—Emílio Peluso Neder Meyer, Federal University of Minas Gerais, and Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, University of Brasília
Brazil’s next elections will be held on Sunday, October 2. More than any other political event since the country’s transition to democracy in 1985, these elections are an inflection point for Brazil’s near and long future. Depending on what comes out of the ballot box, it will define whether the country will strengthen its democracy or will move even further towards illiberalism. If Lula da Silva, who is leading the polls, wins, it will certainly be a relief: a pragmatist center-left politician and a former president (2003-2010), his government will be challenging after years of political crises, institutional disruption, and social divide, but it is a needed first step to reverse Brazil’s course against its democracy. On the other hand, if Jair Bolsonaro, the incumbent, wins, Brazil will be moving closer to that point where “he can hardly be removed by democratic means later.”[1] This diagnosis is in accordance with what several scholars have sustained as serious markers of a democracy on the verge of collapse,[2] and re-election of would-be autocrats, such as Bolsonaro, is normally depicted as a leading sign that, from that moment onwards, it is already too late to reverse democratic erosion. But what about the other variables that are less black and white in the scenario that Bolsonaro wins? And what about the challenges that Lula da Silva will face once in office?
The most likely scenario: Lula wins
Polls have shown that there is an increasing consolidation of the distance between Lula and Bolsonaro in the Brazilian presidential elections’ race. As elections approach, public figures that would supposedly support other candidates have migrated to Lula’s electorate, claiming that a strategic vote can bar Bolsonaro from attempting anything plainly unconstitutional after the voting results are released. The general feeling is that Brazil needs that Bolsonaro be defeated by a landslide victory in the first round to throw cold water in the likely scenario of Bolsonaro contesting the results, though he will most certainly do it. Still, even if the elections end in the second round, polls are still showing an even greater distance between both. Only a dramatic shift in people’s minds could thus alter such a scenario, which has been rather stable for over one year.
Therefore, it seems that Lula da Silva’s challenges are more related not to the elections themselves, but to his future government, which will take place in a significantly more problematic social and institutional environment. Inequality, the most damaging feature for Brazil’s rule of law,[3] is now higher than before, and social welfare, which had greatly improved in the new constitutional order,[4] has declined. Not only would Lula have to make the most of the recent economic growth, but he would also need to advance an agenda that goes beyond the traditional neoliberal repertoire. He was quite successful when he took office in 2003 to stabilize the economy and make it grow by strengthening some pillars of Brazil’s economic framework, while advancing a social agenda that gained momentum especially after the world’s 2008 economic crisis. Yet, the challenges are huge as labor has become more precarious, unemployment is still high after the pandemic, and inflation has escalated, with especially grave effects on the poor. The balance between fiscal constraints and social demands will be one such demanding tasks that will certainly place economic minds in several disputes.
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