—Farjana Jarin Nira, Law Graduate, North South University, and Md. Muhtasim Faiaz, Lecturer, Department of Law, American International University- Bangladesh (AIUB)
Since its incorporation into the Constitution of Bangladesh, there have been many years of unresolved debate in relation to Article 70. This provision enshrines that Members of the national Parliament (MPs) are not free to vote against their party in Parliament and that doing so will result in them having to vacate their seats. This provision, known as the ‘Anti-Defection Law,’ was included in the Constitution with the legitimate aim of ensuring governmental stability by promoting discipline among political party members to eliminate corruption, instability in politics and to maintain the allegiance of Members of Parliament to the party that nominated them for election. Such a restrictive law was primarily intended to ensure stability and discipline in the country’s political parties and restrain floor crossing. However, it is, in practice, liable to handicap the individual Members of in Parliament, by curtailing their independence to vote according to their individually held political beliefs. Article 70 has been used as a tool to silence internal dissent in the country’s political parties and has seen far-reaching consequences in Bangladesh’s democracy, which will be discussed below in this post. Whether the future ruling party, or the current interim government, will be agreeable to repeal such a controversial provision remains an open question. The analysis developed here rejects partial amendments of Article 70 as inadequate and suggests the entire removal of this provision as necessary to rebuild parliamentary sovereignty, legislative independence, and genuine democratic accountability in Bangladesh.
Following a student-led mass uprising in July-August last year, Bangladesh’s political regime has witnessed a massive shift of power. Since then, the whole nation is awaiting what reforms will be carried out by newly formed reformed commissions including the Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC), put in place by the interim government. Along with many other significant reforms, the CRC has recommended removal of Article 70. None of the political parties have supported this proposition unanimously. Rather, major parties like The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami and National Citizen Party all suggest that MPs should be allowed to vote against all policies put forward or supported by their party except those involving Money Bills, constitutional amendment Bill, votes of confidence and on questions of state security. This attitude of the political parties raises doubts as to whether Article 70 will ever be entirely repealed by the government or whether its prolonged existence might undermine the democratic goals of the July 2025 revolutionary movement, as democracy remains stifled within Parliament.
To start with, a vote of confidence is essential to establish accountability and transparency within the government. If the government cannot be challenged even in national emergency situations or in cases involving the protection of human rights, MPs will be unable to act on behalf of their constituents’ interests and hold the Prime Minister to account. A vote of confidence has never been proposed in the Bangladesh parliament because the constitutional framework is against such motion and no political party has showed a willingness to amend this provision ever since the Constitution entered into force. This practice can weaken parliamentary oversight and concentrate power in the hands of party leadership. Repealing Article 70 while barring the MPs from voting against their party in a confidence vote will eventually leave the major problem, the effectiveness of checks and balance in the Bangladesh Parliament, unresolved.
It should be noted that over the past few years, writ petitions have been filed questioning the pertinence of Article 70. The High Court division has repeatedly upheld the importance of Article 70 for party stability and argued that it is a “mandatory” provision for ensuring the stability and continuity of government and discipline within political parties. However, while the necessity of “party-stability” or effective “government function” cannot be denied, unwavering insistence on party loyalty and compliance with party dictates effectively makes MPs subordinate to their party leadership. This is clearly problematic.
In addition, Article 7 of the Bangladesh Constitution declares that citizens are the supreme authority of all power of the State. Therefore, it is arguable that this gives rise to an implied commitment that MPs act in the best interest of the people they are sworn to serve. Unfortunately, their loyalty evidently lies with party leaders. In the political landscape of Bangladesh, senior leaders of the various political parties, particularly the chairperson, wield significant influence over all decision-making processes, especially when the party ascends to power and the chairperson assumes the role of Prime Minister. Removing Article 70 would weaken that grip by allowing voting freedom in the Parliament and such a development would like to be viewed as unfavorable by party leaders. Moreover, Article 11 of the Constitution guarantees that the MPs will be elected by effective participation of the people to advocate for their fundamental human rights. If they are primarily acting in line with party discipline, MPs may fail to safeguard voters’ needs and preferences, possibly resulting in popular disappointment or disaffection with politics. Relatedly, if the MPs cannot provide a veto on decisions that may affect local governance, they fail in their constitutional duty to speak for their constituents. Every citizen of Bangladesh is guaranteed the fundamental right to freedom of thought and conscience under Article 39(1) of the Constitution. Retaining Article 70 also results in a violation of Article 39, which protects the right to freedom of expression and conscience in choosing what is considered right or wrong according to one’s own conscience.
To ensure effective democracy, the legal regime governing political parties must accordingly undergo reform. A partial amendment to Article 70 of the Constitution will not be sufficient. More particularly, Article 70 (b) should be completely repealed, as it requires MPs to vote in accordance with cabinet decisions on every bill, which eliminates a role for, and impact of, constituency interests, parliamentary debate, and democratic representation. In addition to facilitating intra-party democracy and preventing electoral authoritarianism, the complete repeal of Article 70 would also restore MPs’ freedom to represent constituents. Reform must therefore include both the repeal of Article 70 and a restoration of MPs’ right to vote freely even on confidence motions and all other matters. It is high time that the political parties and the interim government realize that this provision is undemocratic and does against constitutional principles, which gives us an opportunity to restore proper legislative independence. In Abdus Samad Azad and Ors. vs BD, the High Court Division suggested a possible alternative, i.e. that secret voting could be a solution to mitigate excessive party control over MPs. Secret voting can substantially protect MPs’ independence, but it should be exceptional. If this can be made feasible for some matters involving high public or national interest the government may, by notification in the Official Gazette or website, disclose the voting results which will enable the voters to know the position taken by their representative in the parliament and hold them accountable. The new Constitution should also make this practice a reality to ensure maximum transparency, especially in sensitive matters. However, without a massive turnabout in the political culture, getting rid of Article 70 seems like a distant reality.
Suggested citation: Farjana Jarin Nira and Md. Muhtasim Faiaz, Article 70 of the Constitution of Bangladesh: Is Reform Necessary & Removal Feasible? Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Feb. 10, 2026, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/article-70-of-the-constitution-of-bangladesh-is-reform-necessary-and-removal-feasible/