—Richard Albert, Boston College Law School
In this first installment of I-CONnect’s interview series, I speak with Ozan Varol about his forthcoming paper on Temporary Constitutions. In his new paper, Professor Varol explores the costs and benefits of designing temporary constitutions. A temporary constitution, as Professor Varol defines it, “limits its own term and lapses at its expiration date unless re-enacted through regular constitutional amendment procedures.”
In our 13-minute interview, Professor Varol situates his thesis against the prevailing understanding of constitution-making. He also illuminates when it might be preferable for constitutional designers to entrench a temporary constitution rather than a durable or permanent one. Professor Varol also addresses the relevance of temporary constitutions to the constitutional reconstructions underway in the Arab World.
The full interview is available here.
Suggested Citation: Richard Albert, New Scholarship Review: Interview with Ozan Varol, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, September 2, 2013, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/09/interview-with-ozan-varol