Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law and

Book Review: Joe Tomlinson on Peter Cane’s “Controlling Administrative Power: An Historical Comparison”

[Editor’s Note: In this installment of I•CONnect’s Book Review Series, Joe Tomlinson reviews Peter Cane’s book on Controlling Administrative Power: An Historical Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016)]

Joe Tomlinson, Lecturer in Public Law, University of Sheffield School of Law and Associate Fellow, Crick Centre for the Public Understanding of Politics.

The comparative study of law and administration did not keep pace with the recent journey of comparative constitutional studies from ‘a relatively obscure and exotic subject studied by a devoted few’ to ‘one of the more fashionable subjects in contemporary legal scholarship’.[1] This, of course, does not mean that there have not been important studies in the field. There were early landmark works, such as Goodnow’s 1903 study of the administrative law systems of the U.S., England, France, and Germany.[2] Since, administrative law texts that have comparative dimensions would, from time to time, appear. A very well-regarded example is Schwartz and Wade’s 1972 book on Administrative Law in Britain and the United States.[3] Notwithstanding such texts, there has been a lack of a sustained scholarly community devoted to studying the topic.  Now that seems to be changing. There is renewed interest in comparative administrative law and the signs of revival are many.[4]

One high-profile indicator is the international Public Law Conference series, first hosted in Cambridge in 2014, and again in 2016. The first conference considered the theme of Process and Substance in Public Law­. It was well attended by a diverse crowd of scholars from the common law world. The diversity of the audience and presentations made the affair, somewhat inevitably, drift towards having a comparative tone. Capitalising, the 2016 event—on the Unity of Public Law?—was a more pro-actively comparative affair. The concrete academic output from this series, thus far, has been two multi-jurisdictional works.[5] The less concrete, but even more valuable, gain has been the emergence of a biennial transnational forum for administrative lawyers—a new space where comparativism can breathe naturally. Another important indicator was a successful conference held at Yale University in 2008, organised by Professors Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter Lindseth. The conference generated an edited volume, Comparative Administrative Law.[6] That volume spawned another conference, in 2016, which led to a second edition of the text.[7]  Beyond these two examples, there are many other signs that the field is springing back to life.[8]

It is against this backdrop that Professor Cane’s new book, Controlling Administrative Power: An Historical Comparison, is published.

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Published on July 14, 2017
Author:          Filed under: Reviews

Call for Papers–“Constitutionalism in a Plural World”–Deadline July 23, 2017

Catarina Santos Botelho, Universidade Católica Portuguesa

The Porto Faculty of Law, Universidade Católica Portuguesa in Portugal is pleased to invite applications to attend its 2017 Conference “Constitutionalism in a Plural World”, that will take place on November 22nd and 23rd, at Porto.

Abstracts addressing the following issues (and others related to constitutionalism) are welcome:

  • history of constitutionalism, comparative constitutional law and science of public law;
  • constitutionalism beyond the state (societal constitutionalism, multilevel constitutionalism, European constitutionalism, etc.);
  • fundamental rights in the global arena;
  • intergenerational justice and rights of future generations;
  • citizenship and migrations;
  • the role of constitutional courts and the methodology for constitutional review;
  • constitutional interpretation and constitutional amendments;
  • democracy in the world society.

Younger academics, doctoral or master students, young legal professionals with an interest in scholarship are encouraged to apply. We accept two kinds of applications:

  1. In the form of an abstract of no more than 750 words,
  2. In the form of a completed paper with maximum length of 90.000 characters (spaces included). In this case, the completed paper should be sent until October 1st.

In both situations, applicants should send the abstract, along with their curriculum vitae, to by July 23rd. After review by the scientific committee, the chosen abstracts will be announced, no later than the 15th September.

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Published on July 12, 2017
Author:          Filed under: Developments

Special Discount for I-CONnect Readers–New Volume on “Comparative Constitutional Law in Latin America”

Richard Albert, I-CONnect Co-Editor

I-CONnect is pleased to share a special 35% discount code for our readers interested in this new volume on “Comparative Constitutional Law in Latin America,” co-edited by Rosalind Dixon, Professor of Law, University of New South Wales, Australia and Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, University of Chicago Law School, US.

