculation.
The list and the word
The list is a mixed one. Some of its items belong squarely to ordinary constitutional politics, such as changes to the tax system or the rules on presidential re-election. Others raise harder constitutional questions. The proposal to lower the age of criminal responsibility, for example, has long been disputed in Brazil because Article 228 of the Constitution, which exempts those under 18 from criminal liability under the ordinary criminal justice system, may be protected as an unamendable constitutional provision. But the proposal to “reform the Judiciary” is different in another respect.
A “reform of the Judiciary” proposed by the son of a former president tried and convicted by the STF for plotting a coup cannot be read only as a technical proposal about how the courts function. It also raises a more basic question about who judges whom, and under what institutional rules.
Nor did the list take back the language of redemocratization. In the candidate’s own words, the goal was to make institutions “respect the Constitution again”. The argument turns the Constitution against the institutions responsible for interpreting it. It is a familiar populist move: an electoral majority is presented as the authentic voice of the people, while courts and other unelected institutions are portrayed as obstacles to that will. The deeper concern is the use of majoritarian power to alter the institutional conditions under which future majorities compete and are constrained.
What the Constitution allows, and what it forbids
The 1988 Constitution of Brazil is no fortress. An amendment needs three-fifths of each chamber in two rounds: 308 of 513 deputies and 49 of 81 senators. Congress has cleared that bar more than 130 times since 1988. Even after its strong result in the congressional elections, Flávio Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (PL) will hold 121 seats in the Chamber and 28 in the Senate, making it the largest party in both houses but leaving it far short of the votes needed for an amendment. The remaining seats are divided among numerous parties, including President Lula’s Workers’ Party on the left and influential centrist and center-right parties whose support is often decisive. Constitutional change will continue to depend on the coalition bargaining that has long shaped Brazilian presidentialism.
What the Constitution forbids is narrower and more precise. Article 60, §4 bars amendments “tending to abolish” federalism, periodic universal suffrage, the separation of powers and individual rights and guarantees. The STF has treated these unamendable provisions as protecting the core of those principles. Ending presidential re-election falls within ordinary amendment power. Lowering the age of criminal responsibility is constitutionally contested, because Article 228 may itself be protected as an individual guarantee under Article 60, §4. Judicial reforms affecting the core of the separation of powers may fall outside the amendment power.
This is the dilemma the candidate’s language leaves unresolved. If the agenda fits within Article 60, it requires no rupture. It is ordinary constitutional politics. The harder question is whether amendments that follow the formal procedure can still undermine the conditions that make constitutional democracy possible. If they do, Article 60, §4 forbids them. The text contains no procedure for calling a new constituent power. In that sense, “redemocratization” either describes an agenda already available under the Constitution, or it points beyond it.
A script with many stagings
Comparative constitutional law has described this pattern before. David Landau calls it abusive constitutionalism: using constitutional amendment or replacement to make a political system significantly less democratic, often by entrenching those in power and weakening courts and other accountability institutions. Kim Lane Scheppele speaks of autocratic legalism, in which elected governments use law itself to weaken the institutions that constrain them. Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg describe a related process as constitutional retrogression: the gradual erosion of democracy through formally legal measures.
The methods vary. In Venezuela, the 1999 constitutional process was used to intervene in the judiciary and sharply restrict Congress’s powers. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s parliamentary majority adopted a new Fundamental Law and reshaped the Constitutional Court. In Poland, after 2015, ordinary legislation undermined the Constitutional Tribunal’s independence. The instruments differed, but the problem was similar: those in power changed the institutions designed to constrain them.
Brazil is not Hungary or Venezuela, and Flávio Bolsonaro has not proposed a constituent assembly. But democratic erosion rarely begins with the formal abolition of a constitution. It often begins with elected leaders portraying courts and other accountability institutions as enemies of the people, then using electoral majorities to reduce their capacity to constrain power. The Brazilian danger lies precisely in the possibility that a strengthened congressional majority will use constitutional reform to weaken institutions that have acted as checks on political power.
The constitutional promise
The claim that 1988 is exhausted rests on a misunderstanding of what the Constitution was meant to do. Written as Brazil emerged from two decades of dictatorship, it did not simply describe the country that existed. It set out a political and constitutional project: broader social rights, racial and gender equality, protection for Indigenous peoples and minorities, and institutions capable of holding public power to account. Much of that project remains incomplete. That does not make the Constitution obsolete. It means that the promise has not yet been fully delivered.
