In a post last week, I argued that the South African Constitutional Court’s first stage of socio-economic rights decisions threaded a needle by enforcing such rights, yet accommodating separation of powers concerns. This new post discusses the second of the Court’s three stages. In this second stage, the Constitutional Court also dealt with several cases in which homeless people were evicted from land where they were “squatting.” Yet in these cases, the Court eventually ordered any municipalities seeking eviction to participate in “meaningful engagement” with the vulnerable community, and ensure that reasonable alternative circumstances were provided. Moreover, the Court essentially encouraged the squatters to return if the government was intransigent. This created a strong incentive for the municipality to treat the “squatters” with dignity. One such case was Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road & Others v. City of Johannesburg, CCT 24/07 (2008). What’s legally innovative about the “meaningful engagement” approach is that it is a kind of forced alternative dispute resolution, in a structural class action type context.
Jurist reports that Turkey’s constitutional court has over-turned a law allowing for civilian prosecution of military personnel in civilian courts. The report describes the law as being a barrier to EU accession, but the real politics are likely domestic: the law was promulgated in part to facilitate investigation of military officials and others who were involved in the alleged plot against the ruling Justice and Development Party. Scholars of the constitutional court have long viewed it as leaning toward the secular statist pole of Turkish politics, as evidenced by its repeated willingness to uphold challenges to ban Islamist political parties. This decision seems quite consistent with that overall approach. We welcome further comment from those more familiar with the local politics!
“The Court’s conception of electoral fairness … is consistent with the egalitarian model of elections adopted by Parliament as an essential component of our democratic society. This model is premised on the notion that individuals should have an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Under this model, wealth is the main obstacle to equal participation. Thus, the egalitarian model promotes an electoral process that requires the wealthy to be prevented from controlling the electoral process to the detriment of others with less economic power.” [para. 62; internal citations omitted]
“Speech,” wrote Justice Kennedy, “is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.” [p. 23]
Moreover, “political speech is indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.” [p. 33; internal citations omitted]
All of which, for Justice Kennedy and the majority, suggests that “the appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.” [p. 44]
here is a question from Mongolia, where the parliament is considering drafting a statute on constitutional amendments. Some countries have specific statutes to cover the procedure for proposing and passing an amendment, filling in details not contained in the constitution. Do any readers have examples of such statutes? Please let us know by comment if so.
Last week’s Senate election in Massachusetts had many of us thinking about the merits and demerits of the filibuster. A basic question that sprang to mind, given the well-known malapportionment of the Senate, was this: what percent of Americans are represented by the 41 would-be filibusterers? I was supremely disappointed by cyberspace to find that no one had done the calculation. After all, one of the perennial knocks on the filibuster is that the recalcitrant minority could theoretically represent as little as 10% of the population, if that set of Senators were from the smallest states.
Thankfully, Abby Blass, a graduate student here at the University of Texas has put these data together and done us all a great service. By her calculations the 41 Republicans represent 36% of Americans (assuming that each Senator represents half of his or her state). One way to think about that finding is that the constituents of the minority Senators are are only slightly over-represented. In that view, malapportionment has not resulted in a disturbingly small filibuster-capable minority.
The flip side, of course, is that Democratic Senators represent 64% of the population, and as such, speak for slightly more than the magic 3/5 supermajority of Americans. Should the Democrats decide to push through a health care bill by “reconciliation” or the “nuclear/constitutional” option (both of which seem unlikely), the fact that Democratic voters are underrepresented in the Senate might be part of the sales pitch. This is not to say that Republicans, much less the growing tea-party movement, will buy any of it.
Either way you view it, it’s nice to have the facts.
Last week, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for a municipal government to offer city-owned land without charge for the site of a Shinto shrine. The ruling by the top court’s Grand Bench upheld the contention of the plaintiffs that the municipal government of Sunagawa, Hokkaido had violated the constitutional requirement of a separation of church and state when it granted city land to the shrine without charge. The court said that “It is inevitable that the general public would believe the local government supports a specific religion if it provides specific benefits to it.” This case follows squarely the 1997 Ehime Case in which the court ruled that it was unconstitutional for a prefectural government to fund offerings to Shinto Shrines.
The broader structural question, beyond the scope of this case, is whether the Japanese Supreme Court will assume a more activist stance in over-ruling government action now that the long-ruling Liberal Democrats have lost power. This would certainly be the prediction of political science studies of courts. Even though the specifics of this case do not fit the logic of our theories of “hegemonic preservation” or “political insurance” in which prospective losers seek to empower the court to constrain government later on, the court itself may feel freer to strike government action now that there is no longer a dominant party that can easily constrain the court. This is the second ruling of unconstitutionality in less than two years; the previous sixty one years of constitutional practice had yielded only seven such instances.
Thanks to Tokujin Matsudaira for the tip on the case!
The South African Constitutional Court has issued internationally significant decisions abolishing the death penalty, legalizing same-sex marriage, and ruling that their Constitution’s socio-economic rights provision are enforceable rather than aspirational. The socio-economic rulings are among the first of their kind internationally with some exceptions (for example, India and Columbia). Yet the Constitutional Court has recently reached a troubling third stage in its socio-economic cases. This will be the first of three posts explaining what has transpired.
