Recently, Tom Ginsburg described in this blog some of the proposed constitutional amendments for the Egyptian Constitution and flagged Tamir Moustafa’s brief analysis of them in foreign policy. It is also worth drawing people’s attention to commentary by two other commentators with long experience watching Egyptian constitutional developments. Each has just today posted interesting thoughts
On The New Republic’s website on February 2, 2011, Thomas Carothers suggested that those leading the Egyptian transition might want to draw some lessons from the experience of Indonesia. He notes several aspects of the Indonesian transition from the regime of Suharto to a new regime that, he believes, helped Indonesia achieve what was, in
Andrew Arato has kindly contributed the following post: “Egypt’s Transformation: Revolution, Coup, Regime Change, or All of the above?”: Among those who believe that in the modern world democracy is a universal value, all have been inspired, amazed and totally convinced by the Egyptian democratic movement. It has accomplished the country’s liberation from its gerontocratic,
Given recent amendments to the Constitution, trying to oust the NDP regime in a formally constitutional manner will delay Mubarak’s formal retirement as head of state for a considerable period and might require significant concessions to current NDP elites. The current Egyptian constitution was enacted in 1971. It was officially named “the Permanent Constitution.” Its
As I noted in my last post, under the current constitutional scheme in Egypt, elites in the ruling National Democratic Party can hold hostage the “legality” of any quick regime change. To recap: Under the current constitution, as soon as the president is forced out, elections must be held within 2 months and must be
There is an ingenious device that one finds in the Egyptian constitution—one analogous to some of the “poison pills” that corporations occasionally adopt to prevent hostile takeover. If a President resigns or is otherwise removed, power will be transferred to high officials appointed to their office by the President. Not surprisingly the people in those
Over the summer a new chief justice was appointed to the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt (the SCC). The appointment of Farouk Sultan was controversial in Egypt. Justice Sultan does not have a distinguished judicial background and is widely thought to lack independence from the executive . The appointment raises all sorts of interesting questions
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