The discount is available for this month, July 2017. Please use the code VIP35 at checkout here:

This book provides unique insights into the practice of democratic constitutionalism in one of the world’s most legally and politically dynamic regions. It combines contributions from leading Latin American and global scholars to provide ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ insights about the lessons to be drawn from the distinctive constitutional experiences of countries in Latin America, both in the Global South and the Global North.

Contributors: H. Alviar Garcia, C. Bernal, J.l. Colón-Ríos, J. Couso, R. Dixon, Z. Elkins, R. Gargarella, T. Ginsburg, A. Huneeus, D. Landau, J. Lemaitre, L. Lixinski, G.L. Negretto, R.A. Sanchez-Urribarri, M. Tushnet, O. Vilhena Vieira


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Published on July 12, 2017
Author:          Filed under: Developments

When is a Limp More than a Limp? Diagnosing Democratic Decay

Tom Gerald Daly, Fellow, Melbourne Law School; Associate Director, Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law

Sometimes a limp is just a limp–arising from a debilitating yet isolated injury or infection that will soon heal. However, sometimes a limp can be indicative of a degenerative disease such as multiple sclerosis. Gaining a clear diagnosis and prognosis of such systemic conditions is a serious challenge: the person affected might experience a continual worsening or multiplication of symptoms, stabilisation, or even a reversal of the condition.[1]

Diagnosing democratic decay has been occupying my mind in recent months, as I attempt to fashion analytical tools to assess a decline in the quality of democracy in states worldwide, which falls short of a democratic breakdown. As a process in flux, and with an uncertain outcome, it is not an easy task to distinguish decay from a democratic crisis punctuating democratic rule without degrading it, or changes that alter the texture of democracy, but not its inherent nature.

In writing a forthcoming book chapter[2] and papers for recent conferences worldwide[3] I have slowly fleshed out my thumbnail definition of democratic decay–incremental degradation of the structures and substance of liberal constitutional democracy–as a fuller analytical framework to discuss developments in India, Turkey, the Philippines, Poland, Venezuela, Brazil, South Africa, Hungary, and the US. My aim has been to test whether democratic decay can provide added analytical value as an organising concept, to achieve an empirically grounded, context-sensitive approach to identifying and assessing democratic decay in any given state, and to test the viability of my initial selection of country case-studies. As I sit on a flight bound for Gdańsk–where I will spend a week discussing the Polish experience with one of its leading analysts, Tomasz Koncewicz, among others–I find myself reflecting on what I have learned in recent months.

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Published on July 12, 2017
Author:          Filed under: Analysis

Book Review: Alan Greene on Antonios Kouroutakis’s “The Constitutional Value of Sunset Clauses”

[Editor’s Note: In this installment of I•CONnect’s Book Review Series, Alan Greene reviews Antonios Kouroutakis’s book on The Constitutional Value of Sunset Clauses (Routledge 2017)]

Alan Greene, Assistant Professor, Durham Law School

Constitutions should evoke ideas of stability, inertia, and permanence. They are often an attempt to reassure and establish certainty that often emerge from the ashes of turbulent revolutions. In a fascinating new monograph, Antonios E. Kouroutakis details how the very opposite of permanent legal norms—legislation made temporary through the use of sunset clauses— have shaped these constitutional institutions and the means through which they interact with each other over time.

Temporary Legislation and Controlling the Executive

The Constitutional Value of Sunset Clauses consists of four parts: Part I is a single chapter outlining a positivist analysis of sunset clauses; Part II details an historical overview of sunset clauses; Part III analyses the institutional impact of sunset clauses; and Part IV discusses sunset clauses and the rule of law.

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Published on July 11, 2017
Author:          Filed under: Reviews

What’s New in Public Law

–Nausica Palazzo, Ph.D. candidate in Comparative Constitutional Law (University of Trento)

In this weekly feature, I-CONnect publishes a curated reading list of developments in public law. “Developments” may include a selection of links to news, high court decisions, new or recent scholarly books and articles, and blog posts from around the public law blogosphere.

