[Editor’s note: In 2014, I organized the inaugural AALS Academic Symposium. The subject of the Symposium was “Comparative Constitutional Change: New Perspectives on Formal and Informal Amendment,” and the program was held in New York City at the AALS Annual Meeting. Half of the papers have been published in the latest issue of ICON; the other
The Honduran Constitutional Chamber’s Decision Erasing Presidential Term Limits: Abusive Constitutionalism by Judiciary?
—David Landau, Florida State University College of Law & Brian Sheppard, Seton Hall University School of Law The recent decision of the Constitutional Chamber of Honduras annulling a series of constitutional and legal provisions that prohibited presidential reelection and made that prohibition unamendable was a troubling one. The same political forces that previously ousted ex-President
There are Still Judges in Berlin: On the Proposal to Amend the Ecuadorian Constitution to Allow Indefinite Presidential Reelection
—Carlos Bernal Pulido, Macquarie Law School Es gibt noch Richter in Berlin!, There are still judges in Berlin! was the well-known acclamation of the humble miller, when he learned that the Prussian King Frederick II, the Great, had ordered the demolition of his mill obstructing the views of the new royal palace in Potsdam. The
—David Landau, Florida State University College of Law The concept of substantively unconstitutional constitutional amendments, for example in the Indian “basic structure” doctrine, presents one of the strangest puzzles in comparative constitutional law. It raises obvious and substantial problems from the standpoint of democratic theory, raising a kind of ultimate counter-majoritarian difficulty. The court using