The first stage was embodied in decisions such as Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), where the Court found that the national government violated Section 26 of the Constitution’s guarantee of access to housing, because the government acted unreasonably in having no policy to shelter the homeless. While honoring the right, the Court left the remedy to the government because of separation of powers and other concerns. The Court went a step further in Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) by ordering the government to provide a drug, to pregnant women with AIDS, that would prevent transmission of the disease to their babies. The Court said the government’s refusal was unreasonable in light of Section 27’s guarantee of the right to access health care. Cass Sunstein has argued that both cases adopted an “administrative law” model of deference to the government, in terms of the reasonableness test. The government, however, must also take action to progressively realize the right. These cases refused, though, to impose “minimum core” obligations on the government because the Court said that would be too rigid, especially in light of scarce resources and other factors. South African scholars have generally criticized the decisions for not adopting a minimum core, though I have written extensively about why that criticism is mistaken as have others. Interestingly, former Constitutional Court Justice Richard Goldstone recently stated that “future litigants are open to raise the (minimum core) issue on the basis of an adequate factual record in the trial court.” Gauri, Brinks, Eds., “Courting Social Justice” xii (Cambridge 2008) The next post will discuss the second stage of the Court’s decisions.
In 2010, most Latin American countries celebrate the bicentennial anniversary of the start of their wars of independence from Spain. Mexico, in addition, celebrates the centennial anniversary of its social revolution. In part because “we cannot afford to waste this year’s symbolic political energy” (words of the Secretary of the Interior), and in part to divert the attention from the war on drugs, Mexican President Felipe Calderón has launched a “Decalogue” of political reforms to update the rules of the political game for the young Mexican democracy. According to the government’s proposal, the reforms have two main objectives: to facilitate the coordination among branches of government and to bring the citizens closer to the political system. The reforms include establishing the possibility of reelection, for up to twelve years, of local officials and legislators at the state and federal levels; giving a certain number of citizens the power to propose legislative initiatives; strengthening the Executive’s veto and legislative initiative; establishing a run-off election for the Presidency; and giving to the Supreme Court the power to present legislative initiatives in matters related to the judiciary.
This is not the first time that Mexican politicians propose a “structural reform” of the political system. In fact, since the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) proposals from different parties have been at the table. But after much discussion, at the end nothing happens. Because these political reforms imply constitutional amendments, the consensus needed to accomplish them (supermajorities in both legislative chambers and approval from a majority of state legislatures) has fallen short in many occasions. For years, the opposing political forces have agreed to reform mainly the electoral system successfully leveling the playing field in a series of reforms that, spanning the last thirty years of the last century, ended up with the defeat of the PRI in the 2000 presidential election. The first non-PRIísta president, however, inherited a constitutional framework self-made by the hegemonic party that governed the country without interruptions for seventy years.
It is not clear if the political rules of the game will be transformed this time. For some, given the fragmentation of the political system and the uncertainty over the electoral results of the next presidential election in 2012, only the reforms that distribute power and reduce the stakes of winning and losing have a real chance to pass. For others, different calculations by the political parties will play an important role. For instance, for the first time since 2000 there is a PRIísta pre-candidate that has real chances of winning back the presidency. Will this expectation be sufficient to motivate the PRI to strengthen the legislative powers of the president? How would the current executive and his party, the PAN, react to this calculus? I will keep track of the reform process and post the news in our blog.
We have a new blogger coming soon. Mark Kende is the James Madison Chair Professor in Constitutional Law and Director of the Drake University Constitutional Law Center, which was endowed by the U.S. Congress. He is the author of “Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the United States” (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). He is also the co-author of a forthcoming casebook on comparative constitutional law with Lexis Publishing. Professor Kende is a two time Fulbright Scholar, and former Chair of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Constitutional Law as well as of its Section on Africa. Besides the U.S., he has published or lectured in Australia, Canada, China, Columbia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France (at the Sorbonne in French), Germany, Hong Kong, Moldova, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom (at Oxford), and elsewhere. He has been a Visiting Professor at Notre Dame Law School, the University of Tennessee Law School, the University of Nantes (France), as well as the University of Durban and the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa. He serves on the Board of Advisors of the University of Hong Kong Center on Comparative Law. He has co-taught classes with several U.S. Supreme Court Justices and worked as an attorney with Barack Obama.
Four recent papers, each one excellent, merit the attention of readers with an interest in comparative constitutional law.
The first, Studying Japanese Law Because It’s There, is an essay by Tom Ginsburg, my colleague here at the Comparative Constitutions Blog. Recently published in the American Journal of Comparative Law, this very important paper states in compelling fashion the case for the intrinsic scholarly benefits, as opposed to the purely practical applications, of the comparative enterprise.
Readers will also be interested in Government in Opposition, an exceptional piece written by David Fontana, another fellow blogger. In this piece, which appears in the Yale Law Journal, Professor Fontana illuminates a fascinating development in constitutional design: an emergent form of separated powers in which governing power is shared between electoral winners and losers.
A third article worthy of readers’ attention comes from the pen of Fiona De Londras and Suzanna Kingston, and appears in the American Journal of Comparative Law. In Rights, Security and Conflicting International Obligations, Professors De Londras and Kingston probe the decisional methodology of the European Court of Justice, the Council of Europe, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the courts of the European Union on the balance between security and rights.
Finally, let me note the paper of Lorenzo Zucca on Montesquieu, Methodological Pluralism and Comparative Constitutional Law. In this piece, Zucca applies the insights of Montesquieu to comparative constitutionalism, arguing, quite sensibly and persuasively, that the best comparisons exhibit a careful appreciation of history, political practice, sociology as well as moral psychology and evolutionary biology. Professor Zucca’s paper is a wonderful contribution to our continuing conversation on comparative constitutionalism.
I recommend all four papers enthusiastically.