To submit relevant developments for our weekly feature on “What’s New in Public Law,” please email

Developments in Constitutional Courts

  1. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh declared void a 2014 constitutional amendment allowing the Parliament to impeach apex court judges.
  2. The Constitutional Tribunal of Spain refused to prosecute PM Rajoy for the crime of disobedience.
  3. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ordered the City of Hamburg to apply the law of assembly to the G20 protest camp but allowed for restrictions.
  4. The High Court of Kenya upheld the right to picket or demonstrate peacefully and unarmed.
  5. The Supreme Court of Egypt ruled that enforced disappearance violates basic human rights and forced the government to reveal whereabouts of persons missing upon arrest.
  6. The Constitutional Court of Mali ordered corrections to the referendum.
  7. The Supreme Court of Canada clarified the applicable doctrine to determine the “sufficient utility” of an invention under the Patent Act.
  8. The Constitutional Court of Austria upheld the seizure of a property which was the birthplace of Hitler for its symbolic power.

In the News

  1. The Venezuelan opposition sets symbolic referendum on the new constitution.
  2. The main opposition party in Turkey has lodged an appeal with ECHR over Erdogan referendum.
  3. French President Macron announced his plan for a constitutional reform to reduce the number of MPs, curb the executive’s role in appointing magistrates, and introduce proportional representation to French elections.
  4. The Malaysian Court of Appeal held that the constitutional right to free movement (Art 9) does not apply to citizens travelling overseas, in an opposition lawmaker’s challenge of a travel ban.
  5. The House of Representatives of New Zealand formally apologized to gay man convicted of homosexual crimes under a law that was scrapped in 1986.
  6. The government of Sri Lanka vowed not to abandon the drafting of the new Constitution to give its Tamil minority greater autonomy.
  7. Activist organizations announced the filing of a lawsuit against the government of Myanmar to rewrite the 2008 Constitution.
  8. Italy introduced a long-awaited law criminalizing torture.
  9. The Governor of Michigan vetoed a law permitting to produce state-sponsored anti-abortion license plates.
  10. Japan and the European Union agreed on an outline for a free-trade deal.

New Scholarship

  1. Wim Voermans, Maarten Stremler, and Paul Cliteur, Constitutional Preambles: A Comparative Analysis (2017) (comparing the preambles to all global constitutions currently in force)
  2. Armin von Bogdandy, Matthias Goldmann, Ingo Venzke, From Public International to International Public Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority, 28 European Journal of International Law (2017) (carving out the notion of international public authority and linking it to international public law, as opposed to public international law)
  3. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot, in Cass R. Sunstein (Ed.) Can It Happen Here?: Authoritarianism in America (2018, Forthcoming) (identifying the causes leading to constitutional “decay” in the U.S. in political polarization; loss of trust in government; growing economic inequality; and policy disasters)
  4. Anna Sledzinska-Simon and Michal Ziółkowski, Constitutional Identity of Poland: Is the Emperor Putting on the Old Clothes of Sovereignty? (2017) (examining the application of constitutional identity as a judicial concept denoting both convergence and divergence with the EU standards, and arguing that recent legal reforms affecting the rule of law are a return to national sovereignty)
  5. Shlomit Stein, In Search of ‘Red Lines’ in the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Fair Trial Rights, 50 Israel Law Review (2017) (identifying minimum thresholds of protection of fair trial rights with an aim to assist policymakers in complying with ECHR case-law)
  6. Valentina R. Scotti, Presidentialism in Turkey. A first appraisal of 2017 Constitutional Reform, 30 DPCE Online (2017) (examining the content of the 2017 constitutional amendment introducing presidentialism in Turkey)
  7. Mohamed Abdelaal, Extreme Secularism vs. Religious Radicalism: The Case of the French Burkini, 23 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law (2017) (providing an account of the interplay between the right to self-determination and assertive secularism in the case-law of the Conseil d’État)