That incompleteness also makes the promise vulnerable. The gap between constitutional commitments and social reality is easy to see, and frustration with what remains unfulfilled can turn against the Constitution itself. This is one way authoritarian populism operates. It turns disappointment with rights that have not been realized into resentment towards the document that guarantees them and towards the institutions charged with enforcing it. The language of “redemocratization” fits that pattern. It offers a different promise of order, harsher punishment and a weaker Court in place of the one made in 1988.
The past four years also show that the institutions built to keep that promise still work. On 8 January 2023, supporters of the defeated president stormed the buildings of Congress, the STF and the presidency in Brasília. The institutions survived the attack. Congress, the courts and the federal executive continued to function, and authorities investigated and prosecuted those accused of organizing and carrying out the coup plot under the procedures established by the Constitution. Former President Jair Bolsonaro was later convicted and sentenced to 27 years in prison for his role in that plot.
Taking the critics seriously
The STF’s role in defending Brazil’s constitutional order does not place it beyond criticism, including that voiced by Flávio Bolsonaro and his allies on the Brazilian right. Part of the right’s criticism rests on serious arguments, and they deserve a serious answer. Scholars from different political perspectives have criticized the STF for the breadth of its monocratic decisions, the structure of inquiries into attacks on the Court, and a jurisprudence on speech and digital platforms that has not always developed clear standards. The Banco Master scandal has added a new source of concern. At its core is a major banking fraud investigation involving the bank’s former owner, Daniel Vorcaro, whose financial and personal connections with politicians, public officials and people close to members of the Court have come under scrutiny. The investigation has raised questions about conflicts of interest, recusals and the Court’s internal standards of conduct.
There is also broader institutional criticism. The 1988 Constitution is unusually long and detailed, and many questions that elsewhere would be left to ordinary politics are constitutionalized in Brazil. That helps explain both the frequency of constitutional amendments and the central role the STF has come to play in political disputes.
None of this requires a new constitution, and the language of redemocratization clarifies none of it. Constitutional amendments, legislation and the STF’s own rules can address limits on monocratic decisions. The Banco Master scandal calls for clear recusal rules, stronger standards of conduct and investigations allowed to reach their conclusions. Disagreement over the Court’s speech jurisprudence is a dispute about constitutional interpretation, to be fought through judgments, scholarship and legislation. An over-detailed Constitution can be changed through the amendment process it already provides.
Judicial reform can strengthen independence, accountability and the separation of powers. It can also weaken them. That is why its direction and institutional design matter more than the label attached to it.
Conclusion
Whoever wins on 25 October will face a Congress very different from that elected four years ago. The Brazilian right will hold a large congressional majority, and Bolsonarismo will have a degree of parliamentary power it has never had before. The Liberal Party will hold 121 of 513 seats in the Chamber and 28 of 81 in the Senate, where Flávio Bolsonaro’s allies have openly discussed using their power to try to remove STF justices.
That new balance of power changes the election’s constitutional stakes. A Flávio Bolsonaro government could govern alongside a Congress with both the numbers and the political appetite to challenge the STF and pursue constitutional changes previously beyond reach. Constitutional reform could then be used to weaken the institutions that contained the last attempt to overturn Brazil’s democratic order.
Much of what was promised in 1988 remains unfulfilled. But incompleteness is not exhaustion. A candidate who pledges to “redemocratize” a democracy owes voters more than a list of amendments. He owes them an explanation of what has ceased to be democratic, which institutions he intends to change, and what will prevent the new congressional majority from using constitutional reform to leave Brazilian democracy with fewer safeguards than it has today. He also owes them reason to believe that this promise of “redemocratization” can be pursued in good faith by a political movement whose recent history includes an attempt to overturn an election it lost.
Suggested citation: Daniel Capecchi Nunes and Isabela Almeida do Amaral, Brazil’s Constitutional Promise and the Rheotric of Redemocratization: What Flávio Bolsonaro’s Agenda Means for the 1988 Constitution, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 19, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/brazils-constitutional-promise-and-the-rhetoric-of-redemocratization-what-flavio-bolsonaros-agenda-means-for-the-1988-constitution/