—Sergio Verdugo, IE University Law School Introduction In 1995, Jon Elster concluded his landmark article by identifying the paradoxes of constitution-making.[1] Constitution-making processes are unlikely to occur without the urgent need that a political crisis triggers. Even though political crises are arguably necessary for constitutional replacement processes, those crises can also create unfavorable conditions for
The Institutional Interest of Political Parties in Chile’s Constitution-Making Process
—Benjamin Alemparte, Duke University School of Law These are times of constitutional change in Chile.[1] On October 25, the referendum’s approval option for drafting a new Constitution won with close to 80% of the general vote, the most significant electoral gap in the country’s history. Notably, more than 50% of the registered electorate went to vote,
I-CONnect Symposium–Contemporary Discussions in Constitutional Law–Part VII: The Political Parties: From a Two Party System to the Crisis of Representation in Colombia
[Editor’s Note: This is Part VII in our Externado symposium on “Contemporary Discussions in Constitutional Law.” The Introduction to the symposium is available here, Part I is available here, Part II is available here, Part III is available here, Part IV is available here, Part V is available here and Part VI is available here.] –Luisa Fernanda García López, Profesora Principal, Universidad del
Do All Democracies Need Party Dissolution Mechanisms?
—Brian Christopher Jones, Liverpool Hope University Although it may appear harsh or severe, the ability of many democracies to dissolve political parties based on the (supposedly) “unconstitutional” or “anti-democratic” nature of their existence is an inherent constitutional feature of many states. Democracy, it appears, must at times protect itself from threat or collapse. Perhaps the most