Calls for Papers and Announcements

  1. The International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts) and the Faculty of Law of the University of Freiburg invite submissions for its 2018 Biennial conference in Freiburg. Abstracts (in English or German) should be sent to by October 20, 2017.
  2. The Centre for International Law at the National University of Singapore invites submissions for the workshop “International Investment Treaties and National Governance,” to be held in Singapore, on November 16 -17, 2017. Abstracts should be sent to by 31 July 2017.
  3. The European Journal of Legal Studies (EJLS) and Academy of European Law invite abstracts for the EJLS 10th anniversary conference “Sixty Years of European Integration: Reflections from Young Legal Scholars,” to be held in Florence on November 16, 2017. Submissions need be sent to no later than July 15, 2017.
  4. The Comparative Constitutional Law and Administrative Law Quarterly (CALQ) invites submissions for its next volume (3:4). The deadline for submissions is September 1, 2017.
  5. The Rehnquist Center at the University of Arizona invites papers for the inaugural National Conference of Constitutional Law Scholars, to be held in Tucson, on March 16-17, 2018. The deadline for submitting abstracts is September 15, 2017.
  6. The Transnational Law Institute welcomes applications for the Transnational Law Summer Institute 2017 on “Inequality: Reproduction, Alienation, Intervention,” held on December 3-8, 2017, in Sydney. Applications close on August 15, 2017.
  7. The Association of Comparative Legal Studies invites applications for its Comparative Law Intensive Course, to be held in Reggio Calabria, Italy, from July 24 to August 4, 2017. The registration deadline is July 16, 2017.
  8. The International Society of Family Law hosts the “16th ISFL World Conference: Family Law and Family Realities,” on July 25-29, 2017, in Amsterdam.

Elsewhere Online

  1. David R. Cameron, Canada’s constitution – 150 years old but still a work-in-progress, Yale Macmillan Center
  2. Globe editorial: Omar Khadr, Canada and the fragile rule of law, The Globe and Mail
  3. Antonios Kouroutakis, After Brexit: The transposition of EU law into national law and the key role of sunset clauses, Oxford Business Law Blog
  4. Joe Tomlinson, The gap between promise and performance – strong, weak, modest and sham systems of administrative justice, Admin Law Blog
  5. Jennifer Thomson, Free abortions in England will not remove the fundamental injustice Northern Irish women suffer, EUROPP
  6. Richard Machin, Four reasons why welfare reform is a delusion, EUROPP
  7. Saudi Arabia: End Male Guardianship, Human Rights Watch
  8. Malte Feldmann, Twenty Years ‘One Country, Two Systems’ in Hong Kong: A Reason to Celebrate?, Verfassungsblog
  9. J. Paul Pope, National security takeaways from 1776, The Monitor
  10. Geoffrey Yeung, First in Asia – Taiwan’s Marriage Equality Ruling in Comparative and Queer Perspectives, OxHRH
  11. Jason Brickhill, Trillion-Rand South African Nuclear Procurement Halted By South African High Court, OxHRH
  12. Pierre de Vos, “Fuck White People”: court correct not to find the work of art to be hate speech, Constitutionally Speaking
  13. Lisa Burton Crawford, The Rule of Law as an Assumption of the Australian Constitution, AUSPUBLAW
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Published on July 10, 2017
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Cooperative Brexit: Giving Back Control Over Trade Policy (I·CON Volume 15, Issue 2: Editorial)

We invited Thomas Streinz,* Fellow at the Institute for International Law and Justice, NYU School of Law, to contribute a Guest Editorial to our Journal. Taking Joseph Weiler’s recent Editorial, “The Case for a Kinder, Gentler Brexit”, as its starting point, Mr Streinz argues that the principle of “sincere cooperation” requires the Union and a departing member states to pursue a “cooperative” approach to withdrawal, and applies that proposition to the contested area of trade policy in the context of the United Kingdom’s impending withdrawal from the Union.

