[Editor’s Note: I-CONnect is pleased to feature a special symposium on the recent Slovak Constitutional Court Appointments Case. The symposium will feature five parts, including this introduction. We are grateful to Simon Drugda for partnering with us to organize this symposium.] —Simon Drugda, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford Late last year, on December 6, the Constitutional
—Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, University of Brasília Brazil was faced with a tragic event this January. Justice Teori Zavascki, one of the most respected members of the Brazilian Supreme Court, was one of the five victims of a plane crash into the sea near Paraty, a colonial town off the coast of Rio de Janeiro state.
—Maxime St-Hilaire, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Sherbrooke Earlier this week on Monday, October 17th, Prime Minister (PM) Justin Trudeau announced the elevation of Justice Malcolm Rowe from the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador (Court of Appeal) to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC). Filling the vacancy left by Justice Thomas Cromwell’s
—Tomáš Ľalík, Associate Professor, Comenius University (Bratislava) July 2 marked the second anniversary of incumbent Slovak President Andrej Kiska’s refusal to fill in two vacancies at the Constitutional Court (CC). The CC has been managing its affairs two judges short since then, but the situation deteriorated further this February when the term of a third judge
Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, Democracy, Constitutional Shenanigans and Constitutional Self-Defense
—Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, Professor of Law and Director of the Department of European and Comparative Law at the University of Gdańsk, Poland; 2015 – 2016 Fulbright Visiting Professor at University of California Berkeley Law School* The Polish general elections of October 26, 2015, completely reshaped the political scene, bringing back to power the right-wing conservative party Prawo
—Richard Albert, Boston College Law School Judges on national courts of last resort are generally appointed in politicized processes. Judicial selection is politicized when the choice rests on popular consent mediated in some way through elected representatives. We can identify four major models of politicized judicial selection in constitutional states: (1) executive unilateral appointment; (2)