[re-posted from New Mandala] While Burma watchers continue to debate the extent of and motives behind Naypyitaw’s current reform process (see here for my take), there seems to be much wider agreement that the 2008 Constitution is a deeply flawed document. Indiana University Maurer School of Law Professor David C. Williams calls it the “worst

Notes from Behind the Bench
Willy Forbath and John Ferejohn (visiting from NYU) are running a unique colloquium at Texas this spring. They’ve invited six of the leading justices from constitutional courts around the world to visit and share insights from their time on the bench. Yesterday, Manuel Jose Cepeda of Colombia’s constitutional court — widely viewed as one

Iraq’s Constitutional Review Committee Delivers its Final Report to Parliament
The Iraq Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) submitted its final report to the Iraq Parliament on July 27 with little notice or fanfare – over two and half years after it began its constitutionally mandated comprehensive review, the report comes in at 68 pages (in English) and represents dozens of proposed amendments to the 2005 Constitution.

Untitled
The Iraq Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) just submitted its final report to Parliament – over two and half years after it began its constitutionally mandated comprehensive review, the report comes in at 65 pages (in English) and represents dozens of amendments to the 2005 Constitution. The report contains a number of important substantive recommendations that

The Puzzle of Unamendable Provisions: Debate-Impairing Rules vs. Substantive Entrenchment
Many constitutions purport to make some provisions immune from ordinary amendment processes. The Constitution of Turkey, for example, states that the character of the country as a secular democracy and republic cannot be changed, and forbids any proposal to amend these provisions. Thailand’s constitution entrenches the monarch as head of state. Other countries purport to

Albert on Amendments
An article posted on SSRN, written by Richard Albert from Boston College Law School, might be of interest to our readers. Here is the summary: The constitutional text in a constitutional democracy does not necessarily constrain constitutional change. Quite the contrary, constitutional change in a constitutional democracy often occurs in ways that depart from the