  1. Introduction

Joseph H. H. Weiler has made the case for a kinder, gentler, Brexit.[1] In this contribution, I argue that a constructive and mutually respectful approach towards the negotiations between the EU and a withdrawing member state is not only politically and economically desirable but legally required by the principle of sincere cooperation, which is enshrined in the EU Treaties[2] and part of the constitutional fabric of the EU legal order. The determination of the terms for withdrawal and the nature of the future relationship between the EU and a member state which is choosing to leave the EU is fundamentally different from the conduct of negotiations between the EU and third countries, because all parties operate within the EU legal framework during the withdrawal process. The principle of sincere cooperation is an integral part of this “supranational law of Brexit” and it provides the legal foundation for what I will call “cooperative Brexit.” Far from mandating any concrete outcomes, “cooperative Brexit” reframes the process of de-supranationalization and re-nationalization, on which the UK is embarking, and affirms the insight that the right to leave the EU contributes to its enduring legitimacy.[3]

As I will show in this article, the continued application of EU law during the withdrawal process has further consequences: it requires the leaving member state to adhere to the division of competences established by the Treaties until it has formally left the EU. This presents a challenge for the timely realization of the UK government’s vision of a “global Britain” in pursuit of new trade deals with countries across the globe,[4] because the EU retains exclusive competence over the “common commercial policy” (CCP), which is “trade policy” in all but name. Curiously, in this context it is precisely the principle of sincere cooperation that blocks the UK from unilateral action. “Taking back control” will take time. Realists are right to point out that enforcement of these boundaries is only a theoretical possibility which has hardly any deterrent effect—and Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson seemed indeed ready to tread the line by suggesting that a deal with India could be sketched out in pencil “on the back of an envelope”[5]—but they underestimate the UK’s self-interest in adhering to the rules and the constraining power of law in the absence of judicial enforcement.

There is, however, a rarely discussed option in line with the spirit of a cooperative Brexit that would allow the UK to negotiate its own trade deals prior to leaving the EU without violating EU law: the EU could re-empower the UK to conduct its own trade policy in lieu of continued participation in the CCP.[6] “Giving back control” to a single member state would be unprecedented but arguably justifiable in the exceptional case of a withdrawing member state. The UK could be granted the highly symbolic and practically important right to formally start its own trade negotiations. In return, it could make no less symbolic or important concessions regarding its conduct during its remaining time as an EU member state to prevent repercussions of the Brexit negotiations for the EU’s own trade and wider legislative agenda, in which the UK will continue to have a say until it has formally left the EU.

I have no doubt that a cooperative Brexit would require political will that may well be lacking. But to suggest that this is “the end of law and the return of politics” is a blatant overstatement.[7] This article aims to show how EU law has framed the Brexit debate and will continue to do so. Section 2 will start by outlining the “supranational law of Brexit” by which I mean all EU law that is pertinent to the withdrawal process. While the now-famous article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) sets up a rudimentary structure for the withdrawal process, general principles of EU law fill the gaps. One of them is the principle of sincere cooperation whose implications (and inherent limitations) for the Brexit negotiations I will explore in Section 3 to outline what “cooperative Brexit” entails. The ensuing section applies this concept to the contentious area of trade policy and discusses the possibility of “giving back control,” i.e. re-empowering the UK to conduct its own trade policy. Section 5 concludes by contrasting “cooperative Brexit” with “confrontational Brexit” which is likely to lead to economic disaster, but also inadvertently increases the remote chance of “Bremain,” i.e. no Brexit at all, with the UK ultimately staying within the EU.

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Published on July 6, 2017
Author:          Filed under: Editorials

Constitutional Amendments in an Age of Populism (I-CONnect Column)

Aslı Bâli, UCLA School of Law

[Editor’s note: This is one of our biweekly I-CONnect columns. Columns, while scholarly in accordance with the tone of the blog and about the same length as a normal blog post, are a bit more “op-ed” in nature than standard posts. For more information about our four columnists for 2017, see here.]

In my last post, I considered how to understand referenda in a context in which populists harness the engine of democratic processes to undermine basic democratic commitments.  Of course, the question of democratic legitimacy is all the more acute when a referendum is used for the purpose of constitutional amendment. For this reason procedural protections to ensure that inclusive and deliberative participation is facilitated, rather than foreclosed, by the referendum is critical. But passing from procedural considerations to substantive ones, what are the criteria by which we may assess the democratic legitimacy of constitutional amendments themselves? Again, here, I turn to recent scholarship on this question.

Yaniv Roznai’s new book Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments is an excellent starting point. In the book, Roznai considers the limitations placed on the constitutional amendment power in democratic orders and interrogates the circumstances under which amendments may be deemed unconstitutional. In many circumstances, constitutions contain explicit clauses that set particular provisions apart as unamendable or place specific procedural limitations on the amendment power. In other cases, there are “implied limitations…imposed on amendment powers in order to preserve the constitution’s identity.”[1] The theory underlying both kinds of limitations is that a constitution is an expression of the original primary constituent power that brings into existence a secondary constituent power that is explicitly or implicitly limited and “cannot modify the basic pillars underpinning its constitutional authority so as to change the constitution’s identity.”[2] The theory also addresses the judicial enforcement of unamendability, arguing that under certain circumstances constitutional courts may properly review the validity of constitutional amendments by reference to unamendable provisions, other explicit (often procedural) limitations on secondary constituent power or conflicts generated between constitutional amendments.

Of course, there are limitations to the theory of constitutional unamendability. In a recent article, Roznai addresses these when examining efforts to entrench secularism in constitutions. Here Roznai acknowledges that the sustained entrenchment of any constitutional principle depends on the general acceptance of the values it reflects. This acceptance, in turn, is the product of “a complicated deliberative process that can establish political consensus.” [3] The democratic validity of constitutional entrenchment depends on the exercise of the original constituent power of the people to establish and entrench their normative constitutional identity. But if that identity should change and the values originally entrenched no longer command consensus, that same original constituent power may be invoked to renegotiate those values explicitly or implicitly.

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Published on July 5, 2017
Author:          Filed under: Analysis

2017 ICON-S Annual Mega-Conference Begins Today!

Richard Albert, Boston College Law School

The 2017 ICON-S annual mega-conference begins today in Copenhagen, hosted by the University of Copenhagen’s Faculty of Law and iCourts – the Danish National Research Foundation’s Center for Excellence on International Courts. The theme for the program is “Courts, Power, and Public Law.” The conference runs July 5-7, 2017.

As in previous years, this edition of the ICON-S conference features plenary panels and hundreds of concurrent panels. An outline of the program is pasted below. Full details about the program are available here.

Congratulations and good luck to the hosts and organizers, and welcome to all to this year’s edition of the ICON-S conference!

Program Outline

Wednesday, July 5, 2017

13h00 – 16h00
Radisson Blu Scandinavia Hotel

Opening Remarks

Professor Gráinne de Búrca, NYU
Co-President, ICON-S

Professor Mikael Rask Madsen
Director of iCourts, University of Copenhagen

Keynote Address

Professor Bryan Stevenson
Equal Justice Initiative/NYU

Plenary Panel I: Global Economic Injustice

Professor Bhupinder Chimni
Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi

Professor Katharina Pistor
Columbia Law School

Professor Joseph H.H. Weiler

Moderator: Professor Erika De Wet, University of Pretoria

17h00 – 18h30
Faculty of Law – University of Copenhagen

Parallel Panels Session I


Cocktail reception

Thursday, July 6, 2017

9h00 – 10h30
Faculty of Law – University of Copenhagen

Parallel Panels Session II

11h00 – 12h30 

Parallel Panels Session III

14h00 – 15h30

Plenary Panel II: High Courts and Political Power: A Conversation with Three Prominent Jurists

Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin
Supreme Court of Canada

Justice Marta Cartabia
Vice President of the Constitutional Court of Italy

Judge András Sajó
Central European University

Moderator: Professor Ran Hirschl, University of Toronto

16h00 – 17h30 p.m.

Parallel Panels Session IV

Friday, July 7, 2017

9h00 – 10h30
Faculty of Law – University of Copenhagen

Parallel Panels Session V

10h45 – 12h15 

Parallel Panels Session VI

12h30 – 14h00

Plenary Panel III: International Courts in the 21st Century

President Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi
International Criminal Court (ICC)

Shaheed Fatima
Senior Counsel, UK

Professor Mikael Rask Madsen
University of Copenhagen

Moderator: Professor Phoebe Okowa, Queen Mary

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Published on July 5, 2017
Author:          Filed under: Developments

ICON’s Current Issue (Table of Contents)

 Volume 15 Issue 2

 Table of Contents



Rodrigo Álvarez. The times they are a-changin’ . . .: Challenges in Latin America


Daniel Brinks and Abby Blass, Rethinking judicial empowerment: The new foundations of constitutional justice

Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, The forgotten people in Brazilian constitutionalism: Revisiting strategic behavior analyses of regime transitions

Symposium: Democracy and Regional Human Rights Courts: Enemies, Allies, or Both?

Andreas Follesdal, Democracy and Regional Human Rights Courts: An Introduction

Andreas Follesdal, Exporting the margin of appreciation: Lessons for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Leiry Cornejo Chavez, New remedial responses in the practice of regional human rights courts: Purposes beyond compensation

Marisa Iglesias Vila, Subsidiarity, margin of appreciation and international adjudication from a cooperative conception of human rights

I.CON: Debate!

Jorge Contesse, The final word? Constitutional dialogue and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Paolo G. Carozza and Pablo González, The final word? Constitutional dialogue and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: A Reply to Jorge Contesse

Jorge Contesse, The final word? Constitutional dialogue and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: A rejoinder to Paolo Carozza and Pablo González

Critical Review of Governance

Jorge González-Jácome, From abusive constitutionalism to a multilayered understanding of constitutionalism. Lessons from Latin America

Sergio Verdugo, Birth and decay of the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal (1970-1973). The irony of a wrong electoral prediction

Critical Review of Jurisprudence

Luis Roberto Barroso, Juliano Zaiden Benvindo and Aline Osorio, Developments in Brazilian constitutional law: The year 2016 in review

Derek O’Brien, Developments in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The year 2016 in review

Book Reviews

Diana Kapiszewski, High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil (Paula Gorzoni)

Marcus André Melo & Carlos Pereira. Making Brazil Work: Checking the President in a Multiparty System (Virgílio Afonso da Silva)

Adriana Vidal de Oliveira. Constituição e Direito das Mulheres: Uma Análise dos Esterótipos de Gênero na Assembleia Constituinte e suas consequências no Texto Constitucional (Marcia Nina Bernardes)

Thamy Pogrebinschi, Judicialização ou representação?: Política, direito e democracia no Brasil (Monaliza O. da Silva)

Alberto F. Garay. La doctrina del precedente en la Corte Suprema (Santiago Legarre)

Santiago Legarre. Obligatoriedad atenuada de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (Alberto B. Bianchi)

Marcial Antonio Rubio Correa. El Test de Proporcionalidad en la Jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional Peruano (Maria Bertel)

César Rodríguez Garavito y Diana Rodríguez Franco. Cortes y Cambio Social. Cómo la Corte Constitucional Transformó el Desplazamiento Forzado en Colombia; César Rodríguez-Garavito and Diana Rodríguez-Franco. Radical Deprivation on Trial. The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in the Global South (Julio Ríos-Figueroa)

Diego E. López-Medina. Eslabones del Derecho; Diego E. López-Medina. El Derecho de los Jueces (Vicente F. Benítez-R.)

Andrea Castagnola & Saul Lopez Noriega (eds.). Judicial Politics in Mexico: The Supreme Court and the Transition to Democracy (Mariana Velasco Rivera)

Patricio Zapata Larraín. La casa de todos. La Nueva Constitución que Chile merece y necesita (José Manuel Díaz de Valdés J.)

Roberto Gargarella, The Legal Foundations of Inequality: Constitutionalism in the Americas, 1776–1860 (Joel Colón-Ríos)

Jeffrey Davis. Seeking Human Rights Justice in Latin America. Truth, Extra-Territorial Courts, and the Process of Justice (Marcela Prieto R.)

Daniel Bonilla Maldonado (ed.). Constitutionalism of the Global South (Roberto Gargarella)

Roberto Gargarella. Castigar al Prójimo. Por una Refundación Democrática del Derecho Penal (Rocío Lorca Ferreccio)

Fernando Atria. La Forma del Derecho (Martín Hevia and Felipe Jiménez)

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Published on July 4, 2017
Author:          Filed under: Editorials